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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is composed of three projects applying non-classical logic to problems
in history of philosophy and philosophy of logic.
The main component concerns Descartes’ Creation Doctrine (CD) – the doctrine that
while truths concerning the essences of objects (eternal truths) are necessary, God had vol-
untary control over their creation, and thus could have made them false. First, I show a
flaw in a standard argument for two interpretations of CD. This argument, stated in terms
of non-normal modal logics, involves a set of premises which lead to a conclusion which
Descartes explicitly rejects. Following this, I develop a multimodal account of CD, ac-
cording to which Descartes is committed to two kinds of modality, and that the apparent
contradiction resulting from CD is the result of an ambiguity. Finally, I begin to develop
two modal logics capturing the key ideas in the multi-modal interpretation, and provide
some metatheoretic results concerning these logics which shore up some of my interpretive
claims.
The second component is a project concerning the Channel Theoretic interpretation of
the ternary relation semantics of relevant and substructural logics. Following Barwise, I de-
velop a representation of Channel Composition, and prove that extending the implication-
conjunction fragment of B by composite channels is conservative. Finally, I argue that
standard accounts of negation in the tradition of relevant logic are ill-suited to this interpre-
tation, with the axiom form of contraposition the culprit.
The final component is a project concerning the implication fragment of Frege’s Grund-
gesetze. In Grundgesetze, unlike Begriffsschrift, Frege uses a proof system consisting of
few axioms and many rules – as Peter Schroeder-Heister noticed, this proof system bears a
striking resemblance to Gentzen’s sequent calculi. I note that while the system does bear
this striking resemblance, one of the structural features of Gentzen style systems, the cut
rule, has additional duties in Frege’s system. Not only does it perform cut, but also per-
forms structural manipulations on sets of premises which are more usually built in to the
data type of the premise sequent. I discuss the features of Frege’s system which result in
the cut rule having this property.
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This dissertation is in the broad subject of philosophical logic – the application of logic to
problems in philosophy, and the methodology throughout tends toward the model theoretic.
So the approach to philosophical logic most in evidence in this dissertation is that of using
model theoretic tools, in particular tools from relational semantics for modal and non-
classical logics, to characterise and solve philosophical problems.
There are three projects undertaken in this dissertation, all of which share this approach
to philosophical logic. In this introduction, I shall describe these projects, the structure of
the dissertation, and discuss themes running through the work here.
The first, and most substantial, project in the dissertation concerns the problem of in-
terpreting Descartes’ Creation Doctrine – this is, in short, the view that God has volun-
tary control over the creation of truths concerning the essences of objects (called “eternal
truths”). Descartes holds that this is the case, and so seems to hold that eternal truths are
possibly false, while elsewhere seems to be committed to the necessity of these truths.
Finding a consistent interpretation compatible with the text concerning the creation doc-
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trine has been a major subject of work in Descartes scholarship for many years. There are
a number of extant interpretations, but for my purposes in this introduction, two of them
are particularly salient. The first, due to Harry Frankfurt [30], called universal possibil-
ism, holds that Descartes’s commitment to the creation doctrine just shows that Descartes
is not committed to the claim that eternal truths are necessary – indeed, Frankfurt holds
that Descartes is committed to the claim that no propositions are necessary, and that all are
merely possible. The second, due to E.M. Curley [23], called limited possibilism, holds
that while Descartes is not committed to the claim that all propositions are possible, he is
committed to the claim that all propositions are possibly possible. Curley goes on to give a
natural deduction argument in non-normal modal logic for limited possibilism, taking him-
self to have shown that Descartes is committed to the view. This same proof was altered by
van Cleve [76] to be an argument for universal possibilism – from which conclusion van
Cleve inferred that Descartes’ modal metaphysics is internally inconsistent.
Three of the chapters of this dissertation concern the creation doctrine. Chapter 2 –
The Creation Doctrine and Modal Arguments for Possibilism – shows that the premises
of the natural deduction argument given by Curley (and those in the argument given by
van Cleve) deliver a conclusion which Descartes explicitly rejects. This conclusion, stated
informally, if that if God wills a proposition to be necessary, then God was necessitated
to will that proposition true. Descartes seems to indicate that God’s willing a proposition
to be necessary does not entail God’s being necessitated to will it, and so the premises
invoked by Curley and van Cleve already miss their mark. The key upshot of this chapter
is that Descartes may not be committed to universal or limited possibilism, and that other
interpretations, perhaps incompatible with these, are available.
Chapter 3 – A Multimodal Interpretation of Descartes’ Creation Doctrine – goes on
to develop such an alternative interpretation. This is one according to which Descartes’
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writing hide an ambiguity between at least two distinct metaphysical modalities. One pair
of which, the i-modalities, concern truths about the actual essences of created things, and
the other of which, the o-modalities, concern truths about any essences God might have
created, or assigned to created things. In this chapter, I first develop this view against
the background of universal and limited possibilism, to show that the multimodal view
is a natural combination of these, and then go on to consider in more detail Cartesian
essences, God’s relationship to these essences, and the relationship between i-modalities, o-
modalities, and epistemic modality in the sense of conceivability. Along the way, I consider
various details about the interpretation, compare it to other extant interpretations, and argue
(informally) that the interpretation is consistent, and that according to the interpretation,
Descartes’ modal commitments are not especially bizarre.
Chapter 4 – Two Logics of Variable Essence – begins the process of developing a robust,
rigorous model theory capturing the multimodal interpretation developed in Chapter 3. The
core moves here are that there are two pairs of modal operators, one corresponding to the
i-, the other to the o-modalities, and that objects have some of their properties essentially,
with an object’s essential properties at a world being a set of properties (in extension), and
yet these can differ across the set of worlds in a model. Against this background, I develop
two logics. The first sets the elements above against a simple background of a Kripke
model with elements (worlds) which are consistent and closed under classical logic. This,
the logic of classical variable essences (or CVE) is simple, and I provide a sound and
complete proof system, as well as some further machinery to characterise it’s models. The
second logic allows for models with worlds at which the non-modal logical vocabulary can
exhibit different behaviour – for instance, where negation doesn’t obey the usual Boolean
rules. This, the logic of non-classical variable essences (NVE) is introduced, and some
results are proved characterising its models, and comparing it to CVE. Some results are
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proved to show that these logics capture key elements of the creation doctrine, and some
further results are given which suggest, by way of proving some key lemmata, that the
logics are consistent, and conservative extensions of classical S5. These two are formal
analogues to the claims made in Chapter 3 – that the interpretation is consistent, and is not
modally bizarre.
Chapter 5 – Channel Composition and Ternary Relation Semantics – is a paper concern-
ing the project of modelling the flow of information using the ternary relation semantics.
On this picture, the ternary relation itself Rαβγ is to be interpreted as saying “α is chan-
nel permitting information flow between various states of information – in particular, it
permits flow from the signal β to the target γ”. The account of information flow over chan-
nels, originally proposed by Barwise [4], was fitted to the ternary relation semantics by
Restall [59], and a number of others. The result is a reading of the ternary relation seman-
tics wherein the points in a ternary relation frame are information states (closed under First
Degree Entailment (or some sublogic of this, depending on the logical connectives under
consideration)), the ternary relation is understood in these channel theoretic terms, and the
various frame constraints placed on the ternary relation to get different logics have intuitive
interpretations in terms of the operations of channels. Among the core requirements laid
out by Barwise are that channels may be defined in terms of other channels – given two
channels α, β, one can compose them either in parallel, or in series. Restall has proposed
reading serial composition in terms of the relevant connective of fusion ◦. This provides
a relatively natural reading of the semantics, but it has two major downsides. It collapses
together the action of composing two information channels and the action of applying a
channel to a signal (which ◦ always models in the ternary relation semantics) – these ac-
tions are clearly distinct. Second, and of more formal interest, Restall’s approach winds up
barring the channel theoretic interpretation of very weak relevant logics. For his account to
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work, ◦ must be associative – that is, R must obey frame constraints corresponding to the
combinators B, B′ – and some interesting logics fail this test – particularly the basic system
of the ternary relation semantics B, and some of the depth relevant systems proposed by
Sylvan and Brady over the years, like DJ, DW, and MC. These logics are of interest for a
number of reasons, and this reading of the ternary relation semantics would be better for
incorporating them.
In the paper, I propose a different definition of channel composition which looks much
more like the usual function composition than Restall’s account. I prove that the set of
models of the conjunction-implication fragment of B – called B∧ – which have points be-
having as composite channels (as I define them) enforces the same consequence relation as
the full set of B∧. The upshot is that for B∧ my proposed interpretation fits nicely. How-
ever, the argument I give does not extend to B with the language including disjunction or
negation. The most interesting connective is negation, because the reason seems to be that
on standard ways of interpreting negation in the ternary relation semantics, the axiom form
of contraposition seems to require an implausible frame constraint on the ternary relation
– that is, implausible under the channel theoretic interpretation. The upshot is that some
other way of interpreting negation is required, or that the channel theoretic interpretation
runs into serious trouble in the realm of weak logics in the ternary relation family.
Chapter 6 – Structural Features of the Implication Fragment of Frege’s Grundgesetze
– concerns the interesting proof system developed by Frege in the Grundgesetze. In the
Begriffsschrift, Frege’s proof system looks very much like a Hilbert style axiomatic sys-
tem. In the Grundgesetze, he changes this and adopts a system with a limited set of axioms
and a large number of rules. Schroeder-Heister [70] noted that this system was more like a
Gentzen-style sequent calculus than an axiomatic system, and proposed a sequent system
to capture Frege’s proof system. In this paper, I note that Frege’s system has an interesting
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structural feature which Schroeder-Heister’s presentation represses. The various ‘struc-
tural’ rules which Frege gives are stated in terms of left-nested conditional formulae, and
the cut rule seems to allow for the rearranging of conditional formulae into this left-nested
structure. This corresponds to the structural rule of associativity of the structural connec-
tive of sequent systems – which corresponds to the combinators B, B′. This structural rule
is, usually, cooked into the data type – the association of some list of the members of a
set, multiset, or sequence of formulae does not matter. In Frege’s system, it’s somewhat
different, as this structural rule is not apparent from the way he writes his formulae, and
its activity is built into his cut rule. I present a proof system which captures this feature of
Frege’s system, and discuss some salient details.
The projects here concern philosophical logic, all but Chapter 6 concern model theoretic
techniques in particular, and all but Chapter 5 concern the application of philosophical logic
in the study of historical figures in philosophy. While the dissertation consists in some
different projects, these projects are unified by a methodology, and a focus on interpretive
questions – I take it that interpreting the ternary relation semantics, and historical work in




Modal Arguments for Possibilism
2.1 The Creation Doctrine & Descartes’ Modal Metaphysics
The status of necessity and possibility in Descartes’ philosophy is a controversial and dif-
ficult topic, and there is a particular tension involving necessity and God’s will which has
troubled both his contemporaries and recent interpreters.
On on hand, most interpreters and commentators seem to agree that Descartes admits
the existence of some necessary truths.1 It certainly seems that Descartes holds that certain
mathematical and physical truths are necessary. He even seems to use possible worlds
as an intuition pump in favour of the claim that certain truths (laws) are such that ‘we
cannot but judge them infallible when we conceive them distinctly, nor doubt that, if God
1The claim that Descartes does admit some necessary truths has been questioned by ([30] Descartes on
the Creation. . . ). However, most accounts in this literature go the other way, and take it as read that Descartes
does accept some necessary truths. Sources discussing Descartes on necessary truth are many, but some which
are directly relevant to the issue of the creation doctrine include ([40] Descartes’ Creation Doctrine and . . . ;
[1] Descartes, Conceivability, and Logical Modality; [38] The Status of Necessity and Impossibility. . . ; [54]
Divine Simplicity and the Eternal. . . ; [13] Descartes’s Method and the. . . ) and ([22] Descartes’ Modal
Metaphysics) gives a survey of the landscape.
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had created many worlds, the laws would be as true in all of them as in this one.’ (Le
Monde, Ch. VII, AT 11:47, [19] The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Volume 12, p.
97)3 In correspondence, a class of truths which Descartes seems to assume are necessary is
referred to as the eternal truths, following a tradition in ancient and medieval philosophy
to characterize necessity in temporal terms.4
On the other hand, there is Descartes’ infamous doctrine that all truths are freely created
by God. This is a form of voluntarism regarding truth, but I shall follow Curley and refer to
this as the creation doctrine. This doctrine is expressed in a number of letters in Descartes’
correspondence, and is briefly discussed in some responses to objections to the Meditations.
It seems that Descartes held some version of the creation doctrine for much of the most
philosophically productive period of his life, as it is in evidence in his correspondence
from the Letter to Mersenne, 15 April 1630 (AT 1:135–147, CSMK,p. 23) to at least the
Letter to Mesland, 2 May 1644 (AT 4:111–120, CSMK, p. 235).5 So we are beholden to
take it seriously as a part of his broader metaphysical commitments.
With this gloss, it is straightforward to how these two commitments – to the existence
of necessary truths and to the creation doctrine – are in tension. Following Kaufman’s
presentation in ([40]) the difficulty can be laid out as between the following claims:
(i) Eternal truths are freely created by God.
(ii) Eternal truths are necessary.
2References to Descartes’ writing will be to the three volumes of the Cottingham et. al. collections in
English translation (along with page and volume numbers for the Adam-Tannery collections). Volume 1
([19]) will be cited as CSM1, volume 2 ([18]) as CSM2, and volume 3 ([20].) will be cited as CSMK.
3Too much weight should not be placed on this point of similarity with possible worlds semantics, and it
is at best a stretch to think of Descartes as any kind of possible worlds theorist.
4Some details on this tradition are available in Knuuttila’s SEP article Medieval Theories of Modality
([42]).
5Some of the relevant passages will be discussed later in the paper.
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(ii) simply notes that the eternal truths, including propositions from mathematics and physics
and, in addition, certain theological claims, are necessary according to Descartes. These
seem to be the kinds of truths which underwrite Descartes’ broader rationalist project, as
being those which we can clearly and distinctly perceive.
However, the creation doctrine is stated in universal generality – all truths are freely
created by God. It is commonly assumed, and Curley takes it to be part of the concept
of free action that when an agent does something freely, this means that they could have
done otherwise. (i) states that God’s creation of the eternal truths was free in just this way.
A plausible, though contested, consequence of (i) is that God could have made any eternal
truth false. From this it seems reasonable to draw the inference that for any eternal truth you
choose, God could have made it false. Let us use lower case Greek letters as variables for
propositions. It seems that ‘it is possible that God made φ false’ is a reasonable paraphrase
of ‘God could have made φ false.’ Hence, by an inference from (i), we can obtain:
(iii) For any eternal truth φ, it is possible that God made φ false.
However, (ii) can be naturally parsed as:
(ii)’ For any eternal truth φ, it is necessary that φ.
This makes the tension more clear. If (iii) is the case, it seems that any eternal truth could
have been false, had God chosen to make it false.6 It seems that Descartes is committed to
the existence of a class of claims which, though necessarily true, are possibly false.
This issue makes interpreting Descartes’ modal metaphysics a difficult project, and his
few explicit claims on the subject provide a number of constraints which restrict potential
interpretations. In addition to these textual restrictions, work by Curley and Van Cleve have
6Though this is a disputed conclusion, this is good enough to show the problem.
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attempted to further restrict this space. Curley in [23] gives an argument in modal logic
using premises which purport to express the core features of (i) and (ii), the conclusion of
which is limited possibilism. According to limited possibilism, while some propositions are
necessary, no propositions are necessarily necessary. Another way to put this point is to
say that all propositions are possibly possibly false, even those which are in fact necessary.
This interpretation is a response to the view presented in ([30]) that Descartes is committed
to the claim that every proposition is possible, which has been called universal possibilism.
Van Cleve in ([76] Destruction of the Eternal Truths) uses Curley’s argument structure,
with minor changes, to argue that Descartes is committed not only to limited possibilism,
but to universal possibilism, and that this commitment is inconsistent with Descartes’ other
commitments. It is Van Cleve’s contention that Descartes modal metaphysics is incoherent,
and that the creation doctrine seems the clear culprit.
Either of these consequences result in serious constraints on providing an interpretation
of creation doctrine. If Van Cleve is correct, then no intelligible interpretation can be given,
or at least no consistent interpretation. If Curley is correct, then any interpretation must be
consistent with limited possibilism.
My purpose in this paper is to show that the premise set and inference rules given by
Curley and Van Cleve do not express the commitments of Descartes’ modal metaphysics. I
argue that each author employs a premise and a principle of inference which allows one to
infer a consequence which directly contradicts an explicit claim made by Descartes on the
subject of the creation doctrine.
Namely, I shall argue that from Curley’s and Van Cleve’s premises and modal princi-
ples, we can infer the following Principle of Divine Necessitation (PDN):
(PDN) If God wills φ to be necessary, then it is necessary that God wills that φ.
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This consequence contradicts a claim made by Descartes in the correspondence with Mersenne:
And even if God has willed that some truths should be necessary, this does
not mean that He willed them necessarily; for it is one thing to will that they
be necessary, and quite another to will this necessarily, or to be necessitated to
will it.
(Letter to Mesland, 2 May 1644, AT 4:118–119, CSMK, p. 235)
This passage rules out the inference from ‘God wills that φ is necessary’ to ‘it is necessary
that God wills that φ’ – a statement of which can be inferred from the premises used by
Curley, and those used by Van Cleve in the course of their arguments. I argue that, as a
result, neither of their conclusions are among Descartes’ commitments. In section 2.2, I
shall argue that the logical tools I shall employ are suited to the project, despite the potential
objection that they are anachronistic or obscure. In section 2.3, I shall discuss Curley’s
argument for limited possibilism, giving some reasons why his premises should be taken
seriously as expressing Descartes’ metaphysics, and discuss a modal inference, Becker’s
Rule, which plays a substantial role in his argument. Then I’ll give his argument and show
how PDN can be inferred from Becker’s Rule and one of his premises. In section 2.4, I’ll
discuss Van Cleve’s argument and show how his assumptions also allow the derivation of
PDN. In section 2.5, I briefly discuss a minor variation on PDN discussed by Curley, and
argue that it is also derivable from Curley’s assumptions.
2.2 Why Use Logical Tools?
This paper employs some tools from non-normal modal logics to study features of Descartes’
modal metaphysics. Why would one want to do this?
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The reasons to take this kind of approach seriously are many, and I’ll start from the
general reasons why one ought to use formal tools when studying this question at all to the
more specific reasons why I shall use tools from non-normal modal logic in this paper.
2.2.1 Logical methods are a good fit for the problems raised by Cre-
ation Doctrine
The nature of the creation doctrine suggests logical tools because the questions which have
been raised by commentators are largely questions either to do with (a) whether Descartes’
modal metaphysics is coherent or, (b) whether Descartes’ modal principles are especially
bizarre. (a) has been raised by some of Descartes’ contemporaries (including those in the
correspondence) and more recently by ([76]) and ([32] Logic Matters, p. 179), both of
whom claim that Descartes’ total theory is incoherent (or “great nonsense” to use Geach’s
term). (b) has been raised by commentators, but perhaps most explicitly by ([39] The
Creation of the Eternal Truths, p. vii). Both (a) and (b) are issues which are quite naturally
addressed using logical tools. While it’s somewhat unclear what makes a theory incoherent,
a formal analogue is inconsistency, for which we do have a clear and rigorous definition.7
Then we have the question of whether Descartes’ theory is consistent, and this is a question
which is best solved using formal tools. A logical method for showing that a theory is
consistent is to build a model of the theory. Establishing that a theory is consistent in this
way goes some way towards showing that the theory is coherent and can be made sense of.
Certainly this doesn’t go all the way to showing that the theory is plausible, but it certainly
helps a theory’s case to be provably consistent. In most cases, we can generally assume
that a theory is consistent until we have some reason to suspect it isn’t, but in the case of
7One might claim that a coherent theory might be inconsistent, as would a dialetheist such as ([56] In
Contradiction), but I leave this point to the side.
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giving a theory of Descartes’ modal metaphysics, the question is on the table as to whether
one can give a consistent theory at all. So some kind of formal methodology is called for
by the nature of the criticisms raised against Descartes’ modal metaphysics.
More specifically, since the creation doctrine is a doctrine about how God’s will relates
to modal notions, it seems that some kind of modal logic is a natural way to think about
the problem, Descartes’ claims, and what those claims commit him to. While Descartes
himself did not and could not have known about modal logics in the modern sense, and
the toolkit I propose to bring to bear in dealing with his modal metaphysics, these tools
do allow us to provide a clearer picture of the consequences of Descartes’ claims. While I
don’t provide a model of the creation doctrine here, the possible models of the theory are
constrained by the claims to which Descartes is committed, so the argument of this paper is
relevant to the project of modelling the creation doctrine in that it provides a clearer picture
of the space of potential models.
2.2.2 Possibilisms and Non-Normal Modal Logics
More specifically, the use of non-normal modal logics is motivated by a couple of consid-
erations. First, I shall clarify what non-normal modal logics are and briefly describe some
of their salient features. The distinction between normal and non-normal modal logics is
naturally stated using the Kripke semantics for modal logics ([43]; [44] Semantical Anal-
ysis of Modal Logic I and II). In Kripke semantics, modelling conditions result in picking
out two principles which define the class of normal modal logics. The most important for
our purposes is the rule of necessitation (RN), which allows one to infer from the fact that
a proposition is valid, or true at all possible worlds in all models, that the necessitation of
that proposition is also valid. Written using the , this can be expressed:
13
(RN) From φ infer that φ.
This rule is valid in all normal modal logics. However, this inference principle is a bad
fit with any kind of possibilism. Suppose that every proposition is possible. From this is
follows that the negation of every proposition is possible. In addition, a feature of modal
logics which is had in common between almost all seriously considered modal logics (nor-
mal or non-normal) is that necessity and possibility are related by negation in the following
ways:
• ¬φ is possible (♦¬φ) iff φ is not necessary (¬φ)
• ¬φ iff ¬♦φ
Given the rule of necessitation, if one admits that there are any logical validities, such as
the law of excluded middle for instance, then one can show that the necessitation of that
validity is also valid. So if φ is valid, then by necessitation, so is φ. However, from
universal possibilism, one has that ♦¬φ is also valid, and hence ¬φ is valid as well. But
then we have both φ and ¬φ as valid.
The problem remains for limited possibilism. There we have that every proposition
is possibly possible. In symbols, for every φ, ♦♦φ. Just as before, a consequence of
this is that the negation of every proposition is possibly possible: hence ♦♦¬φ, which is
equivalent to ¬φ. Now if we suppose that φ is valid, we must simply apply the rule of
necessitation twice to show that φ is valid.
So when dealing with possibilisms, we cannot have the rule of necessitation – it imme-
diately undermines the possibilist’s claim.
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2.2.3 Curley, Van Cleve, and Non-Normal Modal Logics
A final reason for employing non-normal modal logics in particular is that these are the
kinds of logic which Curley and Van Cleve employ. While neither provides a clear indi-
cation of exactly which modal logic they are using, it is quite clear that they logics they
use are non-normal. First, because both present possibilist interpretations of Descartes and
second, because in addition to using the notions of necessity and possibility, they also em-
ploy the notion of entailment by which they seem to mean strict implication. C.I. Lewis in
two famous books ([45] A Survey of Symbolic Logic; [46] Symbolic Logic) introduced strict
implication in order to develop a theory which avoided some issues with classical logic and
material implication. Lewis’ logics were among the first modern modal logics, and they
were primarily focused on the modal features of the conditional connective, rather than on
necessity and possibility by themselves.
These facts about Lewis are worth noting because the Curley style argument uses a
strict implication, and the premises are stated in terms of strict implication. Even further,
Van Cleve’s argument uses both a strict implication and a material implication, and exploits
the difference between these. While a kind of necessitated implication connective can be
defined in all modal logics (with the appropriate vocabulary) – this kind of connective is
just defined as (φ ⊃ ψ), where ⊃ is the material implication – using strict implication
to model entailment usually takes place in a non-normal modal logics, and it was some of
these logics which Lewis himself favoured.
These reasons motivate using some tools from non-normal modal logics in analysing
the arguments given by Curley and Van Cleve, despite the fact that these logics are less
well known than the usual stock of normal modal logics.
In order to distinguish between kinds of conditionals, I’ll continue to use the horse-
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shoe: ⊃ for material implication, and I’ll use Lewis’ fish-hook symbol J for the strict
implication.
2.3 Curley’s Argument for Limited Possibilism
Curley’s argument proceeds from two premises by a collection of modal inferences. I’ll
give Curley’s two premises and some justification for them. Then I’ll discuss the most
distinctively modal inference in Curley’s argument, and show that PDN is a consequence
of this logical background.
2.3.1 Curley’s First Premise
The first premise is intended as an expression of the freedom of God’s free creation. The
the statement of the premise is:
(C1) If an agent wills some φ, then they could have not willed φ.
Curley justifies C1 as ‘a general logical truth about acts of will’ ([23],p. 580). It is worth
noting that for the argument to go through that we don’t need this premise in its full gener-
ality, but rather just the claim that when God wills φ, God could have not willed φ.
A reason to go with the form which refers only to God is that the universal formulation
of C1 seems in tension with another of Descartes’ famous views, on human free will. In
the fourth meditation of the Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes claims that when
making a decision about which of two incompatible claims to accept ‘In order to be free,
there is no need for me to be inclined both ways; on the contrary, the more I incline in one
direction – either because I clearly understand that reasons of truth and goodness point that
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way, or because of a divinely produced disposition of my inmost thoughts – the freer is my
choice’ (AT 7:57–58, CSM2, p. 40). He seems to hold that for human beings, a compulsion
to believe some claim due to a recognition of its truth, or a disposition, is compatible with
freedom of the will to believe it.
I mention this point only to say that this isn’t clearly a problem if C1 is instead restated
in a more particular form:
(C1)′ If God wills that φ, then God could not have willed φ.
In order to express this claim in a formal language, I’ll continue to use lower case Greek
letters (φ, ψ, χ, . . . ) standing in for propositions, and a collection of variables, lower case
letters of the Latin alphabet (a, b, c, . . . ), ranging over agents and a relation symbol Waφ,
which should be read as ‘agent a wills that φ.’ I’ll reserve g to refer to God. With this, the
universal formulation of Curley’s first premise can be stated in terms of strict implication
as:
(C1) ∀a(Waφ J ♦¬Waφ)
and the restricted version formulated as:
(C1)′ Wgφ J ♦¬Wgφ
To set the ground, I’ll present some passages from Descartes showing that he may have
accepted (C1)′.8 Much of this evidence comes from the standard references regarding the
8The formalized version of (C1)′ should be read as an axiom scheme, where one may substitute any well-
formed formula for φ. In Curley ([23]), the argument is stated using a kind of propositional quantification –
where Curley also quantifies over the φ above. This involves some additional logical complexity that is, as
far as I can tell, not needed to state the view. So I shall proceed with axiom schemata. One may worry about
having formulas occur in relations alongside names for agents. This can be solved in any of the usual ways
– Gödel numbering, Quine quotes, reading the relevant vocabulary as Priorean Connecticates. Nothing I say
will distinguish between these various approaches, and all that matters is that we can distinguish names for
agents from names for propositions. So any method will work, and I won’t choose between them.
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Creation Doctrine, taken largely from the correspondence. Consider the following two
passages:
It will be said that if God has established these truths He could change them
as a king changes his laws. To this the answer is: Yes He can, if His will can
change. ‘But I understand them to be eternal and unchangeable.’ – I make the
same judgement about God. ‘But His will is free.’ – Yes, but His power is
beyond our grasp. In general we can assert that God can do everything that is
within our grasp but not that He cannot do what is beyond our grasp. It would
be rash to think that our imagination reaches as far as His power.
(To Mersenne, 15 April 1630, AT 1: 145–146, CSMK, p. 23)
You ask also what necessitated God to create these [eternal] truths; and I
reply that He was free to make it not true that all radii of the circle are equal –
just as free as He was not to create the world. And it is certain that these truths
are no more necessarily attached to His essence than are other created things.
(To Mersenne, 27 May 1630, AT 1:151–152, CSMK, p. 25)
These passages make a compelling case for (C1)′. In particular, as regards the second, if
Descartes is willing to claim that God was free to change the truths of geometry, then it
is likely that he would claim that God was free to make any truths false. Indeed, the talk
of these (eternal) truths being no more attached to His essence than any other truths seems
to bear out the point that if God could have made these necessary truths false, then He
could have made any truth false. The following passage, written some years later than the
previous passages, expands on the point:
I turn to the difficulty of conceiving how God would have been acting freely
and indifferently if He had made it false that the three angles of a triangle were
equal to two right angles, or in general that contradictories could not be true
together. It is easy to dispel this difficulty by considering that the power of
God cannot have any limits, and that our mind is finite and so created as to
be able to conceive as possible the things which God has wished to be in fact
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possible, but not be able to conceive as possible things which God could have
made possible, but which He has nevertheless wished to make impossible. The
first consideration shows us that God cannot have been determined to make it
true that contradictories cannot be true together, and therefore that He could
have done the opposite. The second consideration assures us that even if this
be true, we should not try to comprehend it since our nature is incapable of
doing so.
(To Mesland, 2 May 1644, AT 4:118, CSMK, p. 235)
Again, the text provides some evidence in favour of (C1)′. One may read the consequence
Descartes draws from the second consideration as reason not to try to understand the cre-
ation doctrine, and thus as reason not to engage in this interpretative project. However, what
the passage seems to suggest is not that the creation doctrine itself is incomprehensible, but
rather that the impossible things God might have brought about will be incomprehensible
to us, given that God has provided us with our conceptual capacities. There is much that
has been, and can be, said about the relationship between conceivability and possibility in
Descartes, and some of the extant literature on the creation doctrine delves into this rela-
tionship. For instance, in ([51] Descartes on Modality) and ([13]). This is an interesting
literature, but one which extends beyond the focus of this paper.
In What Does God’s Freedom Consist?
A natural question at this point is in what God’s freedom consists. This is certainly an
important question, and one about which there is controversy.9 For the purposes of this
paper, I take on the modal reading given by Curley and, apparently, adopted by Van Cleve.
This is primarily for the reason that I want to show that even supposing that his premises
9For instance, ([40]) argues that the creation doctrine is not a modal principle, but rather an expression of
divine indifference.
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are acceptable as interpretation, Curley’s argument still doesn’t deliver the conclusion that
Descartes is a limited possibilist. The argument I am giving is not that Descartes actually
does take God’s freedom to be, as Curley suggests, a matter of being able to create things
in accordance with some other world, but rather that even assuming that this is the case,
his comments do not bear out the conclusion that he is committed to limited or universal
possibilism, at least on the basis of the argument structure we’ll see shortly.
This is an involved and interesting question, and there have been interesting interpreta-
tions which read this freedom in other terms. However the question of how best to under-
stand God’s freedom is not the focus of this paper.
2.3.2 Curley’s Second Premise
Curley’s second premise reads:
A proposition φ is true if and only if God wills φ to be true.
Consider the following passage as evidence:
As for the eternal truths, I say once more that they are true or possible only
because God knows them as true or possible. They are not known as true by
God in any way which would imply that they are true independently of Him.
If men really understood the sense of their words they could never say without
blasphemy that the truth of anything is prior to the knowledge which God has
of it. . . . So, we must not say that if God did not exist nevertheless these truths
would be true; for the existence of God is the first and most eternal of all
possible truths and the one from which alone all others proceed.
(To Mersenne, 6 May 1630, AT 1:149–150, CSMK, p. 24)
This passage provides some fairly strong evidence that Descartes would have accepted
premise (2), that φ is true if and only if God wills that φ. At very least, the latter half pro-
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vides compelling reason to think that Descartes would admit that if φ is true then God wills
φ to be true, and the other direction of the biconditional is not particularly controversial.
In the formal language, I shall use the equality symbol = as a shorthand for the strict
biconditional. That is, φ = ψ should be read a (φ J ψ) ∧ (ψ J φ). With this in mind, the
formal statement of C2 is:
(C2) φ = Wgφ
2.3.3 Becker’s Rule
The last piece of modal logic we need in place to put together Curley’s argument is a
rule governing interaction between necessity and strict implication. It allows you to infer
from the fact that φ strictly implies ψ, that necessarily-φ strictly implies necessarily-ψ. In
symbol form:
(Becker’s Rule) From φ J ψ infer φ J ψ.
Discovered by and named after Oskar Becker, this rule holds in Lewis’ modal logic S2,
and every non-normal modal logic stronger.10 This includes most of the seriously studied
systems of non-normal modal logic, with only few logics failing to validate this inference
rule.
The way that Curley employs Becker’s Rule also involves a somewhat hidden use of a
rule of contraposition. This rule states that:
(Contraposition) From φ J ψ, one may infer ¬ψ J ¬φ.
10This fact, and other details about non-normal modal logics, are available in ([36] New Introduction to
Modal Logic).
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The inference which Curley employs is a mix of these two inference rules. Recall that ♦¬φ
is equivalent to ¬φ – that a proposition is possibly false if and only if it isn’t necessary.
With this in mind, the inference principle which Curley employs is:
(∗) From φ J ψ infer ♦¬ψ J ♦¬φ.
One need only apply Becker’s Rule to φ J ψ to obtain φ J ψ. Then apply contrapo-
sition to obtain ¬ψ J ¬φ, and replace instances of ¬ with ♦¬ to obtain (∗). This
inference is the most substantial modal inference Curley’s argument employs. The rest of
the argument is a matter of breaking down his premises.
Now with this in the background, I turn to the argument proper.
2.3.4 Curley’s Argument
The argument, with some minor changes in notation, is as follows:
1. Wgφ J ♦¬Wgφ (C1)′
2. φ = Wgφ (C2)
3. φ Assumption for Conditional Proof
4. φ JWgφ 2 Conjunction Elimination
5. Wgφ J ♦¬Wgφ 1 Instantiation of φ for φ
6. ♦¬Wgφ 3,4, and 5 Modus Ponens
7. ♦¬Wgφ J ♦¬φ (∗) applied to 4
8. ♦¬φ 6,7 Modus Ponens
9. φ J ♦¬φ 3–8 Conditional Proof
10. ♦♦φ Equivalent to 9
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The step leading to line (7) is key, and this relies on (∗), but as I’ll now show, this princi-
ple along with (C2) leads directly to PDN. The last step involves some substantial modal
reasoning, but I don’t need to deal with the inferences used there to make my point.
2.3.5 PDN from Curley’s Premises
The proof of PDN from Curley’s premises is short, consisting of little more than (C2) and
Becker’s rule.
1. φ = Wgφ (C2)
2. φ JWgφ 1 Conjunction Elimination
3. φ J Wgφ 2 Becker’s Rule
As mentioned at the end of §1, there is good textual reason to think that Descartes would
have rejected this consequence.
One potential response to my claim that PDN is unacceptable might be that it is vacu-
ously true. A universal possibilist, insofar as they claim that no propositions are necessary,
may well say that it PDN is a non-problematic consequence of their view. Their view
simply states that the antecedent can’t be satisfied.
First, this line of response is not available to the proponent of limited possibilism, who
may well admit that some propositions are necessary, while denying that any are necessar-
ily necessary.
Second, this line of response seems unsatisfying when Descartes seems to explicitly
deny the conditional. Descartes says ‘even if God has willed that some truths should be
necessary, this does not mean that He willed them necessarily.’ (AT 4:118, CSMK, p. 235)
This seems to be denying the reasoning from the antecedent to the consequent, and not just
either the antecedent or the consequent itself. He appears to be denying that the entailment
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holds, which speaks against the truth of the conditional itself. So the vacuous satisfaction
line doesn’t provide much comfort to the possibilist giving this argument.
Since there are so few steps in the argument above, it seems that one has few options
for altering Curley’s argument to avoid this consequence. Either one has to reject Becker’s
Rule, or one has to replace (C2) with some other premise tying the truth of propositions
to God’s will. While not in response to this problem, Van Cleve does replace (C2) with a
different premise we’ll consider momentarily. First, there is a potential difficulty for my
argument in Curley’s paper which I’ll address.
2.3.6 Curley’s Second Formulation of Limited Possibilism
Curley, after giving the argument above, claims that♦♦φ is not the best statement of limited
possibilism, and provides a different statement of the view. This later formulation is more
complicated, and Curley notes that ♦♦φ isn’t much more palatable than ♦φ as a modal
thesis, particularly as the distinctions between the model structures governing the various
non-normal modal logics in question are quite subtle.
However, whether or not his preferred statement of limited possibilism is♦♦φ or some-
thing more complex, his argument still apparently provides us with the constraint that♦♦φ.
He doesn’t, to my knowledge, anywhere reject either of the premises he assumed or the
modal principles he uses. Indeed, Van Cleve, as we’ll see, gives his argument in response
to the argument for the ♦♦φ formulation. The focus of the criticism in this paper is not
on Curley’s final interpretation, but rather on the modal argument he gives to justify ♦♦φ
in the first place. (C1)′ and (C2) look plausible as interpretative postulates, and my aim
is to show that even if we accept these assumptions, we have good reason not to accept
the conclusion of this argument. Curley’s later formulation of limited possibilism, though
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interesting, is not on the table.
2.4 Van Cleve’s Argument for the Incoherence Thesis
Van Cleve criticizes Curley on the grounds that Curley’s own argument results in universal
possibilism rather than just limited possibilism ([76], p. 60). His argument for this claim
is a minor variation on Curley’s, but the details of that argument are not necessary for my
purposes here. What is of interest is that he proposes that one might attempt to avoid the
claim that Descartes is committed to universal possibilism by altering Curley’s (C2). He
considers, and immediately dismisses, the premise:
φ = Wgφ
on the grounds that God’s omnipotence can’t apply only to necessary propositions, but
must apply to propositions generally. ‘If God is truly omnipotent, the truth of modal and
non-modal propositions alike should be dependent on His will’, Van Cleve claims ([76],p.
60). It is beyond my purposes here to criticize his characterization of omnipotence. What is
important here is that Van Cleve proposes an additional alteration of (C2), which he claims
is implied by a passage in the 6 May 1630 letter to Mersenne, particularly the comment
about how eternal truths are true or possible only because God knows them to be so. The
premise he takes this passage to imply is:
(V2) φ ⊃ (φ JWgφ)
This premise gives rise to an argument for universal possibilism using many of the same
inference principles which are used in Curley’s argument. Perhaps the only major differ-
ence in the principles used by these two arguments is that Van Cleve relies on an additional
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modal axiom – a version of axiom T (φ ⊃ φ) stated with the strict rather than the material
implication. Hence, I shall call this principle:
(Strict-T) φ J φ
Whether Descartes was committed to Strict-T is not at issue, and it does not feature in my
argument that Van Cleve’s assumptions also deliver PDN, so I won’t discuss it except to
note that it is a difference in the modal principles these authors employ.
2.4.1 Van Cleve’s Argument for Universal Possibilism
Van Cleve’s argument is as follows. Once again, the structure is a conditional proof, though
the conditional introduced is material, rather than strict. In addition, the key modal prin-
ciples are Strict-T, and the contraposed Becker’s rule, denoted with (∗), used by Curley.
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1. φ Assumption
2. φ ⊃ (φ JWgφ) (V2)
3. φ JWgφ 1,2 Material Modus Ponens
4. Wgφ J ♦¬Wgφ (C1)
5. φ J φ Strict-T
6. φ 1,5 MP
7. Wgφ 3,6 MP
8. ♦¬Wgφ 4,7 MP
11Van Cleve seems to use it as an axiom, referring to it as ((φ J ψ) ∧♦¬ψ) J ♦¬φ. In this proof, I have
used it as a rule of inference rather than an axiom for two reasons. (1) This reflects how Van Cleve writes
out his argument and (2) the rule form of this principle is weaker than the axiom form, as the axiom allows
one to substitute any formula into the places of φ, ψ, rather than having to first derive φ J φ. This is a subtle
difference, and one which makes no significant difference to my point here.
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9. ♦¬Wgφ J ♦¬φ 3 (∗)
10. ♦¬φ 8,9 MP
11. φ ⊃ ♦¬φ 1–10 Conditional Proof
12. ¬φ Equiv. to 11
So, Van Cleve has it that even with weakening (C2) to what he considers the weakest
plausible version of the principle, Descartes still turns out to be committed to universal
possibilism.12 Van Cleve reasons further that this consequence commits Descartes to in-
consistency because we have it that Descartes is committed to the claim that nothing is
necessary, while at the same time he is committed to claims that some facts about God are
necessary – ‘that God necessarily exists and is necessarily omnipotent (i.e., is necessarily
such that nothing happens save through His will)’ ([76], p. 61).
One might attempt to respond to Van Cleve by arguing that Descartes is not committed
to the necessity of these claims about God, but to my knowledge no one, not even ([30])
whose view is among the most radical in the literature, attempts to argue that. As I have
done in response to Curley, I respond to Van Cleve by showing that PDN is a consequence
of his collection of premises and the modal principles he accepts. On these grounds, I
argue that this collection of assumptions cannot be jointly accepted in an interpretation of
Descartes.
2.4.2 PDN from Van Cleve’s Premises
The argument is slightly longer than that for Curley’s (C2), but doesn’t involve much more
logical complexity.
12This version of the argument is slightly longer than that given by Van Cleve, as I have pulled out and
displayed each of the applications of modus ponens on lines 6, 7, 8, and 10 which he collapses into one step
– this makes no difference to whether the argument is valid.
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1. φ ⊃ (φ JWgφ) (V2)
2. φ Assumption
3. φ JWgφ 1,2 Material Modus Ponens
4. φ J Wgφ 3 Becker’s Rule
5. Wgφ 2,4 Modus Ponens
6. φ J Wgφ 2–6 Conditional Proof
This gives us our result. On Van Cleve’s reading, Descartes is committed to a claim
which he expressly denies. It’s not that this argument shows that Descartes is committed to
something inconsistent with what he has claimed elsewhere, but rather that it asserts a claim
which Descartes expressly denies. Of course, one could reaffirm van Cleve’s conclusion
that Descartes’s modal metaphysics is incoherent on the basis of my argument. So the
options available on the basis of my argument regarding Van Cleve are (a) that Descartes
is not committed to UP, and so at least one of principles or rules in van Cleve’s proof is
to be rejected, and (b) that Descartes has incoherent commitments related to PDN and UP.
Option (b) has us retain Van Cleve’s conclusion that Descartes’ total system is inconsistent
and simply note an additional set of claims where the inconsistency show itself, whereas
(a) allows us to avoid this conclusion, and opens the way for consistent interpretations of
Descartes’ modal metaphysics. The principle of charity speaks for (a), as does the potential
for learning positive lessons in contemporary modal metaphysics from Descartes. These
considerations lead me to prefer (a) to (b), though they do not establish that it compulsory
to accept (a).
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2.5 PDN (Two Different Ones)
Before concluding there is one remaining issue to deal with. I have interpreted the passage
in the 2 May 1644 letter to Mesland as ruling out the entailment:
(PDN) If God wills φ to be necessary, then it is necessary that God wills φ
Curley interprets this passage somewhat differently, though his reading and mine both mo-
tivate the arguments I have put forward here. He claims that this passage has ‘Descartes
invoking a scope distinction between Wgφ and Wgφ’ ([23], p. 582).
I think that this is a natural reading of the passage, but that it is also clear from what is
written that Descartes is rejecting the entailment between Wgφ andWgφ. However, it
involves only some minor variations on the arguments I have before to show that Wgφ
does entail Wgφ, given Curley’s logical assumptions. To see this, note the following
instance of (C2):
(C2) Wgφ = φ
An immediate consequence of this is Wgφ J φ, and from (PDN) φ J Wgφ, one
immediately obtains the consequence Wgφ J Wgφ. So one can even show Curley’s
preferred reading of PDN holds using his premises and modal inferences. In either case,
this is an entailment which Descartes clearly rejects.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper has aimed to remove two constraints on giving a logical account of Descartes’
creation doctrine and modal metaphysics more generally. First, that Descartes is committed
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to limited possibilism, and second that he is committed to universal possibilism and hence
has an inconsistent modal theory. What is left?
One can still retain the premises Curley and Van Cleve admit, but this at the cost of
rejecting Becker’s rule, and the contraposed version thereof, which I’ve called (∗). Even
most non-normal modal logics admit Becker’s rule, and of the usual batch of non-normal
modal logics, only systems strictly weaker than Lewis’ S2 are available.
Another option is to reject at least one premise of the pair (C1)′, (C2) or of the pair
(C1)′, (V2). There are many ways to do this, either by attempting to reinterpret the creation
doctrine as non-modal, which is Kaufman’s preferred solution ([40]), or by reinterpreting
omnipotence in some other way.
Yet another option is to reinterpret the modalities in some way as to distinguish some
varieties of modality. One might, for instance, distinguish between metaphysical possibility
and conceivability, as has been suggested by ([13]), or distinguish between different kinds
of metaphysical possibility.
Adjudicating these options is also beyond the scope of this paper. The important up-
shot here is that the constraints on interpretation put forward by Curley and Van Cleve are
not in force. Their arguments fail in that each commits Descartes to a claim which he




A Multimodal Interpretation of the
Creation Doctrine
3.1 The Problem with the Creation Doctrine
An especially difficult problem in the interpretation of Descartes, in particular his meta-
physics, concerns understanding the status of eternal truths. Following some of his com-
mentators (see citations below for examples), Descartes uses this term to refer to a class of
necessary truths - in particular a class of necessary truths including truths about the essences
or, in more Cartesian terminology, the true and immutable natures of objects.While na-
tures and necessary truths seem to play a key role in Descartes’ metaphysical project in his
Meditations, within his total view, both notions involve serious problems. The substantial
problem to which this paper is addressed is the doctrine of the creation of eternal truths,
or as I shall call it, the creation doctrine (CD). Perhaps the simplest statement of this is as
follows:
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(CD) The eternal truths are freely created by God.
That is to say, God has full voluntary control over the eternal truths – including, it would
seem, the power to make eternal truths false. Since God could make the eternal truths false,
it follows that they could be false. Following Kaufman [40], the problem can be nicely
stated as a tension between the following two claims (both of which Descartes seems to
hold):
1. Eternal truths are necessary.
2. Eternal truths are possibly false.
According to the standard account of the interaction between necessity and possibility,
to say that a proposition is possibly false is just to say that it is not necessary. So these two
commitments of Descartes’ seem to be obviously inconsistent.1 This is the first interpretive
problem raised by CD: can it be faithfully interpreted in a way to render Descartes’ total
view consistent? van Cleve [76] argues that it cannot be consistently interpreted, while
others [30, 23, 38, 1, 40] have attempted to provide such interpretations.
Another problem, raised by certain putative solutions, is whether or not CD can be
interpreted so that Descartes is not seen to be making any especially bizarre modal claims.2
On the topic, Geach [32] has a polemical passage, cited in full by Curley [23][p. 590], in
which he claims that an interpretation of Descartes which seeks to make CD consistent by
employing a bizarre modal logic is suspect. So a desideratum for an interpretation of CD,
along with consistency, is to avoid extreme bizarreness in the modal theory attributed to
1It has been questioned whether Descartes is actually committed to (1) (for instance, by [30]) – for my
part, I take it for granted that he is so committed, but some reasons for this view will be evinced later.
2This was put explicitly in these terms by Kaufman [39][vii].
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Descartes.3
In this paper I shall develop and defend an interpretation which satisfies both desider-
ata.4 Before presenting my interpretation, I pause to consider some extant interpretations
in detail. Against this background, it is easier to highlight the distinctive features of my ac-
count. After this, I’ll present my view, go on to consider the roles of essences and of logic
in Descartes’ comments about CD, and finish by considering two disparate topics raised in
the discussion.
3.2 Two Influential Extant Interpretations
Much of the debate surrounding CD has taken place against the background of two highly
influential interpretations, due to Frankfurt and Curley. In this section, I’ll discuss these
interpretations, and set up my proposal in light of some problems with each.
3.2.1 Frankfurt: Universal Possibilism
Frankfurt’s interpretation is one of the most influential of recent accounts, though its influ-
ence is most often felt in terms of commentators attempting to avoid his conclusion – that
Descartes holds that there are no necessary truths after all, and that every proposition is
possible. This view is a kind of universal possibilism.
Frankfurt puts due stress on the fact that CD concerns the essences of created things:
3Geach’s point also seems to be that if Descartes can only be made sense of using a bizarre modal logic,
then his position is indefensible – Geach also wrote that Descartes, in holding CD, was “clearly talking great
nonsense.”[32][p. 179]
4Though the modal logic suggested by my interpretation is unusual in some ways, I’ll argue that the vast
majority of Descartes’ modal metaphysics is not bizarre, but that only when one considers God’s role in
making eternal truths does the bizarreness creep in.
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What Descartes calls “eternal truths” are truths about essences. The Pythagorean
theorem, for example, is (or purports to be) an eternal truth about what is es-
sential to right triangles. Asserting that the eternal truths are laid down by God
is tantamount, then, to saying that God is the creator of essences.
[30][p. 38]
Evidence for this reading of eternal truths as intimately tied to the essences of things is
available in a letter to Mersenne in which Descartes responds to some questions:
You ask me by what kind of causality God established the eternal truths.
I reply: by the same kind of causality as He created all things, that is to say,
as their efficient and total cause. For it is certain that He is the author of the
essence of created things no less than of their existence; and their essence is
nothing other than the eternal truths. You ask also what necessitated God to
create these [eternal] truths; and I reply that He was free to make it not true
that all radii of the circle are equal – just as free as He was not to create the
world. And it is certain that these truths are no more necessarily attached to
His essence than are other created things.
(To Mersenne, 27 May, 1630 AT 1:152–53 [20][p. 25])
So CD arises from the fact that God has voluntary creative control over the essences of
things, and those essences in some way determine the eternal truths.5 Since God has vol-
untary control over the essences of the objects He creates, He has voluntary control over
the eternal truths determined by those essences.
To be precise, Frankfurt notes that the eternal truths concern not just the essences of
really existing things, but also the essences of things which God has not made to exist.
5One of the difficulties in understanding CD is to pin down the relation between essences and eternal
truths. Descartes’ comments on the topic leave open some interpretive options – some of which I canvas in
§3.3.3 – but as it’s not obvious that the interpretation I propose here provides compelling reason to choose
between them. Hence, I’ll continue writing loosely of a relation of “determination”, and leave more detailed
discussion to the mentioned section.
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As Descartes indicates in the passage above, God is the author not just of the existence of
things (as was a standard claim in the scholastic tradition), but also of their essences, and
there seems to be no good reason to think that He didn’t mean to include essences of non-
existing things - these are subject to God’s free act of creation just as much as the essence
of any existing object.
Part of the freedom of God’s will, on Frankfurt’s reading, is that God’s will and His
intellect are identical. So, for God, knowing some proposition to be true and willing it to
be true are one and the same activity. As a result, Frankfurt puts it, “there are no truths prior
to God’s creation of them, His creative will cannot be determined or even moved by any
considerations of value or rationality whatever.” [30][p. 41] This view is defended in the
replies to the sixth objections to the Meditations, and I’ll display at length a passage which
defends this view. For now, it is enough to note that Descartes, on Frankfurt’s reading,
takes God’s creation to be totally unconstrained by moral considerations, or considerations
of truth. These considerations are dependent on God’s creation, and hence the creation
could not be determined, in any way, by them. So, for instance, moral truths, on Descartes’
view, are contingent in the sense that God could have made them radically different – as
we’ll see, so are mathematical truths (these are Descartes’ most commonly used examples),
but Frankfurt makes a point of noting that logic also falls under this view. This is evident
from the following passage:
I turn to the difficulty of conceiving how God would have been acting freely
and indifferently if He had made it false that the three angles of a triangle were
equal to two right angles, or in general that contradictories could not be true
together. It is easy to dispel this difficulty by considering that the power of
God cannot have any limits, and that our mind is finite and so created as to
be able to conceive as possible the things which God has wished to be in fact
possible, but not be able to conceive as possible things which God could have
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made possible, but which He has nevertheless wished to make impossible. The
first consideration shows us that God cannot have been determined to make it
true that contradictories cannot be true together, and therefore that He could
have done the opposite. The second consideration assures us that even if this
be true, we should not try to comprehend it since our nature is incapable of
doing so.
(To Mesland, 2 May 1644, AT 4:118–119 [20][p. 235])
I’ll have reason to come back and consider Descartes’ second consideration, regarding
conceivability and human comprehension, but for now the important part is the first con-
sideration, that God cannot have been determined to make it true that contradictories cannot
be true together, and therefore that He could have done the opposite. There is dispute as to
how to read ‘therefore that He could have done the opposite” (as we’ll see in a later section
regarding Ishiguro’s interpretation), but on a flat-footed reading, the opposite of making
it true that contradictories cannot be true together is to make it that (some) contradicto-
ries can be true together. From this reading of the passage, Frankfurt draws the following
conclusion, quoted at length:
God was free in creating the world to do anything, whether or not its de-
scription was logically coherent . . . Descartes evidently thinks that God could
have omitted creating the essence “circularity” entirely. In that case there
would be no eternal truths about circles: every proposition about a circle would
have the status now enjoyed by the proposition that the diameter of the circle
on a certain blackboard is one foot. Descartes also evidently thinks that God,
while creating the essence “circularity”, could have made it different from what
we conceive it to be. In that case there would be eternal truths about circles,
but they would differ from – and perhaps be the negations of – the propositions
that are necessarily true of circularity as we now understand it.
[30][p. 42–43]
So, to recap here, the interpretation offered by Frankfurt is as follows: God is the creator of
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essences, and essences determine the eternal truths. God could have failed to create some
essences He did, hence making some eternal truths false, and furthermore, God could have
made some essences to be different than we understand them to be, even in ways which are
logically incoherent.
The issue arises: how are we to understand the “could” in the passages above? Clearly it
can’t pick out logical possibility, as we have understood Descartes to claim that God could
bring about the logically impossible. Frankfurt’s line, put briefly, is that this “could” ex-
presses a genuine metaphysical possibility, whereas the kind of necessity had by the eternal
truths is merely epistemic. Eternal truths appear to be necessary because God has created
our minds in such a way that we can’t conceive them as false. To return to the tension in
§3.1, Frankfurt reads (1) “Eternal truths are necessary” as a fact about our conceptual fac-
ulties and (2) “Eternal truths are possibly false” as a fact about metaphysical possibility in
the sense of what it is possible for God to bring about. On this line, the logical incoherence
of the falsity of an eternal truth is no problem, as this is merely reflective of our conceptual
faculties.
The propositions we find to be necessary – like the Pythagorean theorem
– need not be truths at all. The inconceivability of their falsity, which we
demonstrate by the use of innate principles of reason, is not inherent in them.
It is properly to be understood only as relative to the character of our minds. We
cannot escape this character, of course, but we can realise that God might have
made it different from what it is.. . . The necessities human reason discovers by
analysis and demonstration are just necessities of its own contingent nature.
In coming to know them, it is does not necessarily discover the nature of the
world as it is in itself, or as it appears to God.
[30][p. 45]
For Frankfurt’s Descares, every truth is merely possible, and any truth which would appear
necessary only does so because of the nature of our created minds. As a final point about
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Frankfurt’s interpretation, he considers a proposal, for which he cites Gueroult [33], that
God has unlimited control only over essences which are not His own. So, Gueroult claims,
there are some genuinely necessary truths: namely, truths about God’s essence, such as that
God is omnipotent and is not a deceiver, along with some mathematical truths. Frankfurt
rejects this claim, pointing to some passages in which Descartes seems to claim that God’s
powers are fully limitless:
For my part, I know that my intellect is finite and God’s power is infinite,
and so I set no bounds to it; I consider only what I can conceive and what I
cannot conceive, and I take great pains that my judgement should accord with
my understanding. And so I boldly assert that God can do everything which I
conceive to be possible, but I am not so bold as to deny that He can do whatever
conflicts with my understanding – I merely say that it involves a contradiction.
(To More, 5 Feb. 1649, AT 5:272 [20][p. 363])
The view I seek to defend is a variation on Frankfurt’s, but a key place in which we differ is
with regard to the absolute impossibility of God’s being a deceiver – a point to which I shall
return. In the meantime, I now turn another influential interpretation before presenting my
own view.
3.2.2 Curley: Limited Possibilism
Curley [23] develops his view, now called limited possibilism, in response to Frankfurt.
According to limited possibilism, while the eternal truths are necessarily true, they are not
necessarily necessary.
Perhaps the key motivation for Curley’s view is that Frankfurt’s interpretation fails to
do justice to how eternal truths work in Descartes’ philosophy separate of considerations
regarding CD. When discussing truths dependent upon true and immutable natures else-
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where, such as in the Meditations, Descartes does seem to claim that they are necessary.
Frankfurt weakens principle (1) of §3.1 to concern merely conceptual necessity, and Curley
notes that this is inappropriate for understanding Descartes’ broader philosophical project.
Consider the ontological argument. As Descartes expounds this, it requires
the assumption that I conceive of countless things which have true, immutable
and eternal natures, even though they may never have existed or have been
thought of (AT VII, p. 64). These eternal natures do not depend on my
mind; my thought does not impose any necessity on things, rather the neces-
sity of the things themselves determines me to think of them in the way that
I do.. . . Moreover, not only do we perceive that the truths of mathematics are
necessary, sometimes, at least, we perceive clearly and distinctly that they are
necessary. If they aren’t in fact necessary, then it looks as though Descartes
will have to give up his criterion of truth. Not everything we perceive clearly
and distinctly is true.
[23][p. 572]
So, pace Frankfurt, Descartes is indeed committed to the claim that eternal truths are not
just conceptually necessary, but, so Curley argues, in a robustly metaphysical sense as well.
He points to Descartes’ description of his project in Le monde as more evidence:
Further, I showed what the laws of nature were, and without basing my
arguments on any principle other than the infinite perfections of God, I tried to
demonstrate all those laws about which we could have any doubt, and to show
that they are such that, even if God created many worlds, there could not be
any in which they failed to be observed.
(Discourse, AT 7: 43, [19][p. 132])
Curley takes this as evidence that Descartes held that these laws of nature are necessary
in the sense that they are true in all possible worlds.6 Curley concludes that universal
6It’s worth noting that while this use of something like possible worlds to characterise necessity is striking
in Descartes, it would be hasty to conclude that Descartes held a fully contemporary view.
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possibilism is not adequate to account for CD as against the background of Descartes’
modal metaphysics.
He argues, further, that Descartes’ claims regarding CD indicate not only that God
could have willed eternal truths false, but in fact that He willed them to be necessarily true.
Consider the following passage, in which Descartes responds to an objection from Gassendi
regarding the immutability and eternality of the natures considered in the Meditations:
You say that you think it is ‘very hard’ to propose that there is anything
immutable and eternal apart from God. You would be right to think this if I was
talking about existing things, or if I was proposing something as immutable in
the sense that its immutability was independent of God. But just as the poets
suppose that the Fates were originally established by Jupiter, but that after they
were established he bound himself to abide by them, so I do not think that the
essences of things, and the mathematical truths which we can know concerning
them, are independent of God. Nevertheless I do think that they are immutable
and eternal, since the will and decree of God willed and decreed that they
should be so. Whether you think this is hard or easy to accept, it is enough for
me that it is true.
(Replies to the Fifth Objections, AT 7:380 [18][p. 261])
Taking this passage to extend from essences, which are eternal, to eternal truths, this pas-
sage seems to indicate that Descartes held them to be necessary, but it doesn’t provide much
reason to think that this necessity is conceptual, as Frankfurt’s reading would have it.
These considerations lead Curley into a problem: how can some truth be both necessary
and freely created, as the eternal truths are claimed to be? Limited possibilism provides the
way out – God’s freedom in creation is expressed by the fact that while eternal truths are
necessary, God was not necessitated to create them. [23][p. 579–581] Evidence of this
claim is available in the letter, quoted earlier, to Mesland in 1644:
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And even if God has willed that some truths should be necessary, this does
not mean that He willed them necessarily; for it is one thing to will that they
be necessary, and quite another to will this necessarily, or to be necessitated to
will it.
(Letter to Mesland, 2 May 1644, AT 4:119 [20][p. 235])
So while not every proposition is possible, they are all possibly possible, all this in a meta-
physical sense. As Curley puts it:
Descartes wants to allow that there are some propositions which are in fact
impossible, but which might have been possible, and others that are in fact
necessary, but might, nevertheless, not have been necessary. There is nothing
epistemic about these “mights.” We are not saying: “These things seem neces-
sary, but, for all we know they might not be necessary.” We are saying: “These
things are necessary, but there is nothing necessary about that.”
[23][p. 583]
The most pressing problem with Curley’s interpretation is that it seems to make God’s
power appear quite limited and weak, which is in tension with Descartes’ apparent motiva-
tions for adopting CD. As Alanen puts the point, following some comments of Plantinga’s
[55]:
Modal propositions (propositions ascribing modality to other propositions)
would, according to this view, be subject to God’s control. God could not
have made 2+2=4 false, “He could only have made it the case that He could
have made it false. He could have made it possibly false.”[23][p. 581–583 and
589] This, however, is in conflict with Descartes’ explicit claim that God, for
instance, could make it untrue that all the lines from the center of a circle to its
circumference are equal.
[2][p. 169]
As Alanen points out, Plantinga suggests that Descartes is confused between universal and
limited possibilism. This is an option. However, it seems to me more likely that these two
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views capture parts of Descartes’ total account, while neither gets it quite right. One of the
aims of my view is to make this other alternative more compelling – Descartes did not ‘run
together’ limited and universal possibilism, but rather that both views are only part of the
correct picture.
3.3 Inner and Outer Modalities
My account follows up on insights from Frankfurt and Curley, and is primarily aimed at
preserving the obvious readings of both (1) and (2) from §3.1. Frankfurt, in stressing (2)
paid undue attention to (1), and Curley, in stressing (1), wound up making (2) appear quite
weak. Like Frankfurt, I take it that there are two distinct modal notions at work in (1) and
(2), but unlike him, I hold that both modalities are genuinely metaphysical.
Roughly, one modality concerns what must or could be the case given that God created
the world (including the essences of things) in the way He actually did. The other concerns
how God must or could have chosen to create the world. Another way to think of the latter
is that a proposition is necessary in that sense just when no matter how God creates a world,
the proposition is true, whereas a proposition is necessary in the former sense if God chose
to make it necessary (by setting up the essences in the correct way, for instance). I shall
distinguish these two notions by calling the former inner-necessity (i-necessity), and the
latter outer-necessity (o-necessity).
With this distinction, it is easy to see how to erase the tension raised in §3.1 – I simply
replace (1) and (2) with the following:
(1’) Eternal truths are i-necessary.
(2’) It is o-possible that the eternal truths are false.
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That is, intuitively speaking, the eternal truths are necessary in the sense that Curley em-
phasises. God chose to make them necessary, and they are genuinely necessary – however,
they are necessary only in light of the kind of world God created, including, most impor-
tantly, the essences He actually created. On the other hand, the eternal truths are possible
in the sense that Frankfurt calls for – God o-could have made the world in such a way
(by not creating some essences or changing some essences) such that (almost) any eter-
nal truth would be false. This disambiguation allows for the best of universal and limited
possibilism, without falling prey to the central problems associated with either. Further-
more, it closely matches the key texts without providing obvious problems for the rest of
Descartes’ philosophical work. Finally, I claim that this interpretation is both consistent
and not modally bizarre. At least, I’ll argue, its modal bizarreness is quite restricted – the
majority of Descartes’ modal reasoning is fairly intuitive.
In this, and the following two sections, I’ll discuss the details of my interpretation,
including how Cartesian essences feature into the account, that God is free to both not
create essences and to create essences to be different than they are. In so doing, I’ll attempt
to defend the claim that (1’) and (2’) capture the texts while avoiding the problems for both
Frankfurt and Curley. Afterwards, I’ll go on to consider the questions regarding consistency
and modal strangeness.
3.3.1 Modalities in Light of Essences
One of the core theses I take over from Frankfurt, though it is standard in the literature, is
that Descartes takes modal facts to be somehow determined by the essences God creates.
On my interpretation, this holds of inner modality. Roughly put, the relationship between
inner modalities and essences is as follows:
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• φ is i-necessary just in case φ is made true by the essences of created things.
• φ is i-possible just in case φ is not made false by the essences of created things.
This is a totally standard approach to modality, for the time.7 I-modalities are dependent
on essences in the sense that to say that something is i-possible to say that it is not ruled out
by the essences in question, and to say that something is i-necessary is to say that it is made
true by the essences in question. Some evidence that Descartes stuck to this kind of view is
available in the Regulae, in the discussion of Rule Twelve. Here Descartes is discussing the
connection between simple things, some of which, called simple natures, are importantly
related to his later work on true and immutable natures.
[T]he conjunction between these simple things is either necessary or con-
tingent. The conjunction is necessary when one of them is somehow implied
(albeit confusedly) in the concept of the other so that we cannot conceive ei-
ther of them distinctly if we judge them to be separate from each other.. . . if
I say that 4 and 3 make 7, the composition is a necessary one, for we do not
have a distinct conception of the number 7 unless in a confused sort of way we
include 3 and 4 in it. . . . The union between such things, however, is contingent
when the relation conjoining them is not an inseparable one. This is the case
when we say that a body is animate, that a man is dressed, etc.
(Regulae, AT 10: 421, [19][p. 46])8
An account like this is, as I say, reasonably intuitive, and in endorsing this kind of
7Only sweeping generalisations about medieval and ancient approaches to modality are compatible with
the essence of this paper. Having said that, [74, 41] present the broad outlines of the development of medieval
modal logic, and views matching this broad outline can be found there. For instance, Kilwardby’s claim that
“in order for a proposition to be necessary, it is not enough that it be true and be incapable of not being
true; rather the proposition has to state an essential and insepearable cause of the predicate’s inherence or
non-inherence in the subject.” [74][p. 361]
8That these comments are stated in terms of conceivability is something to which we’ll return later – for
now, the point is just that the broad structure of the account of necessary and contingent connections is in line
with what I have claimed.
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picture, Descartes is not radical.9 What is radical about his view, on my reading, is that he
goes farther and discusses not just modality relative to the essences of created things, but
also the essences God might have assigned to created things. Hence, the rough reading for
the outer modalities is as follows:
• φ is o-necessary just in case φ is made true by any essences God might have created.
• φ is o-possible just in case φ there are some essences God might have created which
don’t make φ false.
So the o-modalities consider not just the actually essential facts about the world, but other
essential facts which may have held, had God created different essences. So the eter-
nal truths are, indeed, necessary in that they are guaranteed by the essences God actually
created, but they are not necessary in the sense that God might have created some other
essences (or not have created some essences salient to the eternal truths in question). Eter-
nal truths are contingent, in the sense that nothing determined God to create the world,
along with its essential facts, in just the way that He did, but they are necessary in that
they are guaranteed by the way in which He did create the world, along with its essential
facts. A way of putting the distinction is in terms of absolute and relative modality – i-
necessities are necessary relative to the collection of actual essences, whereas o-necessities
are not relative to actual essences, and would be true regardless of which essences God had
created.10
9There are, of course, many disputes that come into specifying how this picture is to be filled in to provide
an account, but my point is just that this style of account does not set Descartes apart from his contemporaries
and predecessors.
10Note, contemporary authors also drew the distinction between absolute and relative necessity, but did so
in importantly different ways. I am not claiming that Descartes is taking over that account, but simply using
the language to express his view. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see [2][§6].
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Using talk of possible worlds, we can rephrase the view a bit.11 Consider the collection
of all the worlds God could have chosen to create – including ones where the essences differ
in some way from the actual world (either because these fail to have some actual essence,
or have some essence which is different from any actual essence). Call those worlds which
have all the same essences as the actual world normal – the set of normal worlds is a proper
subset of the total set of worlds. With these, we can restate the conditions above to better
fit a more contemporary understanding of modality:
• φ is i-necessary iff φ is true at all normal worlds.
• φ is i-possible iff φ is true at some normal world.
• φ is o-necessary iff φ is true at all worlds (normal or otherwise).
• φ is o-possible iff φ is true at some world (normal or otherwise).
According to this interpretation we have, for instance, that any o-necessary truth is also
i-necessary, and that any i-possible truth is o-possible, but otherwise we haven’t specified
much of the logic of these modal operators. What is important for now is just that we can
have a proposition which is i-necessary, because it is guaranteed by some actual essences,
and yet o-possibly false, because its negation is compatible with some essences God might
have created.
This raises some questions, which I shall now consider.
11I’ll use this possible worlds talk throughout the rest of the paper. Later on I shall argue that this anachro-
nism is not a dangerous one.
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3.3.2 What are Cartesian Essences?
I have been talking somewhat fast and loose about God creating a world with some essences
or essential facts, but to get my account off the ground I need to clarify what I mean in light
of Descartes’ claims regarding true and immutable natures. My aim here is not to give a
fully fleshed out account of Cartesian essences, but rather to point out some key features of
these creatures which relate to CD.12
The discussion of simple natures in the Regulae is quite explicit and provides a good
starting point. Rule Twelve of the Regulae [19][p. 39–51] concerns the order in which we
should obtain knowledge – that we should start by working to obtain what Descartes would
later call clear and distinct perceptions of propositions. Part of this project is to distinguish
between simples and complexes composed of them – for instance:
If, for example, we consider some body which has extension and shape,
we shall indeed admit that, with respect to the thing itself, it is one single and
simple entity. For, viewed in that way, it cannot be said to be a composite made
up of corporeal nature, extension and shape, since these constituents have never
existed in isolation from each other. Yet with respect to our intellect we call
it a composite made up of these three natures, because we understood each of
them separately before we were in a position to judge that the three of them
are encountered in the same time in one and the same subject.
(Regulae AT 10: 418, [19][p. 44])
So the simple natures are those which are simple with respect to the intellect, even though
they may be combined in a body. It is by starting from these natures that one can obtain
certain knowledge of the kind which Descartes’ epistemic project is aimed at. It is in
the Meditations that Descartes develops the mature version of the project laid out in the
12This picture is in line with Rozemond’s [66] moderate platonism about Cartesian essences. Further
details of this kind of account are available there.
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Regulae, and while he doesn’t continue to use the terminology “simple natures”, the project
is the same in outline, and to a large extent also in detail.
In particular, what is retained is something very much like the theory of ideas outlined
in the Regulae. This is taken up in the Fifth Meditation, as a preliminary to the ontological
argument. Here the notion of essences come up as objects of my ideas which do not seem
to represent an existing thing in the external world. He goes to some pains to claim that
essences, though we don’t access them through the sense, are not mind-dependent:
But I think the most important consideration at this point is that I find
within me countless ideas of things which even though they may not exist
anywhere outside me still cannot be called nothing; for although in a sense they
can be thought of at will, they are not my invention but have their own true and
immutable natures. When, for example, I imagine a triangle, even if perhaps
no such figure exists, or has ever existed, anywhere outside my thought, there
is a still a determinate nature, or essence, or form of the triangle which is
immutable and eternal, and not invented by me or dependent on my mind. this
is clear from the fact that various properties can be demonstrated of the triangle,
for example that its three angles equal two right angles, that its greatest side
subtends its greatest angle, and the like; and since these properties are ones
which I now clearly recognise whether I want to or not, even if I never thought
of them at all when I previously imagined the triangle, it follows that they
cannot have been invented by me.
(Meditations, AT 7:64, [18][p. 44-45]
To put it briefly, Cartesian essences are (human-)mind-independent13, non-existent (or not
necessarily existent14) things which my ideas can represent, and about which I can come to
know, with certainty, eternal truths. In addition, as we have seen in the discussion regarding
Frankfurt, God has voluntary control over them, and this is where CD gets its bite. The fact
13They are not, however, independent of God’s mind – hence Rozemond’s [66] label moderate platonism.
14For further comment on the existence of ‘merely possible’ essences, see the Conversation with Burman
AT 5:160, [20][p. 343]
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that they are mind-independent puts pressure on Frankfurt’s contention that (1) in §3.1
should be understood purely epistemically – if essences are mind-independent entities then
how can truths about them (eternal truths) be reliant on the makeup of the human mind?
This consideration provide more evidence of the claim that, according to Descartes, the
necessity of eternal truths is not just a matter of our inability to conceive them being false.15
This is part of the grounds for my claiming that i-necessary truths are genuine metaphysical
necessities for Descartes, pace Frankfurt.
3.3.3 Connection between Essences and Eternal Truths
Recall the passage, previously quoted, from the 27 May 1630 letter to Mersenne – particular
the claim “For it is certain that He is the author of the essence of created things no less than
of their existence; and their essence is nothing other than the eternal truths.”[20][p. 25]
The standard line seems to be that this should be understood as claiming that the
essences determine the eternal truths – it is the essence ‘circularity’ having certain fea-
tures, such as having all equal radii, that determines that the proposition “all the radii of the
circle are equal” is necessary. This, for instance, is the way Cottingham discusses it in the
Descartes Dictionary. [17][p. 57–58] There he distinguishes two kinds of eternal truths –
truths about essences and common notions (we’ll come back to consider common notions
in a later section). So on that reading, eternal truths are different in kind from essences
in that the former are propositional whereas the latter are not. This is a natural distinction
to make in light of contemporary distinctions between propositions and whatever it is that
accounts for the truth values of propositions: facts, truthmakers, etc. However, the phras-
15The relationship between conceivability and possibility is important in Descartes’ philosophical project,
and it’s one I’ll come back to later in the paper. However, the point here is that they are at least distinct notions
in the sense that a propositions’ being necessary is not merely a matter of its falsity being inconceivable.
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ing of this passage above also seems to allow that the eternal truths might just be essences
themselves. There are two ways I can see a view like this going. One might claim that
eternal truths are essences of a kind (and so are a kind of thing), and they bear important
relations – some kind of inverse truthmaking relation, perhaps – to other essences. On this
view the essence circularity stands in the truthmaking relation to another essence, namely,
“All the radii of the circle are equal”. So the essence circularity and this eternal truth about
circles are distinct, but both are actually essences. Another, and perhaps more natural, way
to go is with a stronger identity thesis. Alanen [2][p. 161] might suggest a line like this:
“Descartes identifies the eternal truths with the essences of the creatures”, as does Roze-
mond [66]. On a reading like this, it would seem, there is no difference at all between
an essence (had by a creature) and an eternal truth (‘about’ that creature). So “Circles are
trilateral” the essence ‘circularity’ are the same thing.16
There are a number of potentially interesting readings available here, and these seem
well worth exploring, but for my purposes, it’s not obvious that any one of these accounts
tells for or against the reading of CD that I develop here. So I leave the matter at this, and
continue developing the view without any particular attention to the distinctions between
these various readings, and continue to talk loosely of a determination relation between
eternal truths and the essences they concern.
16This identification of proposition and object may be in line with the kind of self-induced confusion
Camp [14][p. 191–193] diagnoses in Descartes’ identification of act of awareness and object of awareness.
On this view Descartes would be intentionally blurring the, apparent, distinction between a proposition and
its truthmaker. There is much more that needs to be said in order to state a Camp-style reading of the relation
between essences and eternal truths, and I include it here merely to note that it’s an option. Thanks to Dave
Ripley for pointing out this connection.
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3.3.4 Essences Dependent on God’s Will
As I earlier suggested, the radical feature of CD as against Descartes’ predecessors and
contemporaries is that essences are fully dependent on God’s will. While those in the
Thomist tradition would hold that God’s options in creating the world are limited by the
fact that, for instance, trilaterality is contained in the essence of circularity, Descartes holds
it is blasphemous to claim that circularity is independent of God’s will.
As for the eternal truths, I say once more that they are true or possible only
because God knows them as true or possible. They are not known as true by
God in any way which would imply that they are true independently of Him.
If men really understood the sense of their words they could never say without
blasphemy that the truth of anything is prior to the knowledge which God has
of it. In God, knowing and willing are a single thing in such a way that by the
very fact of willing something He knows it and it is only for this reason that
such a thing is true. So, we must not say that if God did not exist nevertheless
these truths would be true; for the existence of God is the first and most eternal
of all possible truths and the one from which alone all others proceed.
(To Mersenne, 6 May 1630, AT 1:146–150 [20][p. 24])
In addition to providing justification or the thesis that essences are dependent on God,
this passage makes it eminently clear that both the truth and the possibility of the eternal
truths is under God’s direct voluntary control. This reinforces the problem, raised earlier,
that limited possibilism doesn’t capture the full scope of CD – it’s not just modal features
of eternal truths that are dependent on God’s free will, but also their truth simpliciter.17
Having said that, Descartes is fairly explicit here that God does have control over the modal
properties of propositions – this provides part of the grist for my mill in that God does
17There is an interpretive difficulty with how the first occurrence of “or” in the passage should be under-
stood – is it an a genuine disjunction, or is the second disjunct to be understood as a mere restatement of the
first. In this case, it seems odd to take “the eternal truths are possible” as a restatement of “the eternal truths
are true”, so the former reading seems more natural.
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make it that propositions are necessary. That is, He makes propositions i-necessary – the
o-modalities track the limits of His options in performing this creation. That is to say,
on the multimodal account, the i-modalities are those over which God has control. The
o-modalities serve to express facts about God’s powers.18
There is, I take it, plenty of evidence to read Descartes claims about the eternal truths
as modal, but to defend this view, additional reason is needed to read Descartes’ claims
as invoking the second, o-modality. I do not suggest that he does so explicitly – that’s
why, to borrow a comment of Curley’s [23][p. 570] my reading is an interpretation and
not a restatement of Descartes’ view. The best reason I know of is invited by the question
of how one should understand uses of apparent modal talk to discuss the relationship of
dependence between the eternal truths (and essences) and God. Consider the following
claims, which have been, or will be, quoted in full context elsewhere in the paper:
• “our mind is finite and so created as to be able to conceive as possible things which
God could have made possible, but which He nevertheless wished to make impossi-
ble.” [20][p. 235]
• “if God has established these truths, He could change them as a king changes his
laws. To this the answer is: Yes He can, if His will can change. . . [20][p. 23]
• “I boldly assert that God can do everything which I conceive to be possible, but I am
not so bold as to deny that He can do whatever conflicts with my understanding. . . ”
[20][p. 363]
• “God cannot have been determined to make it true that contradictories cannot be true
together, and therefore He could have done the opposite.” [20][p. 235]
18So it does not make sense to ask whether God has control over the o- modalities – these just express facts
about what God has control over.
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These are some of the canonical statements of CD, and they involve fairly explicit modals
“can” and “could”, referring directly to God’s scope of options in creating the world. That
is, here, and elsewhere, we see talk of what options God has in creating the world, and the
o-modalities I propose express this talk. To say that it is o-necessary that φ is to say that
there was no option available to God, in creating the world, which failed to make φ true.
The thrust of CD is to say that since the essences of created things are within the voluntary
control of God’s will, there are options available to God in which they are different, or fail
to exist. To return to possible worlds talk, the non-normal worlds are available as options
for God in creating the world, and at these worlds eternal truths can fail.
To recap here, the indirect textual evidence for multiple modalities is Descartes’ use
of apparent modal terminology to talk about God’s options. In light of this, the claim
of CD, that God’s options include some situations where eternal truths are false, demand
a distinction between the outer modality tracking God’s options, and inner modality, in
keeping with an essentialist picture.
3.4 The Freedom of God’s Will
I have set out a multimodal interpretation of CD, and given some reasons in favour of it.
In this section, I shall discuss further Descartes’ account of God’s nature, and in particular
how this account makes sense of God’s freedom in creation. The claim that God’s will
is free and unrestrained in the act of creation is central to CD, and so a clear picture of
Descartes’ views on God’s will is important. In particular, some key issues I discuss are
the relationship between God’s intellect and God’s will and the nature of indifference.
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3.4.1 The Divine Understanding and the Divine Will
In the treatment of Frankfurt and elsewhere, we have seen glimpses of the peculiar kind
of Divine Simplicity thesis Descartes adopts, according to which there is no distinction in
God between knowing and willing. Perhaps the most clear statements are in the 6 May
1630 letter to Mersenne: “ In God willing and knowing are a single thing in such a way
that by the very fact of willing something He knows it and it is only for this reason that
such a thing is true”(AT 1:149 [20][p. 24]) and the 27 May 1630 letter “In God, willing
understanding and creating are all the same thing without one being prior to the other even
conceptually.” (AT 1:153 [20][p. 25–26])
Kaufman points out how this simplicity thesis distinguishes Descartes from Leibniz,
who also holds the view that essences and eternal truths depend on God. As Kaufman puts
it, “Leibniz believes that the eternal truths exist in and depend on God’s understanding but
not God’s will.”[40][p. 36] For Descartes, there is no such distinction. In God, seeing that it
is necessary that triangles are trilateral, and willing the necessity of this proposition, are one
and the same action. As another example, there is no difference, in Genesis, between God’s
creating light, and His seeing that it was good. In contrast to human beings – more on this
in the following section – God’s believing a proposition does not involve a movement in
God’s will following a light in God’s intellect. Rather, they, being the same divine faculty,
move in unison. So God’s will is not determined by what God’s intellect perceives – it’s
for this reason that God is not constrained by considerations of what is necessary. The
response in God’s intellect to what is necessary is the same as God’s willing to create what
is necessary in the first place.
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3.4.2 Indifference: Divine and Human
This plays directly into Descartes’ reliance on Divine Indifference when discussing CD.
He famously holds that the human will is most free when responding to compelling reason
to believe. This is most clearly stated in the fourth Meditation, in a discussion of the
interaction of human will and intellect in the formation of ideas and judgements, and how
we fall into error in forming beliefs. In this passage, Descartes propounds the view that
human free will, unlike that of God, is not correctly characterised in terms of indifference:
In order to be free, there is no need for me to be inclined in both ways [be-
tween a proposition and its negation]; on the contrary, the more I incline in one
direction – either because I clearly understand the reasons of truth and good-
ness point that way, or because of a divinely produced disposition of my inmost
thoughts – the freer is my choice. Neither divine grace nor natural knowledge
ever diminishes freedom; on the contrary, they increase and strengthen it. But
the indifference I feel when there is no reason pushing me in one direction
rather than another is the lowest grade of freedom; it is evidence not of any
kind of perfection of freedom, but rather of a defect in knowledge or a kind of
negation. For if I always saw clearly what was true and good, I should never
have to deliberate about the right judgement or choice; in that case, although
I should be wholly free, it would be impossible for me ever to be in a state of
indifference.
(Meditations, AT 7: 57–57, [18][p. 40])
The human will is freest and most perfect when responding to what it is given by the
intellect, responding to clear and distinct perceptions. God’s will, however, cannot be so
responsive to His intellect. This is a consequence of the Divine Simplicity thesis to which
Descartes commits himself, and it’s a consequence of which he is clearly aware, and which
he embraces. The following passage sees a lengthy discussion of this point:
As for the freedom of the will, the way in which it exists in God is quite dif-
ferent from the way in which it exists in us. It is self-contradictory to suppose
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that the will of God was not indifferent from eternity with respect to everything
which has happened or will ever happen; for it is impossible to imagine that
anything is thought of in the divine intellect as good or true, or worthy of belief
or action or omission, prior to the decision of the divine will to make it so. I
am not speaking here merely19 of temporal priority: I mean that there is not
even any priority of order, or nature, or of ‘rationally determined reason’ as
they call it, such that God’s idea of the good impelled Him to choose one thing
rather than another. For example, God did not will the creation of the world
in time because He saw it would be better this way than if He created it from
eternity; nor did He will that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to
two right angles because He recognised that it could not be otherwise, and so
on. On the contrary, it is because He willed to create the world in time that it
is better this way than if He had created it from eternity; and it is because He
willed that the three right angles of a triangle should necessarily equal to two
right angles that this is true and cannot be otherwise; and so on in other cases.
(Sixth Replies, AT 7:431–432, [18][p. 291])
The characteristic fact of God’s freedom is divine indifference – that is, following Kauf-
man’s lead [40][p. 38], nothing independent of God impelled or determined God to will
what He actually willed to be true. There couldn’t be anything separate from God to which
God’s intellect could respond in guiding God’s will, because God’s will and intellect are
identical. Thus, God’s will is indifferent, and since the eternal truths are dependent on
God’s will, God is indifferent w.r.t. the eternal truths. Kaufman’s view, to be further dis-
cussed in §3.8, has it that divine indifference is all there is to CD, which has no modal force.
Here I diverge, and claim that it is because God’s will is indifferent w.r.t. eternal truths that
CD has modal force - i.e. that the eternal truths are o-possibly false.
According to this sketch, it is this divine indifference that explains why it’s true that
God o-could have made some i-necessary propositions false. This modal fact is explained
19This “merely” is omitted in the CSM translation, but is included in Haldane and Ross [34][p. 248] – I
include it for emphasis.
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by (1) divine indifference and (2) the fact that all of creation is entirely dependent on the
act of God’s creation. Roughly speaking, here are the inferential moves as I read them in
Descartes:
(P1) Divine Simplicity: God’s intellect and will are identical
(C1) Divine Indifference: God’s will is not determined by any independent factor.
(P2) Dependence: Creation is entirely dependent upon God’s will.
(P3) Essences, and therefore eternal truths, are created.
(C2) Given an eternal truth φ, God was not determined to make φ true.
(C3) Therefore, God could have done the opposite of making φ true.
(C4) Therefore, God could have made ¬φ true.
(C5) ¬φ is o-possible.
So, pace Kaufman, I don’t take it that divine indifference exhausts the intended import of
CD, but is rather part of a broader argument in favour of CD, which does have modal force.
The move that most clearly distinguishes our views is that from C2 to C3 – I take it that
God’s will’s being undetermined, as per C1, does not exhaust the meaning of the “could”
in C3–C4, but rather entails that “could” claim, which is a modal claim.
This completes the presentation of my core account. In the rest of the paper, I’ll discuss
the way in which logic falls under the intended scope of CD, whether there are any outer
necessary truths, how epistemic modalities fit into the proposed picture, and close with
some sundry topics and potential objections.
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3.5 God’s Freedom to Create Logic
So far, I’ve focused on God’s free creation of essences with little discussion for God’s
free creation of logic, but this involves some additional difficulties. Under the assumption
that essences are objects, it is easy to understand how God’s freedom with regard to the
creation of those objects how God has free control over the eternal truths concerning them.
It’s harder to understand how to extend this modal to account for how God can create logic.
We have seen a passage in which Descartes indicates that even logic is in the scope of CD,
when he claims that God could have done the opposite of making it true that contradictories
cannot be true together. [20][p. 235] Given the state of logic at the time, it’s likely that
this claim was intended to have a broader impact than simply to allow for some kind of
paraconsistent possibilities. Rather, it was most likely intended to indicate that God has
control over all of logic, and so could have made logic different in any number of ways – not
just by making the law of non-contradiction (or, more aptly, ex contradictione quodlibet)
false.
In what way does God’s control over the essences of created things also grant Him
control over logic? Logic concerns relations of consequence between propositions, and
not objects directly (at least, it’s not obvious that logic concerns particular objects). So
the question is how changing the essences (of objects) could affect logic. The following
passage from the Regulae gives the grist of an answer – logic is itself a matter determined
by essences of a certain kind. In this passage, Descartes is once again considering simple
natures and the role they play in our knowledge acquisition. Most interesting here is that
he gives common notions as examples (the emphasis in the following quotation is mine):
[T]hose things which are said to be simple with respect to our intellect are,
on our view, either purely intellectual or purely material, or common to both.
Those simple natures which the intellect recognises by means of a sort of innate
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light, without the aid of any corporeal image, are purely intellectual. . . . Those
simple natures, on the other hand, which are recognised only in bodies – such
as shape, extension and motion, etc. – are purely material. Lastly those simples
are to be termed ‘common’ which are ascribed indifferently, now to corporeal
things, now to spirits – for instance, existence, unity, duration, and the like.
To this class we must also refer those common notions which are, as it were,
links which connect other simple natures together, and whose self-evidence
is the basis for all the rational inferences we make. Examples of these are:
‘Things that are the same as a third thing are the same as each other’; ‘Things
that cannot be related in the same way to a third thing are different in some
respect.’ These common notions can be known either by the pure intellect or
by the intellect as it intuits the images of material things.
(Regulae AT 10: 419–420, [19][p. 44–45] – my emphasis)
This passage makes it seem that among the simple natures are logical rules. “Common
notion” is the name given in the Elements for those most general principles which hold
regardless of the figure under study. The content of these include some arithmetic axioms,
but others, those mentioned by Descartes and Common Notion 5 “The whole is greater than
its part”, are more general than this and are, plausibly, basic logical principles. This passage
extends that to include the basis for good inferences in general – this would seem to include
logical inference rules like the law of non-contradiction, or ex contradictione quodlibet.
Descartes gives some indication of the extended generality of this class of common notions
in the Principles:
But when we recognise that it is impossible for anything to come from
nothing, the proposition Nothing comes from nothing is regarded not as a really
existing thing, or even as a mode of a thing, but as an eternal truth which
resides within our mind. Such truths are termed common notions or axioms.
The following are examples of this class: It is impossible for the same thing
to be and not to be at the same time; What is done cannot be undone; He who
thinks cannot but exist while he thinks; and countless others.
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(Principles Pt. 1, Art. 49, AT 8A: 23 – 24, [19][p. 209])
These passages provides a natural option – God’s power over logic is just the same as
His power over other eternal truths though essences. Logical inferences are themselves
based on the links connecting essences (simple natures), which links are themselves just
more essences. We can grasp them just as we grasp mathematical essences, and their truth
guides our reasoning as we contemplate mathematical essences, or reason about extension,
for instance. So, in creating a collection of essences, God is creating logic in just the same
way that He is creating, for instance, numbers and geometrical figures, and so His power
over logic is of a piece with His power over other essential truths.
There are many issues to be ironed out here. How do logical essences relate to non-
logical essences, and how do these relations serve to guide logical reasoning? Further,
if logical truths are wholly general and don’t rely on particular names and predicates (for
instance), then it seems that, whatever relations in which they stand to non-logical essences,
they must stand in those relations to all non-logical essences. These are difficult problems,
and I don’t have fully satisfying answers to these questions, but the initial idea - that eternal
truths about logic concern essences which stand in some relations to other essences - seems
a promising way to proceed.
However, this view may provide one reason to prefer the strong identity thesis men-
tioned in §3.3.3. If essences are just eternal truths, then the relations between essences
provided by logic are just those of consequence among eternal truths. Further, on the iden-
tity reading to say that logical truths are (determined by) essences is just to say that they
are eternal truths, and that God creates these ex nihilo. This strikes me as less mysterious
than saying that God creates some essences, which are not eternal truths, which determine
logical truths by standing in various relations with other essences. I have tried to stay ag-
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nostic between various readings of the relation between eternal truths and essences, but this
provides some reason to think that my account best suits an identity thesis. This is not to
say that only the identity thesis makes sense, but the other theses raise problems which the
identity thesis seems to dissipate.
Regardless of how one fills in the question regarding the relationship between essences
and eternal truths, an interesting consequence of understanding logical truth as determined
by essences is that logical necessity is not something separate from, and more broad than,
metaphysical necessity. We can understand metaphysical necessity as being either i-necessity
or o-necessity, and understanding logical necessity as determined by a class of essences has
it that logical necessity is not broader than either of these. Logical necessity is stricter than
o-necessity, as God could have made some other logical truths, and logical necessity is no
broader than i-necessity, of which it is a species.
3.5.1 Descartes as a Dialethiest?
It should be clearly noted that I am not claiming that Descartes was a dialethiest - this
would stretch credulity, and correctly so as it is clearly not the case. To make this clear,
the dialethiest claims that some contradictions are true, whereas related weaker positions
merely hold them to be possible. While I claim that there is a kind of possibility for which
the latter claim is true, Descartes does not hold that there are actually true contradictions –
indeed, they are i-impossible on his account. For instance, in the letter to Mesland 1944,
he claims that God made the world such that contradictories couldn’t be true together, and
I read this couldn’t as expressing this i-impossibility. That contradictions o-could be true
does not entail that they i-could be true. There is a great deal of evidence that Descartes did
hold the law of non-contradiction to be (i-) necessary – it’s this presupposition that makes
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it noteworthy when claims that God could have done the opposite.
There aren’t, to my knowledge, any contemporary positions which map on to the modal
metaphysics which I attribute to Descartes – this is one of the reasons I take it to be inter-
esting. In the broad sense, the view I am attributing to Descartes is that in considering
some matters, namely God’s will and His act of creation, impossible situations (worlds)
are relevant to the discourse, because they are options for God, even if they are impossible.
Unlike most recent authors who have defended a version of this view (see [62, 56, 49])
I don’t take Descartes to be committed to a paraconsistent logic – his commitment to the
law of non-contradiction, and more importantly to ex contradictione quodlibet, is obvious
and clear. I don’t have a fleshed out account of Descartes’ logical commitments, and this a
topic about which he writes so little that a detailed account is likely not forthcoming. All
that he is committed to, on this reading, is that some i-necessary propositions (including
some that are logical) are o-possibly false. This doesn’t commit him to dialethiesm, nor
to the position that contradictions are conceivable, nor to other related views developed
in the literature on impossible worlds, or paraconsistent logic. Ideally, his view may pro-
vide some insight into positions available in that literature, and on the literature regarding
counterpossible, countermathematical, and counterlogical reasoning, but drawing out these
remarks is left for future work.
3.6 The Scope of CD
An important question which has been raised in some of the interpreters I’ve considered
is that of delineating the intended scope of CD. Over just which necessary truths is God
supposed to have free control? Frankfurt claimed, for instance, that God has free control
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even over eternal truths about Himself – and so, presumably, God could have made it that
He doesn’t exist – whereas Gueroult and others have claimed otherwise.
I hold that Descartes’ view has it that certain eternal truths about God are o-necessary,
against Frankfurt. The truths I consider are not exactly those listed by Gueroult, but only
because I would exclude some he includes. I have two reasons for thinking that some
eternal truths about God are o-necessary – the first serves to justify the existential claim,
and the second serves to justify some particular instances.
A preliminary consideration is that in the most explicit passage connecting the eternal
truths and essences, Descartes says that “God is the author of the essence of created things
no less than their existence” [20][p. 25], not that God is the author of the essence of ev-
erything. If Descartes held that God was not a created thing, then presumably this passage
provides some reason to think that Descartes did not mean to include in the scope of CD
those eternal truths about the essence of God. That is, this omission is some evidence that
Descartes held that God does not have free control over His own essence.20
A more serious consideration arises in some problems with fitting CD into Descartes’
broader commitments. To bring these out, I’ll first need to say something about how con-
ceivability fits into the kinds of possibility I distinguish. Toward that, there seem to be
good reasons to think that Descartes was committed to the claim that conceivability is co-
extensive with some kind of possibility, and a result of this is that it is o-necessary that God
is not a deceiver (and, per force, that He exists).
20Thanks are due to Donald Baxter for suggesting this point.
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3.6.1 McFetridge and the Matching Argument
To start, I’ll discuss an argument to the effect that i-possibility is co-extensive with con-
ceivability. In view of this, I’ll consider McFetridge’s [51] treatment of an argument, what
he calls the matching argument, of the Second Replies. Further, I’ll argue that this co-
extensivity is o-necessary on the grounds that this is what’s needed for this argument to go
through. The key upshot of this is that God is bound (by o-necessity) to make it that our
faculty of conceivability, to be fleshed out more momentarily, matches the world, and its
essential features. This, I take it, is tantamount to claiming that God is o-necessarily not
a deceiver – God could have made the world in other ways, and with other essences, but
whichever way He made the world, He o-cannot have made thinking things which are, in
principle, incapable of obtaining knowledge about that world.
The co-extensivity thesis claims that φ is i-possible iff φ is conceivable. McFetridge
[51] explicitly defends the direction: no claim is conceivable without being possible. This
is the thesis which is most essential in Descartes’ epistemic project – it seems to follow
from the truth rule. Suppose I had a clear and distinct perception of φ, then I clearly and
distinct perceive that it is true, and therefore that it is possible. Thus, by the truth rule, φ is
possible.21
In addition to this, McFetridge points to a passage in the replies to the second set
of objections to the Meditations which makes it clear that Descartes is committed to the
claim that there can be nothing conceivable but not possible. The passage is worth quot-
ing at length. Descartes is responding to Mersenne’s criticism of Descartes’ argument in
the fifth meditation that God exists. Mersenne holds that what Descartes shows in that
meditation is only that existence belongs to the nature of God, but not that God exists
21Thanks to Lionel Shapiro for helping me get clear on this point.
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because Descartes has not successfully argued that God’s nature is possible.[18][p. 91]
Descartes takes Mersenne to open the argument with the major premise ‘That which we
clearly understand to belong to the nature of something can be truly asserted to belong to
its nature.”[18][p.106] In the following passage, he corrects this error (it should say “That
which we clearly understand to belong to the nature of something can be truly asserted
of it”), and goes on to argue that our clear and distinct perception of God’s nature does
provide us with knowledge that God’s nature is possible. These comments give rise to
the passage of most interest here, that possibility, understood metaphysically, must match
conceivability.
[To] deploy the objection which you go on to make, you should have de-
nied the major premise and said instead ‘What we clearly understand to belong
to the nature of a thing cannot for that reason be affirmed of that thing unless
its nature is possible, or non-contradictory.’ But please notice how weak this
qualification is. If by ‘possible’ you mean what everyone commonly means,
namely, ‘whatever does not conflict with our human concepts’, then it is man-
ifest that the nature of God, as I have described it, is possible in this sense,
since I supposed it to contain only what, according to our clear and distinct
perceptions, must belong to it; and hence it cannot conflict with our concepts.
Alternately, you may well be imagining some other kind of possibility which
relates to the object itself; but unless this matches the first sort of possibility it
can never be known by the human intellect22, and so it does not so much sup-
port a denial of God’s nature and existence as serve to undermine every other
item of human knowledge. . . . if we deny that the nature of God is possible, we
may just as well deny that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles,
or that he who is actually thinking exists; and if we do this it will be even more
appropriate to deny that anything we acquire by means of the senses is true.
The upshot will be that all human knowledge will be destroyed, though for no
good reason. [My emphasis]
22Original “. . . nisi cum praecedente conveniat, nunquam ab humano intellectu cognisi potest. . . ”
65
(AT 7:150-151 [18][p. 107])
The discussion is most important in that it states that the kind of possibility which re-
lates to the object itself must match this common notion of possibility, which can be nicely
characterised as Chalmer’s negative conceivability. According to Chalmer’s characterisa-
tion, φ is negatively conceivable iff φ is not ruled out a priori. [15][p. 149] This is the kind
of conceivability I discuss throughout the paper. Descartes seems to explicitly endorse
reading conceivability in these negative terms when, in the letter to Voetius, he remarks:
“if he is asked how he knows that this is impossible, he must answer that
he knows it from the fact that it implies a contradiction – that is, it cannot be
conceived.”
(To Voetius May 1643, AT 8B:60 [20][p. 222])
The passage from the replies (AT VII 150–151) only directly defends the claim that
conceivability entails possibility, which is some kind of ‘matching’. Cottingham et al use
“to match” to translate convenire, which has the alternate meaning “to fit” or “to agree
with”. This last reading may make the co-extensivity thesis more plausible than “to match”,
but there may be another way for conceivability and possibility to agree with one another
while not being co-extensive.
McFetridge takes it for granted (saying that it’s uncontroversial) that Descartes is com-
mitted to the claim that if φ is possible then φ is conceivable, but there is a better defence
of this claim available. Suppose that φ were possible but not conceivable. Then we could
rule out φ on purely a priori grounds, apparently coming to the clear and distinct perception
that φ is necessarily false. By the truth rule, then, it must be true that φ is necessarily false,
which itself is false.
To step back into my account, I take it that conceivability is co-extensive with i-possibility.
In addition, there is good reason to suppose that Descartes is committed to the fact that this
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equivalence is not only true, but o-necessary. That is, God could not have created the
essences of His creatures in such a way that modal facts determined by these essences were
in-principle outside of the reach of our faculty of conceivability. However, this does not
entail that outer possibility is co-extensive with conceivability. This last claim is evidenced
by the 2 May 1644 letter to Mesland in which Descartes writes: “our mind is finite and
so created as to be able to conceive as possible the things which God has wished to be in
fact possible, but not be able to conceive as possible things which God could have made
possible, which He has nevertheless wished to make impossible.” [20][p. 235] I take it
from this that Descartes not only doesn’t think that our conceivability should match what
God o-could have brought about, but that he explicitly holds that it cannot. Not only isn’t
it required that conceivability matches o-possibility, it is not i-possible for us to conceive
of an i-impossibility which is o-possible.
So, a consequence of God’s o-necessarily not being a deceiver is that it is also o-
necessary that i-possibility and conceivability match. As an example: had God created
the essence triangularity differently than He actually did, He would have been bound to
alter our conceptual faculties in such a way that we could conceive this essence in just the
same way we can conceive the actual essence of triangularity. Otherwise, we would be
deceived about the natures of the triangles.
As a more general upshot for the interaction between my reading of CD and Descartes’
epistemic project, for the purposes of vouchsafing certain knowledge, i-necessity is neces-
sity enough. Put in slightly different terms, given that our knowledge is tied to the actual
world, and the actual essences of things, o-modalities don’t have a dramatic impact on our
epistemic states.
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3.7 Consistency and Bizarre Modal Theses
In §3.5.3 I pointed out that the multimodal reading does not commit Descartes to dialethe-
ism. Indeed, the view is consistent in the sense that it does not commit Descartes to any
pair of contradictory claims. To properly defend this, a logical argument is necessary, and
that would involve developing a model theory capturing the view, which goes beyond the
aims of this paper. Having said this, some reasons can be evinced for the claim that CD
is consistent. For all I’ve said, while Descartes is committed to the o-possibility of propo-
sitions of the form φ and ¬φ, this does not entail the i-possibility or truth of any such
propositions. At worst, Descartes is committed to the truth of contradictions only under
the scope of o-possibility, and this is just a commitment, which I take him to accept, to
God’s being able to create the world in such a way as to make contradictions true. He is
not, however, committed to any inference form which would generate a contradiction from
this set of entailments. For instance, it is not true that it is not o-possible for φ and ¬φ to
be true, for in order for this to be the case it would mean that God is, while able to create
the world so as to make φ and ¬φ true, also unable to create the world in this way. Nothing
about the view gives reason to think that Descartes has this pair of commitments.
Further, CD does not commit Descartes to especially modally bizarre claims. Now, it is
somewhat bizarre to hold that there are two different modalities, but, for the most part, the
o-modalities don’t enter into Descartes’ reasoning. For my part, the only points in the text
in which it seems that Descartes invokes the o-possibility are those in which he is explicitly
reasoning about what it is in God’s power to do (and the majority of such passages have
been quoted, indicating the dearth of discussion on this topic in Descartes’ philosophical
output). Outside of these passages, and outside of reasoning about what God could have
done, Descartes only concerns himself with i-modalities – these are what matters for the
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epistemic project of the Meditations, as I’ve argued, and these provide the actual constraints
on physical and mathematical reasoning. The picture of i-modalities as determined by the
actual essences of things is, for its part, quite standard. So, the modal bizarreness in the
account is not widespread, but shows up only in certain kinds of reasoning, concerning
what God could have brought about, and Descartes even casts doubt upon our abilities to
reason fruitfully about those topics at all, since we can’t conceive these o-possibilities.
I take these considerations to show that not only is the view consistent, but it is not
modally bizarre in any way which should trouble us. Those bits of bizarreness are sys-
tematic, and explainable within the broader theory. Bizarreness of that sort looks less like
confusion on Descartes’, and more like bizarreness due to the unfamiliarity of his meta-
physical picture.
3.8 Comparisons to Other Recent Interpretations
Kaufman: CD is Not a Modal Thesis
Kaufman [39, 40] claims that CD is not a modal thesis, but rather merely concerns divine
indifference, which can be understood without invoking modality. While I take it that a
reason in favour of my account is that one may take Descartes’ use of modal terminology
at face value, Kaufman argues that this surface appearance of modality is misleading. So
I’ll take a moment here to consider his reading of CD, and consider the extent to which his
claims speak against my interpretation.
Kaufman’s account [40] is given in response to attempts, like those given by some
interpretations we discussed earlier, to understand the modal implications of the use of
words like “can” and “could” in the various claims of and surrounding CD (like those cited
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in a previous section). His view is, where φ is an eternal truth, Descartes is committed to
the claim that God could have willed ¬φ, but that he is not committed to the claim that ¬φ
is possible in virtue of this previous, or any other, commitments.
Kaufman argues that, since “a proposition is true only if God wills it to be true” is
a consequence of CD, and that this holds for modal as well as non-modal propositions
[40][p. 36] From this he concludes that in order for it to be true that the negation of some
eternal truth φ is possible (or possibly possible), it must be that God willed the truth of
the proposition “¬φ is possible”. But, Kaufman concludes, since God has willed that the
eternal truths are necessary, He did not will that any eternal truth is possibly false. He takes
this reason to motivate his view that CD is not a modal claim. How I take account of the
various claims involving divine indifference has already been discussed, so I want to turn to
some reasons to think, first, that a modal interpretation of CD has its benefits and, second,
that my interpretation does not result in the problem Kaufman raises above.
The main reason to prefer a modal account of CD is that the terms Descartes uses are
distinctly modal, and so an interpretation which attempts to avoid the modal talk apparent
in the passages has a higher price to pay for its credibility. Furthermore, that the passage
includes these apparent modals is borne out by the overwhelming tendency of interpreters
of CD to give modal accounts. Of course, they could all be wrong, but this weight of
previous interpretations and the apparent modalities used in expressing the doctrine lead
me to think that, ceteris paribus, a modal account of CD is preferable to a non-modal
account.
As a further consideration, it’s not just bare modals like could and can which appear
to be used in Descartes’ discussion surrounding CD. He also seems to use modals embed-
ded in counterfactual conditionals, for example (I emphasise the explicitly counterfactual
reasoning):
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You ask whether there would be real space, as there is now, if God had
created nothing. At first this question seems to be beyond the capacity of the
human mind, like infinity, so that it would be unreasonable to discuss it; but
in fact I think that it is merely beyond the capacity of the imagination, like
the questions of the existence of God and of the human soul. I believe that our
intellect can reach the truth of the matter, which is, in my opinion, that not only
would there not be any space, but even those truths which are called eternal,
as that ‘the whole is greater than its part’ – would not be truths if God had not
so established. . .
(To Mersenne, 27 May 1638, AT 2:138 [20][p. 102–103])
The passage does have a counterfactual conditional, though with a complex antecedent.
For clarity, when I refer to the counterfactual conditional in the above passage, I take it to
be the following (where I take it that saying that the eternal truths “would not be truths” is
interchangeable with saying that they “would be false”):
If God had created nothing, then the eternal truths would be false.
Our best understanding of counterfactual conditionals is given by an account, due orig-
inally to Stalnaker [73] and Lewis [47], which employs modals, and it is unclear that there
is a good account of counterfactuals available which does not employ modals. By work-
ing within a modal interpretation of CD, I have the tools necessary to interpret the above
passage– indeed, I take it that my interpretation alone has the tools necessary to properly
interpret this passage. On my reading, using the Lewis-Stalnaker approach to counterfactu-
als, the passage above should be read as saying that among the worlds where God created
nothing, the closest have it that all the eternal truths are false – they are only i-necessary,
after all.
The situation outlined in the antecedent, that God created nothing, is impossible in the
sense that it is not compatible with the eternal truths since, as Descartes concludes, none of
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them would be true. Given that the eternal truths are necessary, it follows that the situation
under consideration in this passage is impossible. So not only is the situation counterfac-
tual, it is also counterpossible. My interpretation can account for this by having invoking
worlds at which eternal truths are false, including some where God created nothing – these
worlds aren’t i-possible, they are o-possible. On my reading, Descartes is making a sub-
stantial claim to the effect that at any such world, the eternal truths would be false.
There are still difficulties and questions that need answering on my account – what does
it mean to have a world in which God created nothing, for instance – but the rough-and-
ready framework for counterfactuals provides a starting point for my interpretation. The
opponent who takes CD not to be modal doesn’t have this kind of analysis available – they
have to explain away the apparent modality of the bare modals like could and can, as well
as the apparent modality of this conuterfactual reasoning. This is not to say that Kaufman
couldn’t provide an account, but that this starts to look like a tall order.
Curley’s Limited Possibilism and Geach’s Suggestion
Curley’s interpretation [23] follows a suggestion he attributes to Geach that the creation
doctrine involves “not a denial that there are necessary truths, but a denial that those which
are necessary are necessarily necessary.” [2][p. 168] Geach seems to have intended this
remark to indicate that the creation doctrine should be understood as involving a denial of
the principle characterising S4: if φ is necessary then it is necessary that φ is necessary. On
my interpretation, this same intuition can be more helpfully characterised by saying that it’s
not the case that if φ is i-necessary then φ is o-necessary – in other words, it is i-possible
that φ is i-necessary while ¬φ is o-possible. This is built right into my interpretation, and in
this sense, I am also following Geach’s suggestion as against Frankfurt, while still holding,
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with Frankfurt, that o-necessity is largely unrestricted.
Another way of looking at this commitment of my interpretation is that most propo-
sitions, whether or not they are i-possible, are o-contingent. In this sense, the i-necessity
and i-possibility of propositions is an o-contingent affair, but as against van Cleve [76],
this does not lead to inconsistency. I think it’s a virtue of this account that it makes the
grounding of the modal in a contingent matter (so to speak) a natural result of a broader
theory, rather than a bizarre and troublesome result in tension with the rest of Descartes’
philosophical commitments.
3.8.1 Ishiguro on God’s Possibly Doing The Opposite
Ishiguro’s interpretation [38] has it that Descartes is not committed to the claim that God
could have made contradictories true together. Her reading relies on a subtle reading of
the passage in the 1644 letter to Mesland where Descartes claims “God cannot have been
determined to make it true that contradictories cannot be true together, and therefore . . . He
could have done the opposite.”[20][p. 235] and related passages. She notes that in the
various places where these examples are given, Descartes does not assert that God could
bring about a positive, like “God could make contradictories true together”, but only a
double negative, as in the above passage. One of the conclusions she draws is that it is
not appropriate to apply a double negation inference, and another is that, for Descartes,
there is an asymmetry between the necessity of the eternal truths, and the impossibility of
the falsehood of this logical truth. That is, she denies that Descartes holds the standard
duality of the modalities – that φ is possible when it’s not the case that ¬φ is necessary,
and necessary when ¬φ is not possible.
The reason why when we add two and three we cannot but get the sum
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of five is because eternal truths, according to Descartes, have their seat in the
mind. (Principles I §49, AT 8A: 23 [19][p. 209]) They do not, it is true, depend
on how particular individual minds are made – for example to be cleverer or to
perceive better. We should therefore not call the Cartesian notion of modality
“epistemic.” Descartes’ modality does not depend on historical states of our
knowledge, nor on the state of knowledge either. In fact, what Descartes means
by eternal truths having their seat in the mind seems closer to Kant’s view on
the a priori than it does to epistemic views like that of Hume. What is at issue
is the universal validity of these eternal truths in our mental constitution – and
this is something that Descartes discovers by the inspection of forms of our
clear and distinct thoughts and not by empirical investigation of psychological
dispositions.
[38][p. 463]
On Ishiguro’s reading, while the necessity of eternal truths is not epistemic in the sense
of depending on particular minds, but is dependent on the nature of human minds broadly
speaking. A way of understanding this in line with the discussion so far is that her view is
that human minds, along with a faculty for conceiving, were created by God and that this
creation determines the eternal truths. So they are tied down to conceivability, but this fact
is bound by the human mind in general, and not by the particular powers of any thinking
individual. In light of this, she goes on to claim that “what we take to be necessary truths
are only necessary conditional on how our mind was created, it is easy to comprehend that
all necessities be conditional.” [38][p. 468]
In contrast with this, she argues that the impossibility of contradictions is absolute.
[There] is an absolute nonepistemic modality even in Descartes: the im-
possibility of actualising something that falls under a contradictory concept is
absolute. It is not true that Descartes’ God could have made it true (let alone
necessary) that two times four be seven or two plus two be five. . . . We do not
ascribe anything at all to anything if we contradict ourselves. We cannot as-
cribe to God the power of creating that 2 + 3 = 6 or that 2 > 3, because we
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have not succeeded in describing a possible state of affairs that a creator could
bring about.
[38][p. 464–465]
The reasoning here is very similar to Thomist account of why God can’t bring about con-
tradictions. The reason is that there’s nothing to bring about. Furthermore, to say that God
cannot bring about a true contradiction is not to limit God’s power, for there’s nothing there
which one says God cannot bring about.
There is a passage, troubling for my account, in the 5 Feb. 1649 letter to More in which
we see Descartes engaging in this kind of reasoning. In particular, he claims:
[We] do not take it as a mark of impotence when someone cannot do some-
thing which we do not understand to be possible, but only when he cannot
do something which we distinctly perceive to be possible. Now we certainly
perceive it to be possible for an atom to be divided, since we suppose it to be
extended; and so, if we judge that it cannot be divided by God, we shall judge
that God cannot do one of the things which we perceive to be possible. but we
do not in the same way perceive it to be possible for what is done to be undone
– on the contrary, we perceive it to be altogether impossible, and so it is no
defect of power in God not to do it.
(Letter to More, 5 Feb. 1649, AT 5:273 [20][p. 363])
On these grounds, Ishiguro claims that Descartes is not committed to the claim that God
could bring about contradictory propositions, nor could God bring about the truth of claims
like 2 + 2 = 5 which contradict our clear and distinct understanding of mathematics.
Rather, she holds: “When Descartes concluded that God freely ordained that two times
four be necessarily eight, we saw that this was because the identity of this truth could not
be given independently of the system of mathematics, which depends on the constitution
of our mind which God created.” [38][p. 469]
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Ishiguro’s denial that Descartes’ modalities are epistemic seems to rely on understand-
ing epistemic modality as connected to “degree of certitude or states of knowledge.”[38][p.
469] However, the account she gives of the conditional necessity of eternal truths still seems
to rely on epistemic modality in the sense I’ve discussed here – it’s a matter of human con-
ceivability, a faculty which God has created. However, a result of this seems to be that on
her account the necessity of eternal truths is nothing more than our inability to conceive of
their falsity. I have attempted to argue against this claim in my discussion of McFetridge
on the matching argument.
Further, the evidence that Descartes does not assert that God could have made con-
tradictories true together, but only that He is not determined not to do so, is perhaps less
striking than it first appears. Alanen notes that Descartes’ statement of CD in the letters
to Mersenne appears “to have been formulated almost verbatim in opposition to the view
defended by Suarez.” [1][p. 68] Further sources and details are available in Cronin’s [21],
who also notes the connection between Descartes’ statement and Suarez’. So the fact that
Descartes uses this negative terminology has an available explanation on which he wasn’t
attempting to avoid stating the positive claims directly.
Finally there is the passage from the letter to More. Another passage which pushes this
point is available in a letter to Regius, where Descartes claims: “God can surely bring about
whatever we can clearly understand; the only things that are said to be impossible for God
to do are those which involve a conceptual contradiction, that is, which are not intelligible.”
(Letter to Regius, June 1642 AT 3:565 [20][p. 214]) This is a problem for my account. I
want to claim that, in general, Descartes discusses o-possibility only when discussing the
limits of God’s options in creating the world, and that all other discussions of modality are
discussions of i-modality. My first move would be to try to claim that Descartes is here
reasoning about inner modality when claiming that contradictions cannot be true, despite
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the fact that he is here considering what is impossible for God. I don’t have a satisfactory
account of these passages, but one is wanting. An option is that Descartes is here parroting
the usual Thomist responses, rather than giving his real view. I don’t endorse this reading,
but hope that something along these lines might be made to work. In the meantime, I
recognise this problem with my account, but hope that the weight of evidence in its favour
outweighs this problem.
3.8.2 The Anachronism of Possible Worlds
Finally, I have used the terminology of possible worlds semantics to give an account of
Descartes modal metaphysics, but this is quite anachronistic.
To this I have a few comments. First, it’s not quite as anachronistic as it seems. As I’ve
briefly suggested earlier, there were predecessors to Descartes who understood modality
in terms of simultaneous alternatives (see the discussion in [42]) in the mind of God, and
for my purposes the talk of possible worlds could be uniformly replaced with this talk.
This is not to say, as might be claimed, that Descartes explicitly committed himself to
understanding modality in terms of possible worlds (despite his rather famous claim in Le
Monde about ‘many worlds’ [19]), but just to say that the resources I’ve used are, with
the possible exception of my brief discussion of counterfactual conditionals, ones to which
Descartes might have had access.
Second, and in a more methodological spirit, my project uses these tools to best capture
what Descartes’ claims committed him to. For this, it’s not required that he thought about
modality in terms of possible worlds or simultaneous alternative. Rather, we can use these
tools to faithfully represent what he meant in making his claims, and what those claims
commit him to. On this approach to the history of philosophy, I aim to characterise his
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views in such a way that we can more clearly express his philosophical commitments than
he could, by being able to draw finer distinctions and use a more refined conceptual toolkit
than was available to Descartes. A nice expression and defence of this methodological
approach is given by Sellars23:
The history of philosophy is appropriately rewritten by each generation,
not because they have better historical methods, but because philosophy itself
has made available not only finer distinctions but finer distinctions between
distinctions. We can understand Plato better than Plato understood himself not
primarily because we can see things that Plato did not see but because we see
more complicated patterns of sameness and difference in the things he saw.
([71] Berkeley and Desacrtes, p. 377)
So the use of possible worlds talk in characterising Descartes’ modal metaphysics does
not involve taking Descartes to be committed to possible worlds, or even to understand
modality in those terms, but merely to use this to better articulate the view he did espouse.
3.9 Conclusion
I have developed and defended a multimodal interpretation of Descartes’ creation doctrine.
While the multimodal account presented here requires more fleshing out, and while there
are many related topics in Descartes’ modal metaphysics about which my account must take
a stand, I have attempted to argue that it is a viable picture, and one which puts the creation
doctrine on firm ground.24 My conviction here is that the creation doctrine, as I understand
it, is a respectable theory in modal metaphysics, which fits in well with Descartes’ broader
commitments. It is genuinely modal, consistent, and doesn’t result from some confusion
23Thanks to Lionel Shapiro for drawing my attention to this passage.
24This point is to say that I hope this account makes the creation doctrine the kind of view about which
commentators will not be pushed to say unkind things – see Kaufman [40][p. 24]
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on Descartes’ part about the meanings of modal terms. In particular, Descartes is not
speaking great nonsense (pace [32]), though his modal views interestingly differ from his
contemporaries, and from recent accounts.
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Chapter 4
Two Logics of Variable Essence
4.1 Motivations
Accounts of the relationship between essences and necessity are present throughout the
history of logic, and has seen recent work by Fine [29], among many others. An interest-
ing variation on this theme can be found in the work of Descartes on true and immutable
natures, and on the controversy surrounding the doctrine of the creation of eternal truths.
This provides the grist for some work in modal logic, on the study of logics of essence in
which essences vary across a set of worlds. I’ll give a brief sketch of the core elements
of the creation doctrine, and an interpretation of the doctrine which motivates the logical
work to follow.
Descartes holds that the set of essences determine a class of necessary truths (the eter-
nal truths) – the most common examples used by Descartes for essences are mathematical
objects, such as triangles, and for eternal truths, necessary truths regarding such objects,
such as “the interior angles of a triangle sum to two right angles”. In addition, he con-
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siders examples of logical propositions, such as “contradictories cannot be truth together”.
Beyond this broad essentialism, Descartes also holds that God has voluntary control over
the essences which He creates (that is, all essences other than God’s own). So, Descartes
claims, God could have made it not true that the interior angles of a triangle sum to two
right angles, by failing to create the essence “triangularity” or creating it in some other way.
His other examples, concerning other mathematical objects, and essences which, somehow,
underwrite logic, have the same pattern.
So, Descartes’ modal metaphysics seems to commit him to the claim that some truths
are necessary (because true of essences) but possibly false (because God could have made
the essences in question differently). A natural way to respond is by distinguishing two
different modalities – so that these apparently contradictory claims really just involve an
ambiguity. This kind of reading motivates the logics I develop here.1
I’ll distinguish two kinds of modality and, for the sake of simplicity, I’ll talk about
possibility (though each comes along with its dual). A proposition is possible in the first
sense (call this “i-possibility”, with “i” for “inner”) just in case it is compatible with the
essences God has actually created – for instance, on this line, it is i-possible for a triangle
to have one right interior angle, but not to have two – and a proposition is possible in the
second sense (call this “o-possibility” for “outer”) just in case it is compatible with any
essences God might have created. In this latter sense, then, there are many o-possibilities
which are not i-possibilities: for instance, triangles o-possibly have three interior right
angles. Both kinds of possibility are naturally analysed in possible worlds terms – using a
standard piece of terminology, call those worlds at which God creates the same essences
as the actual world “normal” and all others “non-normal” and interpret the i-modalities
1This interpretation is further developed in my “A Multimodal Interpretation of Descartes’ Creation Doc-
trine.”
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as standard S5 style modalities accessing all normal worlds, and the o-modalities by a
universal accessibility relation.
With this picture in mind, I develop two logics which flesh out the idea of variable
essences, with an aim of developing modal logics inspired by the creation doctrine.2
The first is presented as an extension of Kripke frame semantics for bimodal S5/U, and
interprets essential predicates in a simple way which allows those essences to vary at non-
normal worlds. Call this the logic of Classical Variable Essences, or CVE. An axiomatic
system for CVE is presented, soundness and completeness is proved, as are some results
relevant to characterising CVE frames and models.
The second logic extends this by allowing for the propositional connectives to exhibit
non-classical behaviour at non-normal worlds, in accordance to something like Graham
Priest’s “open worlds” construction. [57] Call the resulting system Non-Classical Variable
Essences, or NVE. A model theory for this system is given, and some results are proved.
Both CVE and NVE share a syntax and frame definition, so in the next two sections in
which the formal work is relevant to both systems, I’ll talk just of VE.
4.2 VE Syntax
The syntax of the language L, which I’ll employ throughout the paper, includes standard
logical connectives, but with enough structure to atomic sentences to express that objects
have some predicates essentially. L is constructed out of sets N ,P , C, defined as follows.
Definition 4.2.1. N is a denumerable set {a1, a2 . . . } of name constants.
2In addition, some of the key results along the way are relevant to argumentative claims made in “A
Multimodal Interpretation of Descares’ Creation Doctrine”.
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Definition 4.2.2. P∗ is a denumerable set {Pn0 , Pm1 , . . . } of predicate letters – subscripted
letters denote an enumeration, superscripted letters denote arity.
Definition 4.2.3. C = {¬,∧,,♦, ∆,∇} is the set of logical connectives with arities
1,2,1,1,1,1 respectively.
Definition 4.2.4. P is a set of unary predicates {Pi , Pj , . . . } where for every P1i in P∗,
there is a unique Pi ∈ P. The use of subscripts indicates that the ordering of the P’s
matches the ordering of P1i ’s. That is, if P
1
i comes before P
1
j in the ordering of P∗, then
Pi comes before P

j in the ordering of P.
Pi a is to be read “a is essentially Pi”. Call these essentialised predicates.
Definition 4.2.5. P = P∗ ∪ P
Definition 4.2.6. At is the set of sentences of the form Pa0, . . . , an where P ∈ P is n-ary,
and a0, . . . , an ∈ N .
Definition 4.2.7. L is At|A|A ∧ A|¬A|A|♦A|∆A|∇A
In what follows, I’ll use A→ B as shorthand for ¬(A ∧ ¬B), as usual.
One may question the decision to express essential properties only in terms of unary
predicates. The decision is partly one of simplicity – allowing for essential relations and
complex properties significantly increases the complexity of the otherwise simple model
theory developed here.3 I work under the assumption that essential relational properties
can be expressed by means of essential unary predications. For example, I assume that
one can always introduce a unary predicate “is the child of Alice and Bob” to express the
3Fine’s [29] logic of essence, for instance, is much more complex than what’s developed here, at least in
part due to the fact that he allows for a broader range of essential properties than I do.
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essential relation a child has to its parents. With these considerations in mind, I continue
with the simplifying assumption.4
4.3 VE Frames





• D 6= ∅
• e : W × D −→ ℘(℘(D))
• Xi : W −→ ℘(D)
Intuitively speaking, e assigns to each object, at each world, a collection of unary properties
– i.e. those properties essential to that object at that world. R is the inner accessibility
relation, S the outer, and N a set of normal worlds. Intuitively, the normal worlds are
worlds where objects have the same essences as at the actual world. Further, where α ∈W,
let Rα = {β; Rαβ}.
Elements of F must obey the following conditions:
4Future work on this project calls for treating of properties in general, using the full expressive resources
of lambda calculus. However, I take that as a further step after that of laying out the groundwork, as this
paper aims to do.
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(c1) R, S are equivalences.
(c2) S = W2
(c3) ∀a ∈ D∀α ∈W∀i ∈N(Xiα ∈ e(α, a)⇒ ∀β ∈ Rα(Xiβ ∈ e(β, a)))
(c4) ∀a ∈ D∀α ∈W∀i ∈N(Xiα ∈ e(α, a)⇒ ∀β ∈ Rα(a ∈ Xiβ))
(c1) and (c2) are self explanatory, but (c3) and (c4) are slightly more involved. The func-
tions Xi interpret unary predicates, to to say that Xiα ∈ e(α, a) is to say that the property
(in extension) picked out by Xiα is in the essence of a at α. With this in mind, (c3) intu-
itively indicates that if a property (in intension) is essential to a at α, and β is R-accessible
from α, then the property must be essential to a at β as well. In short: essential predications
are necessary. (c4), then, indicates that essential properties are necessary properties.5
4.4 CVE: Model Theory
Definition 4.4.1 (CVE model). M is a CVE model when M = 〈F ; g, f 〉 where:
• F is a VE frame
• g : N −→ D
• When P is an n-place predicate, f (Pnj ) is a function of type W −→ ℘(Dn). For
unary predicates P1i , set f (P
1
i ) = Xi.
Satisfaction, , is defined as follows, where A, B are metavariables over L:
5These comments will be borne out as we come to some correspondence results on the way to proving
completeness.
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• α  Pa0, . . . , an iff 〈g(a0), . . . , g(an)〉 ∈ f (P)α
• α  Pi a iff f (Pi)α ∈ e(α, g(a)) iff Xiα ∈ e(α, g(a))
• α  ¬A iff α 2 A
• α  A ∧ B iff α  A & β  B
• α  A iff ∀β ∈ Rα(β  A)
• α  ♦A iff ∃β ∈ Rα(β  A)
• α  ∆A iff ∀β ∈ Sα(β  A) iff ∀β ∈W(β  A)
• α  ∇A iff ∃β ∈ Sα(β  A) iff ∃β ∈W(β  A)
Definition 4.4.2. Given a model M, Γ M A iff ∀α ∈ NM(α 
∧
Γ⇒ α  A)
Note that consequence on CVE models is a matter of truth preservation at normal worlds
only.
Definition 4.4.3. Γ CVE A iff for every model M, Γ M A
4.5 CVE: Hilbert System
As before, A, B are metavariables over L, while P and a metavariables over P, N ,
respectively.
Axioms:
A1 All propositional tautologies









A10 Pi a→ Pi a
A11 Pi a→ P1i a
Rules:
R1 A→ B, A⇒ B
R2 A⇒ A
Definition 4.5.1 (CVE Proof). A CVE proof is a finite series of formulae, each of which
is either an instance of a CVE axiom or is obtained by one of the CVE rules from previous
formulae in the proof.
Definition 4.5.2 (CVE Theorem). `CVE A iff there is a CVE proof of which A is the last
formula.
Intuitively speaking, A10 indicates that essential predications are necessary, and A11 that
essential properties are necessary, corresponding, as we’ll show, to (c3) and (c4).
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4.6 CVE Adequacy
Theorem 4.6.1 (Soundness). `CVE A only if CVE A
Proof. The proof is, as usual, by induction. I first show that each CVE axiom is true on
all models, and then that the CVE rules preserve truth on all models. I’ll omit the standard
cases, namely (A1)–(A5). That leaves cases (A6)–(A14).
(A6) Suppose that α ∈ N and α 2 ∆A→ A. That is, α  ∆A and α 2 A. Since α  ∆A,
it follows that ∀β ∈W(β  A), and since α ∈W, it follows that α  A, contrary to
the supposition.
(A7–8) Straightforward.
(A9) For this, note only that ∀α(Rα ⊆W) – or, more to the point, N ⊆W.
(A10) Suppose that α ∈ N and that α  Pi a. That is, f (P1i )α ∈ e(α, g(a)), and so Xiα ∈
e(α, g(a)). By (c3), ∀β ∈ Rα(Xiβ ∈ e(β, g(a))), and thus f (P1i )β ∈ e(β, g(a)).
By the truth condition for Pi , ∀β ∈ Rα(β  Pi a), and by the condition for ,
α  Pi a.
(A11) Suppose that α ∈ N and that α  Pi a. It follows that f (P1i )α = Xiα ∈ e(α, g(a))
and so, by (c4), ∀β ∈ Rα(g(a) ∈ Xiβ = f (P1i )β). Thus ∀β ∈ Rα(β  P1i a), and
so α  P1i a.
For the completeness proof, the method is the standard canonical model method with one
twist due to [12][417–418]. We start by defining a pre-canonical model, which satisfies
all conditions on CVE models except that S = W2, and then we generate the genuine
canonical model from this pre-canonical model which, in addition, satisfies this constraint.
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Definition 4.6.2 (CVE Pre-Canonical Model). The CVE pre-canonical model PMc is a
tuple
〈Wc, Nc, Rc, Sc, Dc, ec, {Xic ; i ∈N}, fc, gc〉 where:
• Wc = {α ⊆ L; α is maximally consistent and closed under CVE}
• Nc = Wc
• Rc = {〈α, β〉 ∈W2c ;A ∈ x ⇒ A ∈ y}
• Sc = {〈α, β〉 ∈W2c ; ∆A ∈ x ⇒ A ∈ y}
• Dc = N
• Xic α = {a ∈ Dc; P1i a ∈ α}
• ec(α, a) = {Xic α; Pi a ∈ α}
• fc(Pni )α = {〈a0, . . . , an〉 ∈ Dnc ; Pni a0, . . . , an ∈ α}
• gc is the identity function
• α c A ⇐⇒ A ∈ α
Note that for unary predicates, fc(P1i )α = Xic α for every α ∈Wc.
Lemma 4.6.3. PMc satisfies (c1), (c3), and (c4) of the definition of VE frame, and, in
addition, Rc ⊆ Sc.
Proof. The proof proceeds by cases. (c1) is straightforward, and so is omitted.
(c3) Suppose that α ∈ Wc, a ∈ Dc, Xic α ∈ ec(α, a), and Rcαβ. Since Xic α ∈ ec(α, a),
Pi a ∈ α. `CVE Pi a → Pi a, so Pi a ∈ α, and since Rcαβ, Pi a ∈ β. Thus
Xic β ∈ ec(β, a) as desired – this follows from the definition of ec, Xic .
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(c4) Suppose that α ∈ Wc, a ∈ Dc, Xic α ∈ ec(α, a), and Rcαβ. As before, we have
Pi a ∈ α, and since `CVE Pi a → P1i a, P1i a ∈ α, and since Rcαβ, P1i a ∈ β.
Thus, a ∈ fc(P1i )β, and so a ∈ Xic β, since fc(P1i )β = Xic β.
To show that Rc ⊆ Sc, it is enough to note that `CVE ∆A→ A. This guarantees that
if Rcαβ, and ∆A ∈ α, then A ∈ α, and thus A ∈ β.
Definition 4.6.4. Let α ∈Wc. Mαc = 〈W ′c, N′c, R′c, Sc, D′c, e′c, {X′ic ; i ∈N}, f
′
c, g′c〉 where:
• W ′c = Scα
• N′c = W ′c
• R′c = Rc
• D′c = Dc
• e′c = ec
• The X′ics, f
′
c, g′c, and ′c are defined similarly.
Lemma 4.6.5. For all α ∈Wc, Mαc is a CVE Model.
Proof. Lemma 2 holds of Mc as well as of PMc, since the latter is generated by the former.
In Mc we have that Sc = W ′c, by the construction, so Mc satisfies (c2). All other conditions
were satisfied by PMc, and all are bounded universal generalisations, and so remain true in
Mc.
All that remains are to check that the truth conditions hold in Mc for ′c. This proof
proceeds by cases, which follow directly from the definitions of PMc and Mc.
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Theorem 4.6.6. Γ CVE A only if Γ `CVE A
Proof. Suppose that Γ 0CVE A – as a result, Γ∪{¬A} is consistent. Lindenbaum’s lemma
ensures us that Γ ∪ {¬A} can be extended to a maximally consistent set - call this α - and
take Mαc . By the previous lemma, Mαc is a model of CVE, and we have Γ 2Mαc A. The
result follows.
4.7 Some CVE Consequences
Theorem 4.7.1. Pi a ∧ ∇¬P1i a is satisfiable. Hence Pi a → ∆P1i a is not a theorem of
CVE.
Proof. For simplicity, and without lack of generality, let the language signature consist of
P = {P1i , Pi } and N = {a}. Let M be a CVE model with the following elements:
W = {@, α}
N = {@}
R = {〈@, @〉, 〈α, α〉}
D = {a}
f (P1i )@ = Xi@ = {a}
f (P1i )α = Xiα = ∅
g(a) = a
e(@, a) = {Xi@}
e(α, a) = ∅
On this model, @  Pi a, α  ¬P1i a. Hence M Pi a∧∇¬P1i a. Hence 2M Pi a→ ∆P1i a.
Corollary 4.7.2. A ∧∇¬A is satisfiable. Hence, A→ ∆A is not a theorem of CVE.
Proof. Let A be the statement P1i a, and simply use M – given that P

i a→ P1i a, it follows
that @  P1i a, and thence the result.
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These results are desirable for a few reasons. Corollary 4.7.2 is nice in showing that ∆ is
strictly stronger than , but it and Theorem 4.7.1 have more direct textual importance.
On the intended reading of Descartes, ∆,∇ characterise God’s options in creating the
world. So to say that ∆Pa is true is to say that no matter how God created the world, a
would have been a P. In other words, this is to say that God was necessitated to will that
Pa. On the reading of the creation doctrine which I propose, Descartes is committed to the
claim that (excluding God’s own essence), just because He willed some property of a to
be essential (and therefore -necessary), it does not follow that God was necessitated to
will that a had that property essentially (or at all). With this reading in mind, the content of
Theorem 4.7.1 captures Descartes’ claim that God’s willing a truth to be essential does not
entail that God willed that fact necessarily, or was necessitated to will it, and Cor. 4.7.2 is
a slight generalisation. 6
4.8 Characterising Cells in CVE
Before going on to NVE, I pause to develop some methods for better characterising models
of CVE – in particular, to flesh out the intuitive idea that worlds in these models come
in collections of “co-normal” worlds, equivalence classes induced by R. The interaction
between these equivalence classes and the universal modality can be characterised with a
slight increase in expressive power.
Definition 4.8.1. Let [α] = {β ∈ W; Rαβ}. These are equivalence classes, given the
definition of R, so let C = W/[·].
6See the 2 May 1644 Letter to Mesland, AT 4:119 [20][p. 235].
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Lemma 4.8.2. |C| ≤ |W|
Suppose that W, and hence C, are countable.
Definition 4.8.3. Enumerate the members of C as ci (i ∈ N). Expand L by adding a
countable set of propositional constants T = {ti; i ∈N} s.t.
α  ti ⇔ α ∈ ci.
Furthermore, let t0 = t and c0 = N.
The following simply restates the salient part of definition 4.8.1 as frame condition, in light
of further notational conventions:
(c5) If α, β ∈ ci then Rαβ, and if Rαβ there exists a ci s.t. α ∈ ci and β ∈ ci.
We can then add the following additional axiom schemata:
A12 t
A13 ∆(ti → ti)
A14 ∆((A ∧ ti)→ ∆(ti → A))
Theorem 4.8.4 (Soundness). A12–A14 are true at all normal worlds in all models.
Proof. I prove both cases.
A12 Obvious.
A13 Suppose α ∈ N, and α 2 ∆(ti → ti), thus ∃β ∈ W(β  ti & β 2 ti). Thus,
there’s a γ ∈ Rβ s.t. γ 2 ti. Thus γ /∈ ci and β ∈ ci – however, given Rβγ, this is
impossible.
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A14 Suppose α ∈ N and α does not satisfy A14. Then there must be a β ∈ W s.t.
β  A ∧ ti and yet β 2 ∆(ti → A). In order for this last to be true, there must
be a γ ∈ W s.t. γ  ti and γ 2 A. However, we know that β  ti, so β ∈ ci, and
β  A. Since γ  ti, γ ∈ ci, and thus Rβγ. Hence, γ  A after all.
Definition 4.8.5. Extend the canonical model construction from the previous section to in-
corporate explicit cells talk by extending CVE to include A12–A14, and define the canon-
ical cells cci (i ∈N) as:
cci = {α ∈Wc; ti ∈ α}
Define Mc as before, including the generated submodel construction, but alter the defi-
nition to say that Nc = {α ∈ Wc; t ∈ α}. I’ll show that the additional conditions on cells
hold in the generated submodel.
Lemma 4.8.6. For all α, β ∈Wc, i ∈N, if R′cαβ, then α ∈ cci iff β ∈ cci .
Proof. Suppose that R′cαβ. If α ∈ cci then ti ∈ α, and since ` ∆(ti → ti), it follows that
∆(ti → ti) ∈ α, and since S′cαα, ti → ti ∈ α. Thus ti ∈ α, and since Rcαβ, ti ∈ β.
The argument showing that if β ∈ cci then α ∈ cci is similar.
Lemma 4.8.7. For all α, β ∈Wc, i ∈N, if α, β ∈ cci then R′cαβ.
Proof. If α, β ∈ ci then ti ∈ α ∩ β. To show that Rcαβ, suppose that A ∈ α. By A14,
(A ∧ ti)→ ∆(ti → A) ∈ α, so ∆(ti → A) ∈ α. Thus ti → A ∈ β, and so A ∈ β.
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Definition 4.8.8. Let M∗c be the submodel of Mc (where Mc generated from PMc by some
max. consistent subset of L ∪ {ti; i ∈ N}) with W∗c = {α ∈ Wc; ∃i ∈ N(ti ∈ α)}, and
the other elements generated as usual.
Theorem 4.8.9. M∗c satisfies (c5).
Proof. By lemmata 4.8.6, 4.8.7, we know that R∗c αβ ⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ N(α ∈ cci ⇐⇒ β ∈
cci ). All that is required to obtain (c5) is that for each α ∈ W∗c , there exists a cci s.t. α ∈ cci ,
but this is precisely what’s delivered by the definition of W∗c .
Corollary 4.8.10 (Completeness). The class of models on a CVE frames including C is
completely characterised by the proof system comprising A1–A14 and R1–R2.
Proof. The proof follows from Lemmata 4.8.6, 4.8.7 and Theorem 4.8.9 as usual.
I intend to develop this method further for application in NVE to come, but as of now, I
leave the development here, and the rest for future work. In the next section, when I refer
4.9 NVE Model Theory
Now, to turn to the non-classical element of the construction. We also need worlds in the
intended model at which logic is different (assuming, as we have, that classical logic is the
default). There are, of course, many ways for logic to be different, and my aim is to rule
out no consequence relation on the language.
A natural way to proceed is by the set of what Priest [57] calls “open worlds” – the set
of all subsets of L. However, there are some downsides to this proposal for my aims.
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First, there are certain elements of the interpretation which I want to keep fixed, such
as the truth conditions for the modals and essentialised predicates. These are the elements
of Descartes’ view which are being modelled, so they should be invariant across models.
So just reading all formulas as getting arbitrary truth values is not ideal.
Second, the presence of open worlds makes the metatheory difficult – since they aren’t
closed under any uniform truth conditions, it’s had to say anything substantial about them.7
Instead, the approach will involve using a different accessibility relation for each of
∧,¬ – allowing these relations to be arbitrary but for constraints ensuring that at normal
worlds, ∧,¬ get their usual Boolean truth conditions.
Definition 4.9.1 (NVE Frame). An NVE frame F is a tuple 〈W,≤, N, R, S, R∧ , R¬, D,
e, {Xi; i ∈ N}〉 where 〈W, N, R, S, D, e, {Xi; i ∈ N}〉 are as in VE frame (with R
in for R), 〈W,≤〉 a poset, R∧ a ternary relation on W, and R¬ a binary relation on W,
satisfying the following conditions (along with c1–c4 above):
(c6.0) ∀α ∈ N∀β, γ ∈W(R∧αβγ⇒ (α ≤ β & α ≤ γ))
(c6.1) ∀α, β, γ ∈ N(R∧αβγ⇔ α = β = γ)
(c6.2) ∀α, β, γ, α′ ∈W((α′ ≤ α & R∧αβγ)⇒ R∧α′βγ)
(c7.0) ∀α ∈ N∀β ∈W(R¬αβ⇒ β ≤ α)
(c7.1) ∀α, β ∈ N(R¬αβ⇔ α = β)
(c7.2) ∀α, β ∈W((R¬αβ & α′ ≤ α)⇒ R¬α′β)
7This is, of course, part of the point of open worlds, but an approach which allows us some more power
to make substantial claims would be helpful. An additional feature of this approach, for those motivated by
this sort of thing, is that we can retain uniform truth conditions for the connectives at all worlds – something
clearly lost in adopting Priest’s approach.
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(c8.0) ∀α ∈ N∀β ∈W(Rαβ⇒ β ∈ N)
(c8.1) ∀α ∈ N∀β ∈W(α ≤ β⇒ Rαβ)
Definition 4.9.2 (NVE Model). An NVE model M is a tuple 〈F ; g, f 〉 where g, f are as
with CVE models, and so are the truth conditions excepting that those for ∧ and ¬ are as
follows:
• α  A ∧ B iff ∀β, γ ∈W(R∧αβγ⇒ (β  A & γ  B))
• α  ¬A iff ∀β ∈ R¬α(β 2 A)
In addition, I need the following heredity condition on ≤:
(c10) If P ∈ P and α ≤ β, then f (P)α ⊆ f (P)β
and for all a ∈ D, f (P)α ∈ e(α, a) only if f (P)β ∈ e(β, a).
Lemma 4.9.3 (Heredity). For any formula A ∈ L and world α ∈ N, if α  A and α ≤ β,
then β  A.
Proof. The proof is standard, by induction. For atomic sentences (with or without essen-
tialised predicates, c10 does the work. For the induction cases, I’ll cover ∧,¬,, and ∆ –
♦ and ∇ are similar to the latter two.
Suppose that A is B ∧ C. Since α  A, ∀γ, δ ∈ W(R∧αγδ ⇒ (β  B & γ  C)),
and suppose that R∧βγδ. Since R∧ is antitone in its first place (c6.2), Rαγδ, and so γ  B
and δ  C. Thus β  B ∧ C.
Suppose that A is ¬B, and that R¬βγ. Since α  ¬A, if R¬αδ then δ 2 B. By c8.2,
since R¬βγ and α ≤ γ, it follows that R¬αγ, and so γ 2 B. Thus, β  ¬B, as desired.
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Suppose A is B. Since R is transitive, α  B when α  B. Since α ≤ β,
Rαβ, by c9, and so β  B. If A is ♦B, then the key fact about R is that it’s symmetric,
so that when α  ♦B, α  ♦B.
If A is ∆B, α  ∆B iff ∀γ ∈W(γ  B). This condition holds throughout the frame of
the model, so if α  ∆B then for any β ∈ W, β  ∆B – and this holds as well if α ≤ β.
The case where A is ∇B is similar.
The heredity of ≤ makes it easy to show that R∧, R¬ enforce the Boolean truth conditions
in N.
Lemma 4.9.4. If α ∈ N, α  A ∧ B iff α  A & α  B.
Proof. Suppose α ∈ N.
(⇒) Suppose α  A ∧ B. Since α ∈ N, R∧ααα, so α  A and α  B.
(⇐) Suppose α  A and α  B, and that R∧αβγ. By (c6.0), α ≤ β and α ≤ γ, and so
β  A and γ  B. Thus α  A ∧ B.
Lemma 4.9.5. If α ∈ N, α  ¬A iff α 2 A
Proof. Suppose α ∈ N.
(⇒) Straightforward – since α ∈ N, R¬αα.
(⇐) Suppose α 2 ¬A – then there is a β ∈ R¬α s.t. β  A. By c7.0, it follows that
α  A. The contrapositive is the desired result.
Definition 4.9.6. The S5 fragment of L is that consisting of atomic sentences including the
non-essentialised predicates, the connectives ∧,¬, and modalities ,♦.
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Theorem 4.9.7 (Conservative Extension). NVE is a conservative extension of S5.
Proof. Suppose that Γ, A are in the S5 fragment of L, and that Γ 2NVE A. Then there is an
α ∈ N of such a model where α  ∧ Γ and α 2 A. Since Γ, A are in the S5 fragment of L,
the only pieces of logical vocabulary which occur are,♦,∧,¬. Let N = {α, α0, α1, . . . }
– since R is an equivalence relation on N, 〈N, R〉 is an S5 frame. That ∧,¬ get their
usual Boolean truth conditions in N guarantees that 〈N, R,〉 is an S5 model, and thus
Γ 2S5 A.
Suppose, on the other hand that Γ 2S5 A – so it has a countermodel 〈W, R,〉. This
model can be extended to at least one NVE model. The most boring way to do this is to set
M = 〈W ′, N′, R, S, R∧, R¬, D, e, {Xi; i ∈ N}, f , g〉 s.t.
• W ′ = W
• R = S = R
• R∧ = {〈α, α, α〉; α ∈W ′}
• R¬ = {〈α, α〉; α ∈W ′}
• e = ∅
• D, f , g, {Xi; i ∈ N} as required for v to assign truth values to atomic sentences to fit
the S5 model in question.
That this model obeys the frame conditions for NVE is easily checked – note that the
various X′is actually don’t matter for the construction because the essentialised predicates
are not in the language fragment under consideration.
Then Γ 2M A, and so Γ 2NVE A. Thus Γ S5 A iff Γ NVE A, when Γ, A in the S5
fragment of L.
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Theorem 4.9.8. The proof system introduced for CVE is sound w.r.t. the class of NVE
models.
Proof. The proof proceeds by cases – that any instance of a classical tautology is valid
on the set of NVE models is given by the fact that ∧,¬ have Boolean truth conditions at
normal worlds, which fact also guarantees the validity of modus ponens. (c8.0) tells us that
NVE-consequence will validate the S5,♦ axioms, as well as the rule of necessitation.
The arguments for the remaining axioms are straightforward – for each, I’ll list the key fact
about NVE models which facilitates the proof.
(A6) S is a universal accessibility relation.
(A7) The interpretation of ∆ is invariant across points in the model.
(A8) The interpretation of ∇ is invariant across points in the model.
(A9) R ⊆ S.
(A10) (c3) – the previous argument is unchanged except that the fact that the world of eval-
uation is assumed to be normal is now necessary to ensure that→ has the appropriate
truth conditions.
(A11) (c4) – with a similar comment to that above.
This result guarantees that
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4.10 Correspondence of R∧, R¬ to the Boolean Truth Con-
ditions
In this section, I show that the frame conditions c6.0–c8 all hold on a canonical model
which gives the the skeleton of one for NVE. The upshot of this is that the frame conditions
are well chosen as tightly characterising the behaviour of the connectives in question in
NVE models.
Wc = ℘(L)
Nc = {α ∈Wc; α maximally consistent and closed under S5}
Rc = {〈α, β〉 ∈W2c ;A ∈ α⇒ A ∈ β}
R∧c = {〈α, β, γ〉 ∈W3c ; A ∧ B ∈ α⇒ (A ∈ β & B ∈ γ)}
R¬c = {〈α, β〉 ∈W2c ;¬A ∈ α⇒ A /∈ β}
≤c=⊆
Lemma 4.10.1 (c6.0). If α ∈ Nc and β, γ ∈Wc, R∧c αβγ only if α ⊆ β and α ⊆ γ.
Proof. Suppose α ∈ Nc, β ∈Wc, R∧c αβ, and A ∈ α. Since α ∈ Nc, A ∧ A ∈ α, and thus,
since R∧c αβ, A ∈ β and A ∈ γ. Thus, α ⊆ β and α ⊆ γ.
Lemma 4.10.2 (c6.1). If α, β, γ ∈ Nc, R∧c αβγ ⇐⇒ α = β = γ.
Proof. Suppose that α, β, γ ∈ Nc. First, suppose that R∧c αβγ – from this we already know
that α ⊆ β. Now suppose that A /∈ α. Since α ∈ Nc, ¬A ∈ β, and since β ∈ Nc, A /∈ β.
Thus β ⊆ α, so α = β. To show that α = γ is similar.
Second, suppose that α = β = γ, and that A ∧ B ∈ α. Since α ∈ Nc, A ∈ α and
B ∈ α, so R∧c αβγ.
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Lemma 4.10.3 (c6.2). If R∧c αβγ and α′ ⊆ α, then R∧c α′βγ.
Proof. Suppose that A ∧ B ∈ α′. Since α′ ⊆ α, A ∧ B ∈ α, and since R∧c αβγ, A ∈ β and
B ∈ γ as desired.
Lemma 4.10.4 (c7.0). If α ∈ Nc, β ∈Wc, R¬αβ, then β ⊆ α.
Proof. Make the suppositions of the lemma, and suppose that A ∈ β. By definition of R¬c ,
¬A /∈ α. Under the supposition that α ∈ Nc, it follows that A ∈ α, so β ⊆ α,
Lemma 4.10.5 (c7.1). If α, β ∈ Nc, R¬c αβ ⇐⇒ α = β.
Proof. Suppose that α, β ∈ Nc.
First, suppose that α = β. If ¬A ∈ α and α ∈ Nc, then A /∈ α, so R¬c αα. So R¬c αβ.
Second, suppose that R¬c αβ. Now to show that α ⊆ β, suppose that A ∈ α. It follows
that ¬¬A ∈ α, and so ¬A /∈ β, which, since β ∈ Nc, implies that A ∈ β. Next, suppose
that A ∈ β. It follows that since R¬c αβ, ¬A /∈ α, which entails that A ∈ α.
Lemma 4.10.6 (c7.2). If α, β ∈Wc, R¬c αβ and α′ ⊆ α, then R¬c α′β.
Proof. Under the suppositions of the lemma, if ¬A ∈ α′ then ¬A ∈ α, and since R¬c αβ, it
follows that A /∈ β. Thus R¬c α′β.
Lemma 4.10.7 (c8). If α ∈ Nc, β ∈Wc, and α ⊆ β then Rc αβ.
Proof. Suppose that all the constraints hold, and A ∈ β. Since α ∈ Nc, A ∈ α, and
since α ⊆ β, A ∈ β. Thus Rc αβ.
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Further work includes extending this model to a full canonical model for NVE, and using
that to get a better grip on the class of NVE models. For now, these lemmata show that
the frame conditions were well chosen, and will form the core of a further model theoretic
work on NVE.
4.11 Conclusion
In this paper, I have begun to characterise two logics of variable essence – for CVE a
proof theory and adequate model theory have been given. For NVE, a class of models
has been defined, and I have begun the process of characterising these models. However,
two important upshots available here are (1) that both logics are conservative extensions
of S5, and (2) the groundwork for showing that both are consistent. (1) is important in
providing the means to argue that Descartes’ modal metaphysics is only bizarre when the
essentialised predicates and the outer modality are in play. On my reading, the vast majority
of Descartes’ treatment of modality in, for instance, the Meditations, treats primarily of the
inner modals. So, I hold, even if his view is bizarre, the bizarreness is part of his theory,
and not due to a confusion regarding the modal language he employs. As for (2), I take it
that Descartes’ total view is consistent, and providing a proof of this fact will, hopefully,
proceed by showing that normal worlds in NVE are closed under classical consequence
and that we can build models at which some formula is false at some normal world. The
latter is easy to show, and the former involves extending the proofs given in this paper to




Channel Composition in Ternary
Relation Semantics
5.1 Ternary Relation Semantics and the Problem of
Interpretation
The ternary relation semantic framework, as most famously developed in [64], though very
powerful, has long presented difficulties in interpretation. 1 The proposal with which
we are primarily concerned is that of channel theory, as developed by Barwise [4] and
Restall [59], within the broader theoretical framework provided by situation semantics as
developed in [5], [6], and elsewhere.2
The basic theoretical posit of situation semantics are situations. These can be under-
stood, as following Barwise and Seligman [6], as classification-systems of a kind. A clas-
1Note the classic challenge in [16] that the semantics is merely a technical device with little of the intuitive
grip had by truth-functional semantics or the Kripke semantic framework for intuitionist logic and modal
logics.
2For a broad overview of the interaction between semantics for relevant logics and situation seman-
tics/channel theory see [50].
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sification system is a collection of types and tokens and an assignment, to each type, of
a set of tokens. In some slightly different terms, a situation is a collection of objects and
properties, and an assignment to each property of some (possibly empty) set of objects.
Formally, a situation can simply be modelled as a set of sentences over some vocabulary
containing predicate-symbols (for the types) and name constants (for the tokens).3
Barwise [4] develops an account of how information flows between situations by con-
sidering an additional kind of entity, namely, an information channel. A channel, for Bar-
wise, supports information flow from a situation (the signal of the channel) to a situation
(its target), and just which kind of information flow it supports determines what conditional
propositions are made true at that channel. He employs a ternary relation, evocatively no-
tated β α7→ γ, to indicate that the channel α supports information flow from the signal β
to the target γ. It was not long in the waiting for relevant logicians to recognise the simi-
larity between this semantics and that employed in the ternary relation (Routley-Meyer4 )
semantics for relevant logics. Indeed, the formal match makes the interpretation of relevant
semantics by channels quite natural.
As another brief point of motivation, while situation semantics has fallen out of fashion,
it is, by my estimation, a very natural setting for a theory of inference, and due for a reap-
praisal in the broader philosophical community. Situated inference is general enough that it
can provide a (somewhat) neutral background for debates about logic, and those contested
principles of logic. That is, since something like the situation semantics (particularly in the
extended sense presaged by the set-ups of [65]) can be tweaked to provide semantics for
3There is a great deal more to be said of the situation semantics and, for instance, the interpretation of
negation on such a framework. However, our interests are, for the most part, restricted to the conditional, so
we leave these other considerations to the side.
4Though this semantic framework often goes by the name “the Routley-Meyer semantics”, a better name,
giving proper attention to the history, might be “the Maksimova-Urquhart-Routley(Sylvan)-Meyer-Fine se-
mantics.” What this name lacks in elegance, it makes up in correctness.
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many logics with a variety of consequence relations, non-classical and otherwise, it could
provide a fairly natural setting for debates between proponents of these various logics. In
any case, despite the dearth of new work in situation semantics in the last decade or so, it
is still a framework in which interesting new work is desirable (or so I hold, having missed
situation semantics in its heyday).
Now let me come back to the work at hand. There are a number of ways to proceed
in fleshing out a channel theory in the ternary relation semantic framework. First I shall
focus on Greg Restall’s approach as developed in [59], which is an interpretation of the
ternary relation in terms quite similar to Barwise’s theory. Of particular interest is Restall’s
treatment of serial composition (from here on just composition) and its relation to an op-
eration of his related to the relevant connective fusion, which we shall come to define, as
cashing out a notion of application. I shall provide some reasons to be dissatisfied with
Restall’s account, and shall instead go back to Barwise’s approach, with a particular focus
on his treatment of composition. The aim of this paper is to provide some more defini-
tion to the account by pulling Barwise’s composition apart from Restall’s application, and
to set out an extension to the Ternary Relation semantics to provide a logic for channels
and channel composition. I’ll set out the basic semantic framework for the basic relevant
logic B in the language of conjunction and implication, and show that this extension to the
ternary relation semantics for this logic is conservative. Finally, I’ll display some interest-
ing differences between Restall’s account and the account to be developed here as regards
the idempotence and commutativity of composition, before closing with a problem about
extending the approach to incorporate negation.
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5.1.1 B∧ Frames and Models
Our formal language includes a set of propositional atoms 5 and the connectives ∧ and→
(both of arity 2). In §5.5 we shall also discuss←, but shall set out its semantics as we come
to it. A, B, C, . . . are metavariables ranging over propositions.
A ternary relation model for B∧ is defined as follows: 6
Definition 5.1.1. A ternary relation model for B∧ is a pair 〈F ,〉 of a frame Fand valua-
tion  meeting the following criteria:
F = 〈S, N, R,v〉
• N ⊆ S and N 6= ∅
• R ⊆ S3
• ∃x ∈ N(Rxαβ)⇔ α v β
• v is a partial order
• α′ v α, β′ v β, γ v γ′, and Rαβγ imply that Rα′β′γ′. Tonicity Conditions
• For any proposition A, α v β⇒ (α  A⇒ β  A). Heredity
The following conventions will be useful for a short expression of some features of the
ternary relation.
• R2αβγδ iff ∃ε(Rαβε & Rεγδ)
5The situation-semantic story we shall be interested in here is given in a first order language, but for our
purposes it is sufficient to stay at the level of propositional logic.
6We shall occasionally employ⇒ and & as metalanguage connectives which shall behave in accordance
with material implication and classical conjunction, respectively. In addition, we shall occasionally use
metalanguage quantifiers ∀, ∃ for brevity, and these always range over situations.
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• R2α(βγ)δ iff ∃ε(Rαεδ & Rβγε)
• R3α(β(γδ))ε iff ∃ζ(R2α(βζ)ε & Rγδζ)
Finally, to get a modelM = 〈F ,〉 of B∧, define the valuation  as follows:
• α  A ∧ B iff α  A and α  B
• α  A→ B iff for all β, γ ∈ S if both Rαβγ and β  A then γ  B
Given , we can define theorem and model-validity as usual:
Definition 5.1.2. A is valid on the B∧ modelM (M  A) iff x  A, for all x ∈ N.
Definition 5.1.3. A is a theorem of B∧ (`B∧ A) iff for every modelM of B∧,M  A.
5.1.2 B∧ – A Hilbert System
There are a handful of options 7 regarding how to axiomatise B∧ but we use the following
axioms and rules: 8
A1 A→ A I
A2 (A ∧ B)→ A Simplification1
A3 (A ∧ B)→ B Simplification2
A4 ((A→ B) ∧ (A→ C))→ (A→ (B ∧ C)) Lattice-∧
7See [65] for details.
8Upper case sans-serif letters are used as names for some axioms and these refer to the names of the
combinators of which these formulae are the principal type schemata. See [27] for more information about
this convention.
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R1 A, B ` A ∧ B Adjunction
R2 A→ B, A ` B Modus Ponens
R3 A→ B, C → D ` (B→ C)→ (A→ D) Affixing
Note that these rules are rules of proof, in Smiley’s sense (see Humberstone [37] for
clarification). So, for instance, the statement of (R1) is intended to be understood as “when
A and B are both theorems, then so is A ∧ B”.
Axioms and frame conditions for some extensions of B∧
A11 ((A→ B) ∧ (B→ C))→ (A→ C) Conjunctive Syllogism
A12 (A→ B)→ ((C → A)→ (C → B)) B
A13 (A→ B)→ ((B→ C)→ (A→ C)) B′
A14 (A→ (A→ B))→ (A→ B) W





This correspondence is of the following sort: M  A1i iff the frame of M obeys
restriction S1i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. Proofs of these facts are sketched in [65][313] and [63][203–
204]. We shall have reason to refer to other pairs of provabilities and corresponding ternary
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relation conditions from time to time, but for the most part, our concern shall be with those
above. The following logics are notable for our interests:
DJ∧ is B∧ plus A11.
TW∧ is B∧ plus A12 and A13.
T∧ is TW∧ plus A14.
TW, DJ, and their neighbours, including B itself, have long been of interest as potential
homes for theories of naı̈ve truth and sets.9 While this paper won’t involve any substantial
comment on the paradoxes, it’s worth a passing note that we are in the neighbourhood and
that the channel theoretic interpretation seems a good fit for these very weak logics.
5.2 Information Channels
To begin with, some comments are in order to set out our focal notions of application and
composition.
Some notion of application plays an essential role in many interpretations of relevant
logics and particularly the ternary relation. For instance, Restall interprets Rαβγ as “the
conditional information given in α applied to β results in no more than γ” [59] and else-
where as “applying the information in α to β gives information which is already in γ.” [58]
One can find similar intuitions and terminology at work in [72], [49], and parts of [8]. A
natural way to make these intuitions concrete, following the lead of algebraic semantics for
relevant logics, is to introduce a collection of points α ◦ β into the semantics which, speak-
ing loosely, are the results of applying α to β. Well-known problems with an operational
semantics for relevant logics 10 mean that we cannot, in general, assume that α ◦ β is a
9The paradox to which we refer here is, of course, Curry’s paradox and derivative paradoxes, like the
validity curry [9]. For general information see [7].
10See [75] for details.
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unique point in the frame. Thus, Restall [59] defines this as a set-forming operation:
Definition 5.2.1. α ◦ β = {γ |Rαβγ}.
In order to make sense of how points like this behave in the ternary relation semantics,
we need to enforce at least the following condition: 11
α ◦ β  A only if for every γ ∈ α ◦ β, γ  A.
Even with this operation providing only a set of points, rather than a unique point, the
application story is fairly natural, in abstract. The key fact here is that (α  A → B & β 
A) ⇒ α ◦ β  B, as follows immediately from the definition of ◦. This fact provides the
key intuition behind the ternary relation: when α is a channel from β to γ (Rαβγ), and
β  A implies γ  B, then α  A→ B.
On the other hand, we have composition α; β as channels. The key job we want com-
position to do is to enforce (α  A → C & β  C → B) ⇒ α; β  A → B. Intuitively,
when α is a channel supporting information flow from A-propositions to some propositions
from which β supports information flow to B-propositions, there is a situation which is a
channel cutting out the middle, as it were. As an example, suppose that a phone call allows
for information to flow from my home in Connecticut to Edmonton, and an email allows
for that (or some related) information to flow from Edmonton to my next-door neighbour
in Connecticut. Then there is a channel resulting of the composition of the relevant bits of
the phone-network connecting my house to Edmonton with the relevant bits of the internet
and servers which support that email connection from Edmonton to my neighbour. It’s the
phone line composed with the email connection which allow for information to flow from
me to my next door neighbour. Barwise [4] makes the following demands of composition,
11In addition, we need some posits governing how ◦ interacts with v but these details are not necessary
for the comments in this paper.
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where 0 is a logic channel behaving essentially as a member of N as set out in §1 12 and
β
α7→ γ is to be read as Rαβγ.
• For any α, β, there is a unique α; β.
• γ
α;β7→ δ⇔ ∃ε(γ α7→ ε & ε β7→ δ)
• 0; α = α = α; 0 13
• α; (β; γ) = (α; β); γ
He proceeds to show, given his very abstract framework, that composition has these
features, and leaves open the questions of whether α = α; α and α; β = β; α, taking these
as substantial questions to be filled in by fuller channel theories.
5.2.1 Restall and Application
Restall’s move [59] is to identify α; β and α ◦ β. An equivalent statement of Rαβγ, given
his account of ◦, is α ◦ β v γ. This has some interesting features. One nice feature is
that we can carry over intuitions about composition in order to explain some features of
application, and hence the ternary relation. Barwise’s desiderata for composition, when
read in terms of ◦, are either built into the ternary relation semantics, or underwrite what
many take to be plausible axioms and arguments, understood in an information-theoretic
terms. Consider Barwise’s normality condition that 0; α = α = α; 0. For Restall’s reading
to capture this it must at least demand the following condition, where α ◦ (β ◦ γ) v δ holds
12While, for the purposes of generality, we consider non-reduced models, that is, models with multiple
normal points, in the remainder of §5.2 we follow Barwise and Restall in focusing on a distinguished normal
point, 0.
13For this desideratum and some discussion, see [4][19].
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just when there exists an ε s.t. α ◦ ε v δ and β ◦ γ v ε, and (α ◦ β) ◦ γ v δ just in case
some ε is s.t. α ◦ β v ε and ε ◦ γ v δ.
α ◦ β v γ⇔ (0 ◦ α) ◦ β v γ⇔ (α ◦ 0) ◦ β v γ
i.e.
Rαβγ⇔ R20αβγ)⇔ R2α0βγ.
Note, that Rαβγ ⇔ R20αβγ is immediate. For Rαβγ ⇒ R2α0βγ, some more robust
assumptions are required 14 but it is, perhaps, a plausible demand on this story.
For Restall, satisfying the desired associativity property, α; (β; γ) = (α; β); γ, involves
at least admitting:
(α ◦ β) ◦ γ v δ⇒ α ◦ (β ◦ γ) v δ i.e. R2αβγδ⇒ R2α(βγ)δ
which corresponds to (A12). In addition, in order to enforce the condition: α  A→ B
and β  B→ C imply α ◦ β  A→ C, one needs the condition:
(α ◦ β) ◦ γ v δ⇒ β ◦ (α ◦ γ) v δ i.e R2αβγδ⇒ R2β(αγ)δ
which corresponds to (A13). So, setting aside the concerns with our logic channels, the
weakest logic which can be given a Restall-style channel account is around the strength of
TW. 15
There are a couple of potential problems here.
1. ◦ is not functional, so given some appropriate α, β, α ◦ β is not unique.
14A far too strong one, for instance, being Rαβγ ⇒ Rβαγ, which collapses the distinction between →
and ← (see the semantics of this arrow below), and corresponds to the axiom A → ((A → B) → B).
Perhaps a more natural answer is just R0αβ⇒ Rα0β, which is somewhat weaker.
15Adding disjunction and negation to TW∧ involves adding the axioms A5–A9 of [65][287] in addition to
the contraposition axiom we consider in §6.
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2. This version renders the associativity of composition as a fairly substantial property,
corresponding to the provability of the B′ axiom (A→ B)→ ((B→ C)→ (A→
C)). On Restall’s scheme, one also gets the B axiom (A → B) → ((C → A) →
(C → B)), and so rules out some very weak logics as underwriting a channel theory.
However, its unclear how the provability of the axiom corresponding to this property
of composition is to be justified on channel-theoretic terms. The frame conditions
corresponding to B and B′ involve at least blurring the distinction between channels
and situations operated upon by channels.16
3. Surely composition and application are distinct operations with distinct notions, and
even if it makes sense to identify them, such an argument would need more detail
about how they operate separately.
4. The requirement that Rαβγ ⇒ R2α0βγ seems potentially problematic on the in-
tended reading, in that it seems to demand that we accept something like Rα0α
which is quite implausible, when understanding 0 as some kind of logic channel,
in line with Barwise. Why should it be that any channel given a logic channel as an
input produces itself?
In the rest of this paper, we shall be interested to develop an account more in line with
Barwise’s initial proposal. This proposal has quite broad applications, applying naturally
to classical, intuitionist, and some other logics, as Barwise showed, and as we shall show,
to an important fragment of the basic relevant logic B.




The ternary relation semantic framework set out in §5.1 by itself meets some of Barwise’s
desiderata for composition. In this section we shall show that important consequences of
the identity and associativity contraints are met.
The best way to proceed would be to define and fully work out the details of a compo-
sition operation or function on the ternary relation semantics of the type S2 −→ S. This
would involve defining an operation which interacts with R and v in ways which produce
the desired behaviour. The first demand is that for any pair of points in S there exists a
point which behaves as their composite. That is, for any α  A → B and β  B → C,
there is some α; β  A→ C.
First, however, we should set out just when a putative composite point is a channel
between some points. The following condition fits the bill:
∃ε(R2β(αγ)δ⇔ Rεγδ) (Existence of Composites)
We use α; β to name the ε for α, β in question. Then the above has the effect that
R2β(αγ)δ ⇔ R(α; β)γδ, so long as α; β exists. On the intended reading, R(α; β)γδ tells
us that there is some information one gets from applying α to γ which, when β is applied
to it, results in δ. That is, there is a chain of channels along which we can reason where we
take a signal γ for α, get its target, and then apply β to that target to get a situation which
supports the target of β, namely δ.
That this fits the bill is easy to see. Suppose that α  A → B and β  B → C. Then
since ∀γ∀δ(Rαγδ ⇒ (γ  A ⇒ δ  B)) and ∀ε∀ζ(Rβεζ ⇒ (ε  B ⇒ ζ  C)),
so there is an η s.t. Rαγη and Rβηδ and γ  A, then η  B and so δ  C after all. So
R(α; β)γδ⇒ (γ  A⇒ δ  C) as desired.
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We first present two preliminary results showing that if composite points are around in
the frame, they behave in much the way that Barwise wanted. In lieu of 0; α = α = 0; α,
we can show that something like Rαβγ⇔ R(0; α)βγ⇔ R(α; 0)βγ, where we generalise
to the non-reduced framework initially introduced. This shows that when α is a channel
from β to γ, then so is the composition of α with some normal point, which captures at
least part of the spirit of Barwise’s desideratum.
Theorem 5.3.1. IfM satisfies the existence of composites condition, then it also satisfies
Rαβγ⇔ ∃x ∈ NR(α; x)βγ⇔ ∃y ∈ NR(y; α)βγ.
Proof. Suppose that Rαβγ. Then we have that Rαβγ and ∃x ∈ N(Rxγγ), and thus
∃y∃x ∈ N(Rαβy & Rxyγ). That is, ∃x ∈ NR2x(αβ)γ.
Suppose that ∃x ∈ NR2x(αβ)γ. That is, ∃x ∈ N∃y(Rxyγ & Rαβy). Since x ∈ N
and Rxyγ, we have that y v γ, and so since Rαβy, it is the case that Rαβγ, by the tonicity
conditions on R.
So, we have that Rαβγ⇔ ∃x ∈ NR2x(αβ)γ, that is Rαβγ⇔ ∃x ∈ NR(α; x)βγ.
Suppose that Rαβγ. Note that ∃x ∈ NRxββ and hence ∃y∃x ∈ N(Rαyγ & Rxβy),
that is ∃x ∈ NR2α(xβ)γ.
For the other direction, note that if R2α(xβ)γ then ∃y s.t. Rαyγ and β v y, and so the
tonicity conditions on R guarantee that Rαβγ.
In a similar vein, we can show that the following important consequence of associativity
for composition holds in any ternary relation model:
Theorem 5.3.2. IfM satisfies the existence of composites condition, then it also satisfies
R(α; (β; γ))δε⇔ R((α; β); γ)δε
Proof. Suppose R(α; (β; γ))δε, that is R2(β; γ)(αδ)ε. So ∃ζ(R(β; γ)ζε & Rαδζ). So
∃ζ(R2γ(βζ)ε & Rαδζ). Thus ∃ζ(∃λ(Rβζλ & Rγλε) & Rαδζ). Hence, since λ does
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not occur in Rαδζ, we have that ∃ζ∃λ(Rβζλ & Rγλε & Rαδζ). So ∃λ(∃ζ(Rβζλ & Rαδζ)
& Rγλε). Thus ∃λ(R2β(αδ)λ & Rγλε). Hence ∃λ(R(α; β)δλ & Rγλε) and so
R2γ((α; β)δ)ε and so R((α; β); γ)δε.
The other direction is similar (just do the above proof ‘backwards’, so to speak).
You can understand this proof as essentially giving us that both R(α; (β; γ))δε and
R((α; β); γ)δε are equivalent to R3γ(β(αδ))ε (from simply pulling the two existential
quantifiers to the front as we did before). The series of equivalences can be nicely demon-
strated linearly:
R3γ(β(αδ))ε⇔ R2(β; γ)(αδ)ε⇔ R(α; (β; γ))δε
⇔ R2γ((α; β)δ)ε⇔ R((α; β); γ)δε.
Note that we only needed to appeal to the definition of R2 and R3, so nothing beyond
the basic definition of ternary relation models is needed for the result. So, these facts hold
even in B. So, our extension of the ternary relation framework by composite points will
have at least these desired features.
5.4 Adequacy of B∧ for Channel Models
Call a B∧ ternary relation model a channel model just in case it includes composite points
meeting our Existence of Composites condition from §5.3. The goal here is to prove that
the axiom system for B∧ is adequate, i.e. sound and complete, for channel models. From
this, one can obtain a conservative extension result that adding channel-composites to the
B∧ ternary relation model structure does not alter the validities of that structure. First,
make note of another salient adequacy fact.
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Theorem 5.4.1. The class of models in §5.1.1 is sound and complete with respect to B∧ as
in §5.1.2.
Proof. The proof can be found in Chapter 4 of [65], using essentially the canonical model
construction as set out below.
The composite points α; β, for some α, β, will have to include all the arrow statements
A → B s.t. α supports A → C and β supports C → B. This feature is captured by simply
incorporating the definition of R(α; β)γδ into something much like the usual valuation
clause for→:
α; β  A→ B iff ∀γ∀δ(R2β(αγ)δ⇒ (γ  A⇒ δ  B)).
These are the points added to a ternary relation model for B∧ to result in a channel
model. Essentially, all one needs to do to obtain a channel model from a B∧ model is to
outfit the set of situations in that model with the appropriate composite points.
Theorem 5.4.2. The class of channel models are sound with respect to B∧
Proof. This is obvious, as every channel model is a model of B∧.
Completeness is a bit more involved. Our strategy is to show that the canonical model
of B∧ is a channel model, and to do this, we need only show that each composite point is
already in the canonical set Sc of B∧ situations, which we’ll define shortly.
Definition 5.4.3. α is a B∧-theory just in case the following conditions hold:
• A, B ∈ α⇒ A ∧ B ∈ α
• (`B∧ A→ B & A ∈ α)⇒ B ∈ α
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Furthermore, α is a regular B∧-theory just in case α is a B∧-theory and
• `B∧ A⇒ A ∈ α
Definition 5.4.4. The canonical frame of B∧ is Fc = 〈Sc, Nc, Rc, 〉
• Sc is the set of B∧ theories.
• Nc is the set of regular B∧ theories.
• Rcαβγ⇔ ((A→ B ∈ α & A ∈ β)⇒ B ∈ γ).
To get the canonical modelMc = 〈Fc,c〉, we need add only the canonical valuation
as follows:
α c A⇔ A ∈ α.
In this setting, we are interested to find a point α; β in Fc which obeys the following
condition:
A→ B ∈ α; β⇔ ∀γ∀δ((R2β(αγ)δ & A ∈ γ)⇒ B ∈ δ).
The question of finding a point like this can be recast as one of whether one can take
a set of conditional formulae meeting this condition and build a B∧-theory out of it. Im-
portantly, the process of building a theory out of this set of conditionals must not involve
adding any conditionals beyond those added to satisfy the above condition. If this were
not to be the case, then one of these new conditionals A → B would not be such that
α  A → C and β  C → B. If we can build such a set without any additional condition-
als, then we’ll have shown that α; β is in the canonical model after all and behaves as we
want.
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5.4.1 Construction of α; β
We employ a standard theory construction. Let us begin with the following:
α; β0 = {A→ B | ∀γ∀δ(R2β(αγ)δ⇒ (A ∈ γ⇒ B ∈ δ))}.
To make sure α; β is a theory in the language, we need only add conjunctions as follows:
A, B ∈ α; βn ⇒ A ∧ B ∈ α; βn+1





5.4.2 Verification of α; β
Now, our concern is to verify that α; β is a B∧-theory after all. That it obeys the conjunction
property clearly falls out of the construction (conjunctive formulae only get in when both
conjuncts do). So, the remainder of the verification requires that we show that when A→ B
is a theorem of B∧, then A ∈ α; β ⇒ B ∈ α; β. First, we need some lemmata. The first is
reported by Dezani-Ciancaglini et al. in [25][210]:
Lemma 5.4.5 (Bubbling). Suppose `B∧
∧
i∈I
(Ai → Bi)→ (A→ B) for some propositions








Proof. See Barendregt et al. [3][933] and note that as we don’t have anything like >
matching their ω, so the initial non-identity clause, which would amount to B 6= > as in
[25], is unnecessary for our purposes. 17
17It is worth noting here that the proof given here bears a substantial resemblance to work done by Dunn
and Meyer to provide ternary relation semantics for Combinatory logic [28]. Indeed, Thanks are due to a
referee for noting this point of resemblance.
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It is easy to extend this lemma to an equivalence:







Bj → B. Then `B∧
∧
i∈I
(Ai → Bi)→ (A→ B).
Proof. The proof is completed in two stages. First is to show, in the ternary relation se-
mantics for B∧, that if for every x ∈ N, x  A→
∧
j∈J
Aj and x 
∧
j∈J
Bj → B then for every
x ∈ Nc x 
∧
i∈J
(Aj → Bj)→ (A→ B).
Suppose otherwise. That is, suppose that there exists α, β s.t. α v β and α  ∧
j∈J
(Aj →
Bj) and β 2 A → B. Thus, there are γ, δ s.t. Rβγδ and γ  A and δ 2 B. Since γ v γ
it follows that γ 
∧
j∈J
Aj, and so γ  Aj for each j ∈ J. The tonicity properties of R
guarantee that Rαγδ, and so δ  Bj for each j ∈ J. Hence, since δ v δ, we have that δ  B
after all. So, each x ∈ N must satisfy ∧
j∈J
(Aj → Bj)→ (A→ B).






Bj → B then `B
∧
j∈J
(Aj → Bj) → (A → B).
By (R3) `B (
∧
i∈I
(Ai → Bi) →
∧
j∈J
(Aj → Bj)) → (
∧
i∈I
(Ai → Bi) → (A → B))
follows. However, when J ⊆ I, ∧
i∈I
(Ai → Bi) →
∧
j∈J
(Aj → Bj) is provable with either
(A2) or (A3). Hence, if there exists J ⊆ I s.t. `B
∧
j∈J




(Ai → Bi)→ (A→ B).
Lemma 5.4.7. If `B∧ C then there exists some
∧
i∈I




for formulae with indeces from some I ⊆N.
Proof. Since `B∧ C, we know that C must not be an atomic formula. Similarly, since a
conjunction is provable in B∧ iff both conjuncts are provable, we can be sure that C does
not have an atomic formula as a conjunct. So C must have some complex structure, and
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every non-atomic formulae in the language {→,∧} has the desired structure, hence every
conjunction of non-atomic formulae in the language has the desired structure.
Theorem 5.4.8. (`B∧ A→ B & A ∈ α; β)⇒ B ∈ α; β
Proof. We proceed by structural induction on the proof of A→ B.
Base: A→ B is an instance of a B∧ axiom.
(A1) That A ∈ α; β⇒ A ∈ α; β follows from the fact that α; β is a set.
(A2) Suppose that A ∧ B ∈ α; β. Then at some stage n, A ∈ α; βn and B ∈ α; βn. If
A ∈ α; βn then A ∈ α; β. (A3) is similar.
(A4) Suppose that (A → B) ∧ (A → C) ∈ α; β. Suppose that A → (B ∧ C) /∈ α; β. So
∃γ, δ(R2c β(αγ)δ & A ∈ γ & B ∧ C /∈ δ). Since R2c β(αγ)δ and A ∈ γ, it follows
that B ∈ δ and C ∈ δ. By supposition, δ is a B∧-theory, and so B ∧ C ∈ δ after all.
Induction Step: Consider the cases when A → B is a result of an application of a B∧
rule to some other B∧ theorems. In particular, suppose that each premise to the application
of the rule is respected by α; β, for induction, and we’ll show that the consequence of the
rule application is respected by α; β.
(R2) Suppose that `B∧ C → (A→ B) and `B∧ C. From `B∧ C, Lemma 5.4.7 guarantees
that `B∧ C ↔
∧
i∈I
(Ai → Bi) for some collection of arrow formulae. Thus, the
replacement property guarantees that both `B∧
∧
i∈I




(Ai → Bi). Suppose that A ∈ α; β. Since `B∧
∧
i∈I
(Ai → Bi) → (A →







Bj → B. Under the supposition that both of these are
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respected by α; β, given by the equivalence in Lemmata 5.4.5 and 5.4.6, we have that∧
j∈J
Aj ∈ α; β and so each Aj ∈ α; β. By IH we have that Ai ∈ α; β ⇒ Bi ∈ α; β for
all i ∈ I, so for each j ∈ J, Bj ∈ α; β and so
∧
j∈J
Bj ∈ α; β. Thus B ∈ α; β.
(R3) Suppose that `B∧ A → B and `B∧ C → D and, in addition, that B → C ∈ α; β
and A → D /∈ α; β. By this last supposition, we have ∃γ∃δ(R2β(αγ)δ & A ∈
γ & D /∈ δ). It follows that B ∈ γ, since γ is a B∧-theory. Therefore, since
B→ C ∈ α; β, C ∈ δ, and so D ∈ δ as δ is a B∧-theory as well.
On our way to the conservative extension result, we note an additional result. Namely,
that whenever both α, β ∈ Nc, then α; β ∈ Nc. This is a straightforward result of the
construction, but one which guarantees that these composite points are not only around in
the frame, but are sensitive to the points of which they are composites.
Theorem 5.4.9. When α, β are regular B∧-theories, then so is α; β.
Proof. By supposition, we have that `B∧ A ⇒ A ∈ α ∩ β. Suppose that `B∧ A, to show
that A ∈ α; β. We have already shown that α; β is closed under the rules of the system, so
it is sufficient to our purposes to show that if α, β are normal, then α; β must contain each
axiom of the system, as the fact that α; β is a B∧ theory will ensure that anything provable
from the axioms is in α; β. Note that every axiom of B∧ has → as its main connective.
So, we need only consider the cases where the A in question is B → C, and show that
B→ C ∈ α; β when it a theorem.
Suppose that `B∧ B → C, ∃x(Rcβxδ & Rcαγx), α, β ∈ Nc, and B ∈ γ. Since
α ∈ Nc, we have that B → C ∈ α as `B∧ B → C. Since Rcαγx and B ∈ γ, we have
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that C ∈ x. Now, as β ∈ Nc, we have that C → C ∈ β, and so since Rcβxδ, we have that
C ∈ δ. Hence, B→ C ∈ α; β given the construction of α; β.
Corollary 5.4.10. ∃ε(R2c β(αγ)δ⇔ Rcεγδ)
Proof. We start by showing that R2c β(αγ)δ⇔ Rc(α; β)γδ.
First, for the left to right direction suppose that R2c β(αγ)δ and let α; β be in accordance
with the construction in §5.4.1. Theorems 5 and 6 show that the defined set is, indeed, a B∧
theory (which is regular if α, β are) – since Sc is the set of all B∧ theories, then, α; β ∈ Sc.
The construction ensures that Rc(α; β)γδ, and so R2c β(αγ)δ⇒ Rc(α; β)γδ.
Second, the right to left. Suppose that Rc(α; β)γδ. We want to show that ∃x(Rcαγx
& Rcβxδ). Let x′ = {B|∃A(A → B ∈ α & A ∈ γ)} – we can construct a theory
x from x′ using a construction very much like that given in §5.4.1. Note that we have
immediately that Rcαγx. Suppose, then, that A → B ∈ β & A ∈ x. Then, there is a C
s.t. C → A ∈ α & C ∈ γ. The construction of α; β guarantees that C → B ∈ α; β when
C → A ∈ α and A→ B ∈ β, so, since Rc(α; β)γδ and C ∈ γ, B ∈ δ. Hence Rcβxδ after
all, and thus R2c β(αγ)δ. So Rc(α; β)γδ⇒ R2c β(αγ)δ.
Thus, R2c β(αγ)δ⇔ Rc(α; β)γδ, and so ∃ε(R2c β(αγ)δ⇔ Rcεγδ).
Note that R2c β(αγ)δ ⇒ ∃εRcεγδ follows from Corollary 5.4.10. This is, perhaps, the
most natural statement that for any α, β standing in the correct relation, there is a composite
point in the canonical model.
Corollary 5.4.11. The logic characterised by the class of channel models conservatively
extends that characterised by the class of B∧ models.
Proof. Given Corollary 5.4.10, for any α, β in the B∧ canonical model, there exists a B∧
theory (which is regular whenever α, β are). That is, the canonical model satisfies the
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existence of composites property. So, the canonical model of B∧ is a channel model, and
hence the class of channel models is complete for B∧. Hence, the class of channel models
admits no validities not already admitted by the class of B∧ models, and so the extension
of the B∧ model structures by additional composite points is conservative over B∧.
The facts proven in §5.3 also provide an argument for the associativity and left/right
normality of our composition ‘operation’. Theorem 5.4.8 implies that Theorems 5.3.1 and
5.3.2 also hold in the canonical model (as they hold in any B∧-model). It is a key question
whether or not this construction continues to work in logics extending B∧.
This proof strategy, at very least, does not extend any further, due to its reliance on the
bubbling lemma. This lemma fails in B∧∨, more commonly referred to as B+, because it
includes all instances the following theorem for ∨:
`B+ ((A→ C) ∧ (B→ C))→ ((A ∨ B)→ C)
some instances of which are counterexamples to the bubbling lemma. 18 So, we can-
not extend this proof to cover any of the extensions of B∧ including the usual disjunction.
However we can say something interesting about other potential extensions of B∧ and how
composition as we have defined it operates in those logics. First, we can say something
about the question whether ; is commutative and idempotent under the intended interpre-
tation, and how our answers stack up against Restall’s. Second, there is a more serious
problem into which this approach runs as soon as we consider logics with negations obey-
ing a certain contraposition property.
18This can be seen by noting that, in general, 0B+ (A ∨ B)→ (A ∧ B).
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5.5 Idempotence and Commutativity of Composition
Whether α; α = α and α; β = β; α are interesting questions, and ones which Barwise
leaves open. Our concern here is to consider what results enforcing these conditions has
on our approach, as opposed to Restall’s. Unsurprisingly we get quite different answers,
and answers which provide some indication of the split in the approaches. We’ll display
some of the key differences, and reflect on which approach is more natural for the channel
theoretic interpretation.
α; α = α looks to be some kind of contraction principle. Understanding this condition
as Restall does, the most salient consequence of this is, in Restall’s notation, α ◦ α v α, or
more commonly Rααα, which corresponds with the axiom ((A → B) ∧ A) → B, which
we call WI. As has been known since at least [53], this theorem is bad news for the usual
naı̈ve theories, as it provides for a straightforward Curry paradox. This is an interesting re-
sult, and, understood in Restall’s terms, there is a nice story one can give for why this prin-
ciple ought to fail along channel-theoretic terms. However, understood in our terms, the im-
portant related upshot of this idempotence principle is Rαβγ⇔ R(α; α)βγ⇔ R2α(αβ)γ.
Under our interpretation, this is a somewhat different kind of ’reuse of resources’ than one
has in something like WI. With our interpretation, what this tells us is that exploiting a situ-
ation α qua-channel to get from β to γ is in no way different from exploiting α twice. This
is to be contrasted with what contraction allows, namely, that one can exploit a situation
qua-signal twice. In other words, that one can use the same proposition as a premise as
many times as one likes, with no change in the validity of the argument.
Consider not Rααα and WI, which is contraction ‘mixed’ with identity, but rather the
pure contraction axiom W: (A → (A → B)) → (A → B). The frame condition cor-
responding to this axiom is Rαβγ ⇒ R2αββγ. Using Restall’s notation, this comes to
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α ◦ β v γ ⇒ (α ◦ β) ◦ β v γ, which can naturally be read in terms of allowing the ex-
ploitation of an antecedent-supporting situation multiple times when it can exploited once.
Our way of cashing out composition provides for a kind of ’contraction’ of the channel
in use which is quite distinct from employing some premise information twice. Note that
Rαβγ ⇒ R2α(αβ)γ is a consequence of our precisification of the idempotence clause.
This frame condition corresponds to (A11):
((A→ B) ∧ (B→ C))→ (A→ C).
A natural reading of this formula, and its associated ternary relation condition, is that
whenever some situation supports two constraints A → B and B → C, then it must
also ‘act as its own composition’ and support A → C. This is, indeed, what Rαβγ ⇒
R(α; α)βγ most naturally gives us. That is, that when α is a channel from β to γ, so is
α; α. There may be reasons to accept this principle, perhaps resulting in a theory not too
dissimilar from that of [48], but it is at least not obvious.
Consider a channel understood is purely physical terms, as a part of the world which
connects some site of information to another site. Then employing a channel, as it were
by applying it to some signal, is one instance of application of that channel. If the same
channel supports A → B and B → C, it is at least questionable that one can pass across
both conditionals with only one application of the channel. 19
We leave off the interpretation for now simply to point out two interesting features
of this approach. These have to do with the interaction between → and the ← which is
available in this logical setting where we don’t have Rαβγ ⇒ Rβαγ. 20 Briefly, the
valuation clause for← is as follows:
19Thanks go to Dave Ripley for pushing me on this point.
20Details on this connective and its relation to → are available in many places, and [60] provides a nice
overview.
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α  B← A iff ∀β∀γ(Rβαγ⇒ (β  A⇒ γ  B)).
When we enforce idempotence for our composition, Rαβγ⇒ R(α; α)βγ, an immedi-
ate consequence is a contraction principle for←, namely:
((B← A)← A)→ (B← A).
This is noteworthy because of its connection to the commutativity of composition. An
immediate consequence of the commutativity of ; in our sense is:
R(α; β)γδ⇔ R(β; α)γδ (i.e. R2β(αγ)δ⇔ R2α(βγ)δ)
which enforces:
((C ← B)← A)→ ((C ← A)← B).
A kind of permutation for ←.21 However, there seems to be no obvious connection
to the frame conditions which enforce prefixing or suffixing for ←, i.e. R2α(βγ)δ ⇒
R2(αβ)γδ and R2α(βγ)δ ⇒ R2(αγ)βδ, respectively. This is an avenue for some future
work.
5.6 The Axiom Form of Contraposition
Something difficult happens here when we consider a common contraposition axiom, namely:
(A15) (A→ B)→ (¬B→ ¬A).
21These formulae also correspond to the associated ternary relation restrictions.
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Negation is generally interpreted in the ternary relation semantics for relevant logics by
means of an operation ∗ on worlds, the Sylvan-Plumwood star. [65] For the small point we
make here, it is enough to note that the valuation condition on negation in this semantics is
α  ¬A iff α∗ 2 A, and that the above axiom corresponds to the following frame condition:
(S15) Rαβγ⇒ Rαγ∗β∗
Note, given what we have up to this point, α; β does not provide what we want if we
are to consider logics including this axiom. Suppose that α  A → B and β  B → C,
so that α  ¬B → ¬A and β  ¬C → ¬B. We have α; β  A → C, but not necessarily
α; β  ¬C → ¬A.
Fact 5.6.1. If α; β  A→ B then β; α  ¬B→ ¬A
Proof. Suppose that α; β  A → B and β; α 2 ¬B → ¬A. Unpacking the latter, we have
∃γ∃δ(R2α(βγ)δ & γ  ¬B & δ 2 ¬A). Since γ  ¬B, we get that γ∗ 2 B and since
δ 2 ¬A, we have δ∗  A. Since R2α(βγ)δ) we know there is an ε s.t. Rαεδ & Rβγε.
Therefore, Rαδ∗ε∗ & Rβε∗γ∗, and thus R2β(αδ∗)γ∗. Since α; β  A → B and δ∗  A,
we get that γ∗  B, contrary to hypothesis.
If we impose merely Rαβγ ⇒ Rαγ∗β∗, what we get by assuming R2β(αγ)δ is not
R2β(αδ∗)γ∗, as we’d want, but rather R2α(βδ∗)γ∗. So, we don’t have:
R(α; β)γδ⇒ R(α; β)δ∗γ∗
but rather
R(α; β)γδ⇒ R(β; α)δ∗γ∗.
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One way to enforce the result we want is to enforce that R(α; β)γδ ⇒ R(β; α)γδ, but
this is a fairly hefty assumption, and hard to justify. At very least, I don’t see any intuitive
reason to think it holds.
For the general case, we need only to enforce:
R2α(βγ)δ⇒ R2α(βδ∗)γ∗
Now, we needn’t necessarily enforce the above commutativity principle to get this. The
question is, what does this add to the frames of logics containing DW?
This raises a more general question, namely, what should negation look like in channel
theory in the first place? While the ternary relation of the relevant semantics is fairly natural
in the channel-setting, the Sylvan-Plumwood star is another matter entirely. 22
5.7 Concluding Remarks
We have proven the main result, that one can supplement the ternary relation semantics
for B∧ with points behaving as the composites of other points in the frame. This is a
good first step to the larger project of fully laying out how Barwise’s initial approach to
channel theory helps to interpret the ternary relation semantics, but, as we have seen, there
are some difficulties ahead. Some, like extending the result to full B+, seem solvable, but
clearly require some other proof tactic. From there, one might hope that it is not a difficult
manner to extend the picture upwards into other positive logics gotten by extending B+ by
various additional axioms and rules. Incorporating negation into the picture, on the other
hand, seems to require some more foundational work before the formalism can get off the
ground.
22As are Dunn’s Perp [26] and Restall’s compatibility [61].
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In addition to these forward looking comments, as mentioned at the start of §5.2, the
work we have done here, though it is a step to giving us some insight into channel compo-
sition in relevant semantics, doesn’t yet settle the behaviour of this operation in any other
than purely extensional terms. Future work is certainly needed to expand the picture we’ve
given to one which provides a more robust insight into just what kind of critter this compo-
sition operation really is, and not just that we can find composites when we want them, at
least as far as B∧ is concerned.
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Chapter 6
The Implication Fragment of Frege’s
Grundgesetze
The propositional logic of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik [31] does not seem to be
the subject of much discussion in the Frege literature. Books and article which do discuss
Frege’s propositional logic tend to focus on Begriffsschrift, without expounding on the fact
that this earlier system differs in some key ways from the Grundgesetze system. In Begriffs-
schrift, there are two conditional axioms and two negation axioms, roughly corresponding
to Thinning (K), full Conditional Distribution (S), Contraposition, and Double Negation
elimination, and one rule, Modus Ponens.1 However, in Grundgesetze, there is only one
Basic Law governing each connective, and an expanded set of rules designed to shorten
and clarify inferences. One result is that while the system of Begriffsschrift is a standard
looking axiomatic presentation of classical logic, that of Grundgesetze is unusual.
Schroeder-Heister has claimed that the logic of Grundgesetze is a precursor to Gentzen’s
1The principles I’ve labelled K and S are displayed in §6.1, and since my focus is on the implication
fragment of the Grundgesetze logic, we shall not discuss the negation axioms beyond these introductory
remarks.
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sequent calculus, and has produced an elegant Gentzen system for the Grundgesetze rules.
[70] This way of understanding the Grundgesetze logic is englightening, but there are in-
teresting structural features of the system which stand to be made more explicit. For this
purpose, I shall employ a different kind of sequent calculus which permits a finer-grained
study of the structural features of the conditional at work.
First, I set out a standard axiom system for the implication fragment of classical logic,
pulling apart some key axioms which underwrite the kinds of structural rules employed in
sequent calculi. Then, I shall go through the axiom and rules of Grundgesetze, setting out
potential readings of the rules in modern terms, to settle on a collection of rules. Finally,
I shall present a sequent calculus for this system using techniques from structurally free
logics as developed in relevant and substructural logic.
6.1 K→: A Hilbert System
The following is a more or less standard axiom system for the implication fragment of
classical logic, namely, the system set out in [52].
Axioms
1. A→ (B→ A) K
2. (A→ (B→ C))→ ((A→ B)→ (A→ C)) S
3. ((A→ B)→ A)→ A Peirce’s Law
Rule
` A ` A→ B Modus Ponens` B
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This implication system is equivalent to Frege’s system from Begriffsschrift except for
the inclusion of Peirce’s Law. Indeed, Begriffsschrift is essentially the same system of pure
implication presented by Hilbert in [35]. That is, it includes K, in addition to axioms for
prefixing and suffixing (B and B′), permutation (C) and contraction (W), as listed below.
As is well known, axioms K and S in the presence of MP present a structurally complete
theory of implication. That is, all of the usual results of a full set of structural rules in a
single-succedent sequent calculus are admissible. These rules roughly correspond to the
following theorems, here expressed again with combinator names reflecting their status as
the principle type schemata of their associated combinators:2
1. (A→ B)→ ((C → A)→ (C → B)) B
2. (A→ B)→ ((B→ C)→ (A→ C)) B′
3. (A→ (B→ C))→ (B→ (A→ C)) C
4. (A→ (A→ B))→ (A→ B) W
5. A→ A I
I shall follow Curry [24] in referring to the system including these formulae as axioms
and MP as Absolute Implication; it is the implication fragment of Intuitionist logic. This
system happens to have the same set of theorems as the implication fragment of Grund-
gesetze, although the particular construction of the theory is interestingly, importantly dif-
ferent. I shall set out Frege’s system to compare with standard axiomatic treatments of
absolute implication as compared to a standard sequent calculus treatment of the same
theory. The result is that Frege’s system much more closely corresponds to the latter, in
particular due to his rule corresponding to B and B′.
2See [10] for a modern introduction to combinatory logic.
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6.2 G→: Axiom and Rules Variants
I shall set out Frege’s axiom and rules, distinguishing potential readings of the rules to draw
out the peculiarly sequent-like features of his generalised rules. 3
6.2.1 Basic Law I
A→ (B→ A) A→ A
Basic law I has two components, corresponding to K and I above. This second form of
Basic law I is an immediate instance of the contraction rule, but it is so often used that Frege
includes it as a basic form to shorten the proofs. For my purposes, it is more convenient to
avoid using the full form of basic law I and focus only on K or I as necessary.
6.2.2 Permutation of subcomponents
This permutation rule is designed to recapture the key inferences permitted by the principal
type scheme of C,
namely (A → (B → C)) → (B → (A → C)). However, the statement of the rule
is somewhat unclear. I’ll distinguish instances of the permutation rule by C with number
subscripts. One very natural, modern, reading of this rule is as follows:
` A→ (B→ C)
C1` B→ (A→ C)
3It should be noted that modern informal interpretations of this system, and the system to be developed
later in the paper, are not quite Frege’s, as Frege had a very different conception of the logical vocabulary
from that which is common now. I focus only on cases where complex formulae involved are those whose
components are propositions, setting aside the additional formalism Frege put in place to ensure that any
terms could be connected by the logical vocabulary.
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Simply, when given a theorem of the form shown in the premise of the rule, which is
the antecedent of C, one may derive a theorem with the form of the conclusion. However,
this does not appear to be Frege’s rule. His statement, given in the summary of the rules,
§48 of Grundgesetze, is the following:
Subcomponents of the same proposition may be pe- rmuted with one another
arbitrarily. [31][61]
A subcomponent for Frege is essentially an antecedent of a conditional. Consider the




Frege tells us that this can be read so that C is the supercomponent while A and B are
subcomponents or so that
C
B
is the supercomponent and A is the subcomponent. This provides flexibility, as one can
instantiate formulae into the rule more or less without restriction. That is, one can apply the
rule to a conditional formula with arbitrarily many antecendents, at least so long as it has a
right-associated structure. As such, the standard reading of the rule, see [31][A-20–A-22]
is the following:
` A0 → (. . . Ai → (. . . Aj→ (. . . An → B) . . . ) C2` A0 → (. . . Aj → (. . . Ai → (. . . An → B) . . . )
However, there is a contextually sensitive variant of the rule in the area. Note that in the
short statement of the rule Frege uses “proposition”, which might allow the following rule,
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where Γ[A] signifies that A is some a particular instance of a formula which is a component
of Γ, a complex formula:
` Γ[A→ (B→ C)]
C3` Γ[B→ (A→ C)]
Now, clearly these rules are of differing strength, against a structurally free background.
C3 allows for the proofs of strictly more formulae than C2, and that more than C1. To see
the difference between C1 and C2, consider a theorem of the form A → (B → (C →
D))). Clearly either rule will license the inference to B → (A → (C → D))). However
C2 will also license the inference to
A → (C → (B → D))), while C1 by itself will not. C3 licences both of these, in
addition to inferences such as (A → (B → C)) → D ` (B → (A → C)) → D
and similar sequents, which C2 does not. In the presence of the provability of B or S,
the distinction between these rules collapses, as instantiation into such forms provides the
necessary manipulation of nested conditionals.
The most plausible of these rules as that of Grundgesetze is C2.4 Every example Frege
provides is to a formula, preceded by `, with the right-association form required by C2.
In addition, the use of “Satz”, which is rendered “proposition” in [31], is generally used to
refer to judged formulae, namely, theorems of the system. So, C3 is rendered dubious by
Frege’s use of terminology. 5
It is worth noting that from Basic Law I (BLI) and C2 or C3, one can easily prove the
axiom form C given an appropriate instance of I.
4See, for instance, the treatment in Roy Cook’s appendix to [31]
5To show fully that C2 is Frege’s rule, one would need to go through the proofs given throughout Grund-
gesetze to ensure that no instances of Permutation are licensed only by C3. This is a daunting task as there
might be inferences which resemble those allowed by C3 which are made by appeal to other rules. Frege’s
notation for showing applications of rules allows for such applications to be chained together in a way which
makes this far from an easy task, and for now we shall suppose that C2 is the rule.
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` (A→ (B→ C))→ (A→ (B→ C))
C2` (A→ (B→ C))→ (B→ (A→ C))
So, in this case, one can easily prove the axiom from the rule.
6.2.3 Fusion of equal subcomponents
The short statement of the rule given in §48 is as follows:
A subcomponent that occurs repeatedly in the same proposition only needs to
be written once.[31][61]
Again, the natural interpretation is that of a generalized contraction rule. In keeping
with our previous numbering, I’ll formally state this rule as:
` A0 → (· · · → (Ai → . . . (Ai → (. . . An → B) . . . ) W2` A0 → (· · · → (Ai → (. . . An → B) . . . )
An instance of this rule is the more familiar:
` A→ (A→ B)
W1` A→ B
Note that W1 has all the same consequences as W2 in the presence of C2. Given a theorem
of the form of the premise of W2, one can simply permute antecedents to bring the two
instances of the same antecedent to the far left of the formula, where one can then apply
W1.
In either case, using W1 along with C2 or just using W2, one can derive the axiom form
from an obvious instance of I.
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6.2.4 Modus Ponens
Again, Frege states his MP rule in general terms.
` Ai ` A0 → (. . . Ai → (. . . An → B) . . . ) MP2` A0 → (. . . An → B) . . . )
The most familiar instance instance of this rule follows:
. ` A ` A→ B MP1` B
Similarly to the above, MP1 has the same consequences as MP2 in the presence of C2.
6.2.5 Hypothetical Syllogism
As above, the HS rule is designed for generality, and hence becomes rather long in a our
presentation. I shall instead state it linearly, rather than in a proof-tree format. Read the
presentation below as follows – if (1) and (2) are theorems, then the formula following the
∴ sign is a theorem.
(1) C1 → (· · · → (Cn → Ai) . . . )
(2) A1 → (. . . Ai → (. . . An → B) . . . )
∴ A1 → (. . . C1 → (. . . Cn → (. . . An → B) . . . )
This rule essentially allows one to replace an instance of some antecedent Ai in a con-
ditional with C1, . . . Cn when you have a proof of Ai from C1 . . . Cn. However, there are
tricky details involved with how the replacement occurs. What is being done is that in
formula (2), the occurrence of Ai is being deleted, and the symbol string “C1 → (· · · →
(Cn → ” is inserted so that Ai−1 (the immediate antecedent of Ai) is the immediate an-
tecedent of C1, and that Ai+1 is the immediate consequent of Cn. With this string included,
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the other antecedents of formula (2) continue in the same order as before the application of
the rule. It is precisely this feature which is important, and we shall provide some examples
of applications of this rule in this and the following section.
A first-degree (with only on occurrence of →) instantiation of this rule resembles B′,
as presented below:
` A→ B ` B→ C HS1` A→ C
However, this more natural reading fails to capture the results of Frege’s rule in one key
regard. While HS1 does something like a single cut rule in a sequent calculus, HS2 does
the same job while, at the same time preserving the structure of the antecedents allowing
for the proof of the cut formula, Ai. Consider a relatively simple instance of this rule:
` A→ (B→ C) ` D → (C → E)
` D → (A→ (B→ E))
Note that the nesting of the antecedent conditionals in the left premise are preserved
in the conclusion. This is is key to providing the full system with the power necessary to
produce absolute implication.
6.2.6 Full G→
So, as noted, the more generalized formulations of the rules other than Permutation and
Hypothetical syllogism are derivable from their ungeneralized variations in the presence of
C2. That is, K plus C2 W2 MP2 HS2 has the same set of theorems as K plus C2 W1 MP1
HS2. Using the weaker variant rule for C or HS would result in a strictly weaker system,
and one which is, strictly, substructural.
A result of G→ which is not a result of any proper subsystem is shown easily in the
following, which is an instance of the inference shown in §6.2.5. I’ll use Ḃ to pick out
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the ‘cut formula’, as it were. This is to say, the formula Ḃ is that in common between the
antecedent of the formula on the rightmost ‘leaf’ of the proof tree and the consequent of
the formula on the leftmost ‘leaf’.
` (A→ B)→ (A→ Ḃ) ` (A→ (B→ C))→ (Ḃ→ (A→ C))
HS2` (A→ (B→ C))→ ((A→ B)→ (A→ (A→ C)))
W2` (A→ (B→ C))→ ((A→ B)→ (A→ C))
This is a proof of the axiom S which nicely displays the way in which HS2 is a powerful
rule and which, as I’ll set out in a later section, can naturally be read as a cut rule in a
sequent calculus. Before that, however, we should give some more indication of what G→
amounts to. We know that K and S are provable, so it is at least Absolute Implication.6 To
properly pin down precisely what system the implication of Grundgesetze amounts to, one
would need to consider the various intermediate logics, which strays somewhat beyond the
intended scope of this work. It is, however, an interesting open question.
6.3 Grundgesetze as Sequent Calculus and HS2 as Cut
Schroeder-Heister, in [70] (and earlier noted these issues in an abstract [69]), has developed
a reading of the propositional logic of Grundgesetze in terms of a sequent calculus with the
following axioms and rules7:
Axioms
A ` A A, B ` A
6Note that from K, S, and the usual modus ponens rule all of the implication principles considered so far
beside Peirce’s Law are provable.
7I ignore trivial differences in notation.
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Rules
Γ, A ` B → IΓ ` A→ B
Γ ` A→ B → RΓ, A ` B
Γ ` A Per.
Γ′ ` A
Γ[A . . . A] ` B
Contr.
Γ[A] ` B
Where Γ′ is an arbitrary permutation of Γ, and the conclusion of Permutation includes
some fewer instances of A in the list Γ of premises than in the Γ occurring in the premise.
Perhaps an even more straightforward way to state this is to simply treat the premise as a
set, as opposed to a sequence or other structured entity, where arbitrary permutations and
contractions fall out of the data type. His final rule is a standard form of Single Cut.
Γ ` A ∆, A ` B
CutΓ, ∆ ` B
However, it seems that this proof system skates over the interestingly strong presen-
tation of HS. As usual with Gentzen-style sequent calculi, the structural features of the
conditional codified by B and B′ are packed into the structural connective in a way which
obscures their role. So, I develop a system which draws out the particular features of HS2.
6.3.1 LG→
This calculus, LG→ draws on Structurally Free Logics developed by Dunn and Meyer
[28].8 The key feature of these calculi is that the structural connective ; is designed to build
in no structural features beside those enforced by rules.9 So, for instance, in a standard
Gentzen-style sequent calculus B is provable without appeal to any of the structural rules.
8§5.2 in Bimbó [11] is an excellent source on these calculi.
9In Dunn and Meyer’s work, one then adds explicit combinators the effects of which are the structural
rules corresponding to them. The relationship between this system and their systems is one of inspiration
only – I don’t give a structurally free system here.
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This is not the case in the calculus we develop. This shows the way in which G→ proofs
rely on the particular statement of the rules, and showcases the way in which HS2 features
as cut.
The connective ; is dyadic, and we read a sequent Γ; ∆; Θ ` A as left associated, that
is as (Γ; ∆); Θ ` A, where Γ, ∆, Θ are (possibly empty) structures of varying complexity.
We shall keep the brackets to explicitly show the structure of antecedents.
Axiom
A; Γ ` A
Rules
Γ ` A ∆[B] ` C
→`∆[A→ B; Γ] ` C
Γ; A ` B `→Γ ` A→ B
(Γ; ∆); Θ ` A
C2(Γ; Θ); ∆ ` A
(Γ; ∆); ∆ ` A
W2Γ; ∆ ` A
Γ ` A ∆[A] ` B
HS2∆[Γ] ` B
The string ∆[A] occurring in the presentation of HS2 is intended to pick out the location
of A in ∆, including its nesting in the parentheses. This is important in the intended reading
of ∆[Γ]. As with ∆[A], this is intended to indicate that the elements of Γ, in their order,
are to be plugged into the previous location of A, where the resulting formula remains
left-associated, with the elements of Γ appropriately distributed. Consider the following
example:
A; (B; C) ` D E : D ` F
(((E; A); B); C ` F
The structure in the antecedent of the sequent which results from the application of the
rule, now left associated, can be operated upon freely by the other rules.
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This statement of the sequent rule is to make the rule accurately match Frege’s HS2,
which results in formulae which are right-associated conditionals. The result of an applica-
tion of Frege’s HS2 results in well-formed, right-associated conditionals, just as the result
of the sequent HS2 rule results in a left-associated structure in the antecedent which can be
manipulated with rules which naturally match Frege’s other rules. This is some indication
of the way in which this rule is not standard cut rule but something stronger, which affects
the structure in a way which forces the kinds of B-manipulations displayed above. The
usual structurally free B rule is as follows:
Γ; (∆; Θ) ` A
(Γ; ∆); Θ ` A
It’s this rule which mimics prefixing, and our HS2 rule, matching Frege’s rule, builds
this B behaviour into its construction. This is as opposed to building the B-features into the
structural connective, as with a set-like structural connective is a standard Gentzen system.
For instance, consider the following instance of HS2 which, after preliminary applications
of→`, precisely mimics the proof of S given above.
A ` A B ` B
A→ B; A ` B
B ` B C ` C
B→ C; B ` C A ` A
(A→ (B→ C); A); B ` C
C2(A→ (B→ C); B); A ` C
HS2
((A→ (B→ C); A→ B); A); A ` C
W2
(A→ (B→ C); A→ B); A ` C
`→ x3` (A→ (B→ C))→ ((A→ B)→ (A→ C))
It is not just that there is a translation between the axioms and conclusion formu-
lae. This is true of Schroeder-Heister’s sequent calculus, using a standard translation
of A1, . . . , An ` B as A1 → (· · · → (An → B) . . . ). LG→ clearly also proves
A → (B → A), and it seems clear that such a formula translation is also available here.
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Simply read (A1; A2); A3 ` B as A1 → (A2 → (A3 → B)), and expand to more for-
mula as expected. An advantage of LG→ over Schroeder-Heister’s system is that it more
faithfully reproduces the proofs available in Frege’s system. There is an obvious translation
available between Grundgesetze-proofs and proofs in LG→, where the latter mimic just the
same moves that are permitted in G.
As set out, HS2 clearly functions as a cut rule, though it has the extra feature of enforc-
ing prefixing and suffixing behaviour. With HS2, we have the following derivation:
A ` A B ` B
A→ B; A ` B
B ` B C ` C
B→ C; B ` C
(B→ C; A→ B); A ` B
` (B→ C)→ ((A→ B)→ (A→ C))
This corresponds to the Frege proof, where the notation Ḃ is as above. 10
(A→ B)→ (A→ Ḃ) (B→ C)→ (Ḃ→ C)
(B→ C)→ ((A→ B)→ (A→ C))
The essential feature is just the B-like manipulation allowed. This is the most natural
available proof in Frege’s axiom system, and one which the sequent system naturally repro-
duces. This points out an interesting additional features of the hypothetical syllogism rule
which utilising a polyadic structural connective, like Schroeder-Heister’s comma, obscures.
6.3.2 Pulling out the T Rule
Our C2 rule is stated to allow for one of the structures on the left of the turnstile to be
possibly empty. To make this point more explicit, let us set out the following additional,
redundant, rule T:11
10Note that the other instance of B occurring in the upper right formula cannot be the cut formula. This is
clear from the statement of Frege’s rule, as the first instance B → C in (B → C) → (B → C) is itself an
antecedent.
11The implication formula associated with this rule and combinator is A → ((A → B) → B) which is
clearly a kind of permutation principle.
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Γ; ∆ ` A
T∆; Γ ` A
T immediately allows the proof of B and B′, and makes HS2 redundant as one can then
prove K and S without appeal to HS2 (though with appeal to MP2). Consider the following
derivation:
A ` A B ` B
A→ B; A ` B C ` C
B→ C; (A→ B; A) ` C
T
(A→ B; A); B→ C ` C
C
(A→ B; B→ C); A ` C
A→ B; B→ C ` A→ C
From this end-sequent, one can, of course, prove either the B axiom or the B′ axiom
using the T rule. So, we have the axioms K, W, C, and B provable and modus ponens as a
rule of proof. This means that S is indeed provable, and all these without use of HS2.
So, the LG→ calculus as presented has it that the HS2 rule is redudant. This provides
an immediate, interesting upshot. While Frege provided the extra rule for hypothetical
syllogism, and, as we have suggested, prefigured the kind of cut principle later employed
by Gentzen, this was, formally speaking, strictly unnecessary. He, like Gentzen, could
have done without this rule, providing only the modus ponens rule, the K axiom, and his
generalised C and W rules. Frege seems to have been lead by the desire to reproduce the
inferential work done by the implication axioms in his Begriffsschrift by means of adding
generalised rules, he wound up making a mistake we might have expected in producing a
redundant rule set. However, the redundancy points to an interesting feature of his proof
system, and one about which either he didn’t know, or of which he chose to make no
comment.
This result does not undermine the fact that this treatment of the hypothetical syllogism
rule as enforcing prefixing and suffixing behaviour sheds some light on how the proof
system fits together. It is very clear that Frege’s proof system is, finally, an axiom system,
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which manipulates formulae, and for the most part implication formulae. This is a key
formal difference between Frege’s system and sequent-style systems, which operate on
arguments. The insight provided by studying this logic in terms of the binary structural
connective of structurally free logics is to, as closely as possible, mimic the behaviour of
the binary conditional connective in which Frege carried out his proofs.
6.4 Conclusion
I have sought to clarify just how the structural features of Frege’s conditional are produced
by his rules, with a particular focus on his hypothetical syllogism rule and considered some
ways in which does and does not resemble Gentzen’s cut rule. As with all implication
systems, structural features of Frege’s conditional rules set out key features of how the proof
system operates, and there is more to be said about how Frege’s system is interestingly
novel in building such features in. While his proof system is not a sequent calculus12, one
can capture key elements of his proof system using this formalism which sheds light on the
interesting and unique system which Frege did develop. Frege’s work prefigured the key
role that cut plays in proofs, and seems to have noticed some subtle structural features of
the conditional some decades before these same features were more explicitly specified by,
for instance, Russell [67], Schönfinkel [68], or Curry [24]. While, perhaps not surprising,
it is some indication that Frege, in the Grundgesetze, may have been aware of some subtle
proof-theoretic issues not carefully studied for some decades after the publication of his
work.
12Clearly the intended reading of his conditional is not as inferences or inference tickets, but as the name
of a truth value, namely, The True in the case of theorems of the system.
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